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An Abstract of
THE IMPORTANCE OF DIAGNOSIS IN IMPLEMENTING
SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
:
FIVE CASE STUDIES
by
Sylvia I. Carter
Directed by: Kenneth H. Blanchard
Today the crisis of leadership pervades our institutions. An
organization’s survival or failure depends greatly on its leadership.
Accelerating technological changes and growing sophistication of our
work forces have created new demands on today’s leaders. Those
responsible for organizational growth and prosperity need new models
to help them understand the complex nature of leadership.
The Life Cycle Theory (LCT) of leadership formulated by Paul
Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard is a model which attempts to identify
some of the major elements in the leadership function and organize
them into a framework for diagnosing the appropriate leadership style
for a given situation. The purpose of this study is to test the
usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic framework for
effective leadership by applying it to five published case studies of
organizational change acknowledged for their success or failure.
The Life Cycle Theory is based on the Ohio State leadership
studies which identified two fundamental dimensions of leadership
vii
behavior, and concluded that "initiating structure" and "consideration
for People" are not mutually exclusive, but that a leader may exhibit
both behaviors in varying degrees. These two behaviors were plotted on
two separate axis, forming a grid which contains four basic leader
styles.
Hersey and Blanchard renamed the two leadership behaviors "task"
and "relationships" behaviors. They added a "maturity continuum" to the
grid. This continuum refers to subordinates task relevant maturity.
In order to diagnose a subordinate's level of "maturity", a leader must
take into account 1) their achievement motivation, 2) their willingness
and ability to perform the task, 3) their task relevant education and/or
experience. Once a leader has determined the subordinate's level of
"maturity" according to these variables, he or she, can select the
leadership style most appropriate to the subordinates’ needs.
A summary of each case precedes a final analysis. Each phase
of the case, before, during and after change, is analyzed according to
the analytic framework to discover if the style of leadership used by
the key leader was appropriate for the particular situation.
Anatomy of Educational Innovation by L. Smith and p. Keith
examines the unsuccessful attempt to create an open school. Behind the
Front Page by C. Argyris chronicles failure in a major American news-
paper. Making Waves In Foggy Bottom by A. Marrow described successful
and unsuccessful change in the State Department. Organizational Change:
The Effect of Successful Leadership by H. Guest describes how an auto-
mobile assembly plant was brought from last to first place in its
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division. Management fry Participation by A. Marrow, D. Bowers and
S. Seashore describes successful change in the garment industry.
In conclusion, five issues emerge from the study:
1. Leaders of successful change programs showed
flexibility of style.
2. In cases of unsuccessful change, inadequate
technical systems were not improved; attention
was paid only to human systems.
3. The T-Group approach to organizational change
was extremely unsuccessful.
4. Successful change was always preceded by
recognition of organizational crisis, which
brought to the fore an awareness and acceptance
of inappropriate leadership. In unsuccessful
cases, crisis either did not exist, or was not
acknowledged.
5. As a diagnostic model, the Life Cycle Theory is
subject to much individual interpretation. Its
ultimate usefulness depends on the diagnostic
skills of the practitioner.
While the Life Cycle Theory provides a useful framework for
diagnosing appropriate leadership in a given situation, it is still in
its initial stages of development and needs further research to provide
a more accurate measurement of "maturity'’ . In the last analysis, the
Life Cycle Theory is a forerunner in the field of situational leadership.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
Leadership is a principal cause of organizational survival or
failure. Today, the crisis of leadership is becoming ever more serious
in our governmental, industrial, and educational institutions. This
study offers a particular perspective on leadership that might provide
some help to those responsible for organizational growth and prosperity.
The relatively new practice of assisting organizations in their
growth, called Organizational Development (OD) , began to develop in the
early thirties, and has grown greatly over the last decade. Hersey and
Blanchard (1975) define it as:
planned change—an effort to increase the overall
effectiveness of an organization or organizational
unit [p. 14].
Although an organization is composed of technical and human systems,
traditionally OD practitioners have tended to emphasize the human
system
and the human relations approach when attempting change.
This approach however, has had its difficulties. In
a 1967
study of successful and unsuccessful attempts at
organizational change,
Buchanan was unable to find any crucial issues
common to the successes
and failures. He concluded that one of the
reasons for this was that
all ten cases he studied represented "a
similar people approach to OD
[p. 66]." Schein and Bennis (1965) are
concerned that the emphasis on
2a cohesive, leaderless democracy. They feel that as a result of lab-
oratory training, people should be able to choose with greater knowledge
what forms or practice might be most appropriate; for example, that
under certain conditions, "autocracy might be more appropriate [p. 329]."
Many practitioners, such as Margulies and Raia (1972) have begun
to call for a greater variety of approaches to OD. Finding that in
actual practice, "most practitioners tend to focus on the personal-
cultural subsystems, and merely pay lip service to technological and
administrative changes [p. 477]," they suggest that OD techniques
developed to date show an over-emphasis on the human aspect. If OD is
truly to use a system approach to organizational effectiveness and
change, then, they state, the practitioner must make an effort to make
use of alternative change strategies. Ultimately, interventions to
bring about organizational change will be concerned with the style of
leadership directing the change(s) in the organization. As the
theoreticians above have argued, leadership should vary according to
the unique needs of each organization.
Hersey and Blanchard (1972) have built on existing situational
approaches to leadership in developing the Life Cycle Theory of leader-
ship. This method is used as a diagnostic tool in organizational
development. A brief background of the Life Cycle Theory follows. The
Ohio State Leadership studies (1945) described leadership according to
two dimensions of initiating structure and consideration. From these
studies, Blake and Mouton (1964) developed their Managerial Grid which
3describes five types of leadership styles based on. ’concern for people.’
and. 'concern for production'. The Tri-Dimensional Leadership Effec-
tiveness model as described by Hersey and Blanchard (1972), grows out of
these previous studies. In the Tri-Dimensional model, leader style is
related to an effectiveness dimension. The Life Cycle Theory of leader-
ship is an outgrowth of the Tri-Dimensional model. This situational
theory attempts to relate task behavior and relationship behavior of the
leader, and maturity level of the followers. In so doing, the theory
attempts to provide a leader with some understanding of the relation-
ships between an effective style of leadership and the level of maturity
of his or her followers. While Life Cycle Theory emphasizes appropriate
leader behavior, Hersey and Blanchard have also used this theory as a
framework to integrate many of the motivational and change theories
available in the literature.
Purpose of the Study
This study will attempt to determine the usefulness of Hersey
and Blanchard's Life Cycle Theory of leadership as a diagnostic method
for determining the most appropriate leadership style in a given
organizational situation. In order to accomplish this, five cases of
organizational change taken from the literature, both successful and
unsuccessful, will be described and analyzed according to an analytic
framework. This framework will contain all of the variables of the
Life
Cycle Theory and some variables from related situational leadership
theories. In each case, we will attempt to see if the Life
Cycle Theory
accounts for the success or failure of the leader's
attempt at change.
4Significance of the Study
1. There is a need for a situational approach in OD interven-
tions. Hopefully this study will examine the Life Cycle Theory as one
useful situational approach.
2. Case studies are an important tool in furthering the
development of the field of organizational development research. As
Giaquinta and Bernstein (1971) observe, case studies provide an in depth
observation of the efforts to institute planned change. As such they
are useful to the future efforts of OD practitioners.
3. It is important to continue research in the field of
organizational change. As Schein and Bennis (1965) note,
In some organizational change programs a great deal
of attention is being paid to research, but not
enough research is yet being done [p. 323].
In particular, it is important to investigate the applicability of any
diagnostic framework; thus the examination of the Life Cycle Theory
which will be undertaken in this study.
4. The length of a case description and analysis has been
deliberately limited to around twenty pages each in order to provide a
set of cases of practical usefulness to the practitioner in classroom
or workshop settings. It is the hope of the writer that this study
will be used in the field, to make this theory "come alive" for people.
Delimitations of the Study
1. Because the writer will be dealing with already recorded
case studies, knowledge of the interventions will be second hand.
52. Each case study written contains the personal biases of the
author of the case, as well as the writer of this study. Schmuck and
Miles (1971) note the problem arising from this method of case writing:
Most OD practitioners are not researchers: they do not
systematically evaluate the outcome of interventions
except in informal ways Most OD consultants collect
information from clients in the manner of an 'artistic
clinician' [p. 231].
Buchanan, after his study of a number of OD interventions, noted that
the information required to determine crucial issues in OD interventions
was often not included in case reports because of what the writer was
willing to reveal about his or her own work, or because of what the
organization would allow the writer to record.
3. The Life Cycle Theory of leadership has not yet been fully
researched. As a result, one cannot claim that it encompasses the
total spectrum of organizational problems.
4. All of the dimensions of the Life Cycle Theory have not yet
been defined through research and operationalized. Hence the practi-
tioner must use subjective judgment to utilize the Life Cycle model.
Organization of the Study
This study will be divided into seven chapters. The present
chapter introduces the study. Chapter two will outline a background of
leadership theory, tracing the development of two theoretical schools of
thought: one, that there is one best style of leadership in all situa-
tions, and two, that leadership is relative to the situation. Chapter
three will describe the Life Cycle Theory of leadership, a situational
theory which postulates a method for diagnosing the situation so that
6the most appropriate leadership style can be selected. Chapter four
develops an analytic framework which is used to analyze the cases under
consideration. Chapter five describes and analyzes two unsuccessful
cases, and one mixed success case of organizational change:
Case 1: Education Anatomy of Educational Innovation, hy
Louis M. Smith and Pat M. Keith. This
case describes an unsuccessful attempt
to create an open school.
Case 2: Business Behind the Front Page, by Chris Argyris.
This case describes Argyris' unsuccess-
ful three year attempt to bring about a
participative management system in a
major U. S. newspaper.
Case 3: Government Making Waves In Foggy Bottom, by Alfred
J. Marrow. This case describes two
unsuccessful attempts, and one success-
ful attempt to reorganize the United
States Department of State.
Chapter six describes and analyzes two successful cases or organizational
change:
Case 4: Business Organizational Change: The Effect of
Successful LeadershiD. bv Robert Guest.
This case describes how a plant manager
brought an automobile assembly plant
from last to first place in its
division.
Case 5: Business Management bv Participation . bv Alfred J.
Marrow, David G. Bowers, and Stanley E.
Seashore. This case describes how the
Harwood company brought the Weldon
company from failure to success.
7CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Introduction
Applied behavioral scientists have been of two minds concerning
leadership. One school of thought, the older, has held that leadership
is absolute, and that there is one best style of leadership in all
circumstances. Beginning in the early thirties, the generally humanis-
tic and democratically oriented practitioners beloning to this school
emphasized interpersonal relations and democratic leadership as the key
to improving organizations. The other newer school of thought which
began in the forties, and has gained momentum over the last decade,
holds that leadership is relative to the situation. Practitioners in
this school argue for a systems approach to Organizational Development
with an emphasis on situational leadership.
This chapter will be divided into two parts. Since chronolog-
ically writers who view leadership as absolute, dependent solely on the
characteristics of the leader, preceed those who view leadership as
relative, Part One will outline some of the concepts that fall under
the category of leadership as absolute. Part Two will describe
some of
the concepts of situational leadership. This order is
summarized in
the following flow chart. (See Figure 1.)
8LEADERSHIP ABSOLUTE
Traditional
Leadership Theory
To 1900
Human Relations
Leadership Theory
1930
White and Lippitt
Autocratic - Democratic -
Laissez-Faire Leadership
1940
Fleishman and Harris
Human Relations Training
in Industry
1950
Likert
Participative Management
I960
Blake and Mouton
Managerial Grid
LEADERSHIP SITUATIONAL
Hemphill
Leadership depends on
Group
Fiedler Korrnan
Contingency Criticism
Theory of Fiedler
Lawrence and Lorsch
Integration - Differentiation
Theory
Lowin and Craig
Farris and Lim
Leadership depends on Followers
Figure 1. Theory Flow Chart for Chapter Two
9This chapter has three purposes. The brief history of leader-
ship theory presented here will show the development of leadership
theory and approaches to Organizational Development to the present.
Today, behavioral science practitioners are calling for a greater
variety of approaches to OD. There is a growing need for emphasis on
the particular situation in order to determine what type of intervention
to use to bring about organizational change.
This chapter will also show the derivation of the Life Cycle
Theory of leadership. The Life Cycle Theory, to be fully described in
Chapter Three, is a situational leadership theory which attempts to
provide a method for diagnosing the situation in an organization so
that a leader can select a leadership style suitable to the needs of
the situation. This situational theory will be the primary one used to
analyze the cases under consideration in this paper. Finally, this
chapter will generally provide a theoretical reference for the analyses
of the cases to be presented in this study.
Part One - Leadership As Absolute
Introduction
The concepts of leadership summarized in this section will be
those which are concerned with leadership as absolute; that there is
one best style of leadership which exists independently and which is
always appropriate. Those believing in a best approach divide them-
selves generally into two schools: the traditional and the human
relations approach to leadership.
10
Leadership is inextricably linked to social systems. The tradi-
tional approach to leadership which will be described first, was the
outcome of an autocratic social system that has been extant in the
western world to the time of the industrial revolution. The human
relations approach to leadership which will be considered next was the
outcome of a democratic-technocratic social system which began with the
industrial revolution and continues today. Some of the aspects of these
two social systems relevant to the concepts of leadership they produced
are presented in figure 2.
Classical-Traditional
!
Human Relations
Concept of Leadership 1 Concept of Leadership
autocratic social system:
Greek times to industrial
revolution
society based on class
structure
:
King-serf
Pope-laity
master-servant
boss-indentured worker
leaders ruled by power,
status, position, wealth,
education: independent of
followers
leaders have control of
life support systems of
followers : hence leaders
unconcerned with socio-
emotional needs of followers
democratic-technocratic
social system: industrial
revolution to present
"classless” society
leaders rule through
power, status, position
wealth, education
through support of
followers
followers control own
life support systems:
hence leaders concerned
with socio-emotional
needs of followers
Figure 2. Traditional and Human Relations Concepts of
Leadership
Compared to Two Social Systems
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Traditional Leadership Theory
For all recorded history leadership has been a subject of
concern. In the western world, from the Greco-Roman era, leadership
was the province of the male citizen who, by virtue of sex, status,
education and wealth, held responsibility for governing. This hierar-
chical system continued basically unchanged through the industrial
revolution in Europe and America. Leaders were men whose leadership
positions were determined by birth and wealth.
Traditional leadership theory, derived from a hierarchical
social system, holds that an organization, whether military, religious,
educational or industrial, functions best when headed by a strong and
authoritative leader. As Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) describe, this
type of leader provides his followers with a detailed description of
their role and function, establishes limited and prescribed communica-
tions channels, and directly oversees no more than five or six imme-
diate subordinates. (See figure 3») In this type of organization,
influence is highest at the top, and decreases to none at the lowest
levels. Departmentalization is viewed positively; the more of it the
better, as it contributes to easier coordination. Conflicts are
resolved by superiors. Authority and responsibility rest with the
supreme head, whose influence derives from his position, control of
rewards and punishments, and superior knowledge.
Because of the responsibility and importance of the leadership
position in this heirarchical system, much time was spent in teaching
the sons of priviledged classes the skills and characteristics
considered necessary to good leadership. And the literature of leader-
12
ship, from Cicero to the 193Q’s, largely reflected this attitude.
Gibb (1959) has summarized the traits or characteristics of the good
leader which were to be sought for and emulated. There have been many
hours spent in researching the characteristics of successful leaders.
However, as Hemphill (1949) points out, while the results have yielded
a mass of data on the personal qualities of leaders in many specific
situations, personal qualities common to all leaders have not been
found.
Figure 3. Traditional Leadership and Organizational Pattern
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Hicnar) Relations Leadership Theory
With the advent of compulsory mass education, the abolition of
Child labor, the rise of the unions with attendant labor-management
conflicts, the waste of human resources in industry, and a rise in
worker apathy and boredom because of mass production, industry sought
new ways to achieve high production output in the face of rapid change
The efforts of Elton Mayo, Roethlisberger and Dickson in the early 30's
to improve production at the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric,
marked the beginning of the human relations approach to leadership in
industry.
In Mayo’s 1933 study, the working conditions of the women who
assembled telephone relays were gradually Improved; scheduled rest
periods, company lunches and shorter work weeks were implemented. As
each of these innovations was introduced, production in this experimen-
tal group increased. Finally, the researchers removed all of the
improvements, expecting production to drop. However it rose to a new
high. The researchers concluded that because of the attention devoted
to them, these workers felt they were an important part of the company.
They had developed feelings of affiliation, competence and pride. Hence
when the improvements in working conditions were removed, they felt the
company was ”in trouble" and made an extra effort in production.
This study signaled the need for management to study and under-
stand relationships among people. As Hersey and Blanchard (1972) note,
in these studies at the Hawthorne plant and the many that followed, the
most significant factor affecting organizational productivity was found
to be the interpersonal relationships developed on the job. This led
14
to an emphasis on the human relations approach as the best style of
leadership. The main tenets of this approach, as summarized by
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) are:
1. that the participation of the lower echelons is
secured in solving organizational problems.
2. that more openness and trust is fostered among
individuals and groups in the organization.
In contrast to the traditional approach, the human relations movement
advocates low structure organizations with widely shared influence
among members, open confronting methods of conflict resolution, and a
high state of integration.
A Comparison of the Traditional and Human Relations Approaches
Extensive studies of these two approaches to leadership have
resulted in general agreement among researchers that leadership concepts
tend to sort themselves into two general categories. As Bowers and
Seashore (1966) state, one category is concerned with people, and the
other with getting the job done. The following chart (see figure )
attempts to summarize the titles for each of these two categories, and
the functions of each of the two types of leaders as seen by several
theoreticians. The theoreticians include: Bales (1965), Bowers and
Seashore (1966), Borgatte (I960), Gibb (1959), Homans (1950), Kretch
and Crutchfield (1948), Carter (1954), Leary (1959), Longabaugh (1966),
Shepherd (1964), and Thibaut and Kelly (1959). A key to the authors
of each title is given under the chart.
After the Mayo study, much time was devoted to comparing these
two types of leadership in an attempt to determine which was the "best".
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In general, the ensuing studies tended to favor the democratic people-
oriented approach. This value judgment may be observed in the
definitions of traditional leadership in figure 4. Several studies
will now be reviewed which show the development of the research
supporting the viewpoint of the human relations approach as the best
method
.
Human Relations Approach to Leadership: The Best Method
White and Lippitt . Ralph White and Ronald Lippitt (1943)
studied the effects of three leadership styles — autocratic, democratic
and lai??ez-faire -- in a boys' recreational club, and concluded that a
democratic leadership style was best. They found that the autocratic
style often created hostility, aggression, including a tendency to
scapegoat, latent discontent, more dependence on the leader and less
individuality
,
and a submissive group cohesiveness characterized by a
"we're all in the same boat" attitude. The laissez-faire style resulted
in less and poorer work done and was more characterized by play. The
democratic style created more group-mindedness and more friendliness.
Although the quantity of work was slightly greater under the autocratic
style, work motivation and originality was stronger under the democratic
style.
These findings led White and Lippitt to support the democratic
leadership style as best. For the next ten years, this view predominated
in leadership research. It was not until the early fifties that doubts
were raised about the universal applicability of the human relations
approach as the best method of leadership.
16
titles
Classical q,Ai.)
or
Authoritarian (G)
or
Task Orient.^ (B&S)
or
Instrunentai-Adam-.i vp (b)
or
Power (L)
or
A.ttainment/Achipvpmpn t (c)
FUNCTIONS
goal oriented
production oriented
emphasizes high performance
goals
initiates structure
provides for organizational needs
emphasizes management skills
directs group in solving
problems
represents group in dealing
with outside groups or
situations
introduces new ideas
has key position in decision making
copes with and exercises
power over social and
physical environment -
maintains external system
maintains segregation within
group - sees that communication
between members is kept to a
minimum except insofar as it is
through leader and focussed on
leader
emphasizes obedience,
focussed particularly on
leader
creates and exploits group needs
which create dependence on leader
mechanistic
rational emphasis
CODE
B - Bales
B&S - Bowers and Seashore
C - Carter
TITLES
Hyman Relating
or
Democrat i c (C)
or
People Orient (B&S)
or
Integrative-Exnrefrp ) yr> (b)
or
Interpersonal Affiliate ( L )
or
Sociability (c)
FUNCTIONS
group oriented
employee oriented
emphasizes group supportive
relationships
initiates consideration
provides for individual needs
emphasizes human relations
skills
assists group in solving
problems
group represents itself
in dealing with outside
groups or situations
encourages new ideas from
group members
shares decision making
maintains group's inner/
internal system - main-
tains solidarity among
group members
seeks to reinforce and
encourage interpersonal
contacts and communica-
tion between group mem-
bers
seeks to spread responsibility
throughout group and avoid
hierarchical structure, special
priviledge and status
encourages interdependence
organic
emotional emphasis
G - Gibb
L - Leary
L&L - Lawrence and Lorsch
Figure A Comparison of Traditional and Human Relations Approaches to
Leadership
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Eleishrcan and Harris. In order to discover:
1 . if the effects of human relations
permanent
training were
2 .
3.
how the effects of human relations training areinfluenced by actual work situations
industry
CtiV6neSS °f hUman relations training in
Edwin Fleishman, Edwin Harris and Harold Burtt (1955) conducted a leader-
ship training program for first line foremen at International Harvester.
These researchers emerged from their study skeptical about the human
relations approach to leadership.
Fleishman and Harris’ findings had significant implications for
advocates of the human relations approach to leadership. They discovered
that although there was a general increase in consideration attitudes on
the part of the foremen immediately after training, once back at the
plant, there was a significant tendency for the trained group to be lower
in consideration behavior, and higher in task orientation than the fore-
men who had not attended the course.
They also discovered that day to day climate was more important
in influencing a foreman's leadership style than the leadership training
program, and concluded that specific training in human relations is
wasted unless the environment in the plant is also strong in human
relations. Because of this finding, they recommended that behavioral
scientists begin working with leadership attitudes at the top of the
organization so that a favorable leadership climate will spread downward
through the organization.
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Further, they discovered a conflict between leadership styles
preferred by bosses for production efficiency and effective leadership
styles as inferred from the worker's behavior. In production oriented
divisions, supervisors saw proficient foremen as tending toward being
authoritarian. This leadership style however, was accompanied by more
absenteeism, accidents, grievances, and employee turnover. The workers
however, tended not to like working for authoritarian foremen and
preferred foremen with a people-oriented leadership style. On the
basis of this finding, Fleishman and Harris questioned the assumption
that good morale leads to increased production.
After their study, Fleishman and Harris doubted the universal
effectiveness of the purely human relations leadership style, and seemed
to be reaching toward a best style that would combine the task oriented
(traditional) approach and the relationships oriented (human relations)
approach. Perhaps, they suggested, a foreman or supervisor who can be
both high in task and high in consideration may be able to reconcile this
conflict; however, more research, they concluded, would be needed to
clarify this. Such research was in fact being conducted at the Institute
for Social Research at the University of Michigan, during the same period
of time in which Fleishman and Harris were conducting their study.
Likert . In 1947 the Institute for Social Research at the
University of Michigan began investigations into the field of leadership
to discover what organizational structures, principles, and methods of
leadership result in "the best performance." For fourteen years Director
Rensis Likert and his colleagues investigated the factors correlating to
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high productivity and the factors correcting to low productivity
figure 5.)
(See
In 1961 Likert found that productivity depends not on employee
morale, but on how well supervisors perform their leadership function.
He also found that effective managers are characterized by cooperative,
people-oriented attitudes, and an ability to create a situation in which
employees establish high performance goals for themselves. His basic
components of effective leadership were:
1. human relations orientation
2. ability to bring about compatability of
organizational and individual goals
3* ability to create high performance goals.
Likert (1961) incorporated these findings into four systems of
management: 1) exploitive authoritative, 2) benevolent authoritative,
3) consultative, and 4) participative group. He posited that system
four, Participative Management, is the most effective.
System One: Exploitive Authoritative
This management system assumes that labor is largely a
market commodity, with time freely sold and purchased.
It conceives of the manager's job as consisting of
dfiCisiQn > direction
,
and surveillance
T relies primarily
upon coercion as a motivating force, and makes little or
no provision for the effects of human emotion and inter-
dependence. As a result, communication in this system is
sluggish, largely downward in direction, and frequently
distorted. Goals are established and decisions made by
top management only, based upon fragmentary, often
inaccurate and inadequate information. This produces
disparity between the desires and interests of the
members and the goals of the organization. For these
reasons, only high levels of the organization feel any
real responsibility for the attainment of established
objectives. Their reliance upon coercion as a motivating
force leads to an almost total absence of cooperative
20
High Productivity LOW Product ivit-y
supervisor is employee
oriented; concentrates on
building work group with
high performance goals
supervisor concentrates
on task and production
reasonable pressure unreasonable pressure
supervisor makes objectives
clear to subordinates, and
gives them freedom to do job
conflict between employees
and supervisors
favorable attitude of
employees to supervisor,
working conditions, comp-
ensation and work itself.
employees free to set own
work pace, but onlv in
situation of frequent contact
and interaction between
employee, colleagues and
supervisor
manager skilled in using
group methods to create
employee motivation
excessively routine job
goals of work group con-
sistent with goals of
organization
work groups have high
peer-group loyalty
goals of work groups counter
to goals of organization
good communication between
employees, and employees
and supervisors
poor communication between
employees and employees
and supervisors
Figure 5. Likert's Factors Correlating to High and Low Productivity
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servient attitudes toward superiors, hostility towardpeers, and contempt for subordinates. Performance isusually mediocre, with high costs, excessive absence,
and substantial manpower turnover. Quality is maintained
only by extensive surveillance and a great deal of
rework [p. 223-233].
System Two:—Benevolent Authori ta t
i
vp
This management system assumes that labor is a market
commodity but an imperfect one: Once purchased, it is
susceptible to periodic emotional and interpersonal
interferences". Consequently, to decision
,
direction
,
anc*
-SUrveillanCQ it adds a fourth managerial duty:
expurging the annoying affect of subordinate members.
This fact permits some small amount of upward and
lateral communication, although most is downward, and
sizeable distortion usually exists. Policies are
established and basic decisions made by upper management,
sometimes with opportunity for comment from subordinate
supervisory levels. Some minor implementation decisions
may be made at lower levels, but only within the care-
fully prescribed limits set by the top echelon.
Managerial personnel, therefore, usually feel responsibil-
ity for attaining the assigned objectives, whereas rank-
and-file members usually feel little or none. Very
little cooperative teamwork exists, and superiors at
lower echelons are able to exercise only moderate true
control in the work situation. Attitudes toward
superiors are subservient, and hostility is prevalent
toward peers, but the absence of open contempt toward
subordinates makes dissatisfaction less intense.
Performance may be fair to good, although high costs,
absence, and manpower turnover frequently occur [p. 223-
2333.
Sy.stem Three: Consultative
This management system does not assume labor to be a
market commodity. It still reserves to the manager the
tasks of decision , and direction , but removes surveillance
as a major function. Little recourse to coercion occurs.
In their places recognition of the frequently disruptive
effects of human emotion is expanded to include employee
involvement through consultation. This practice encourages
a moderate amount of valid upward communication, although
lateral communication is limited by the prevalence of man-
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!ther than group, decision-making. Comnunlcationis, therefore, usually accurate and only occasionallv
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bPOad aremad t t top, but specific objectives to implementthese policies are entrusted to lower managers for
consuitatiye decision-making. For all these reasons asubstantial proportion of the members of the organizationfeel responsibie for attaining established objectives,
and the system makes use of most positive motivational
orces, except those which would otherwise arise fromgroup processes. Some dissatisfaction may exist, but
normally satisfaction is moderately high, with only somedegree of hostility expressed toward peers, some
condescension toward subordinates. Performance is
ordinarily good; costs, absence, and turnover moderate;
and quality problems no cause for major concern [p. 223-
^33 J •
Sygtem Fopp: Participative Group
This management system assumes that employees are
essential parts of an organizational structure which
has been built at great cost and necessarily maintained
with the same attention and care given more tangible
assets. It conceives of decision as a process, rather
than a prerogative, with the manager's responsibility
consisting, not of himself deciding, but of making
sure that the best possible decisions result. In this
light, he focuses his efforts upon building an over-
lapping structure of cohesive, highly motivated,
participative groups, coordinated by multiple member-
ships. Within this highly coordinated and motivated
system, characterized by high mutual confidence and
trust, communication is adequate, rapid and accurate.
Because goals are established and decisions made with
the participation of all those affected, objectives
are comparatively closely aligned with the needs and
interests of all members, and all motivational forces
push in the direction of obtaining the established
objectives. The closely knit system in addition
permits superiors and subordinates alike to exercise
great control over the work situation. Employees at
all levels are highly satisfied, but without
complacency, and feel great reciprocal respect and
trust. Performance is very good; costs absence and
turnover are low; and high quality is the natural
concern of all [p. 223-2331.
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Likert's conclusions place him in the camp of those who advocate
a best style of leadership. His system of Participative Management
suggests that he supports the democratic, human relations approach as
the best method of management, although he notes this as an ideal.
Likert seems to suggest that before attaining the ideal of system four
Participative Management, the manager would have to practice a certain
amount of task-oriented leadership behavior in order to bring about
compatability of organizational and individual goals. However, it
remained for researchers Blake and Mouton to make the final step towards
stating that the best style of leadership was one that combined a high
concern for task and a high concern for people.
Blake and Mouton * While Likert was carrying out his studies at
the University of Michigan, Robert Blake and Jane Mouton were research-
ing types of leadership styles at the University of Texas. Drawing
upon the work of John Hemphill (1949), and the work of other Ohio State
University researchers, in 1964 they published the "Management Grid",
a theoretical model which supports "team" leadership (high concern for
task and high concern for people) as the best style of leadership.
Rather than seeing leadership as an either-or proposition,
either authoritarian or democratic, they plotted concern for production
on one axis, and concern for people on another. (See figure 6.) Each
was expressed in a nine point scale from low (1) to high (9). The
manner in which the two concerns intertwine would define a leader's
style. They concentrated on analyzing the assumptions of a leader at
each of the four corners (the extremes) and at the mid-point.
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High 9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
Low 1
Figure 6. The Management Grid
Ihe 9-1 Style: Nice guys finigh iaafc . A leader assumes that
people are instruments of production; he heavily emphasizes tasks and
job requirements, one to one relationships with his subordinates,
obedience, supresses conflict and minimizes human relations.
The 3.-9 Style:—Nj.ce guv's don't fight . A "big brother" leader
who encourages people to work; he expects them, because of loyalty and
acceptance, to turn out some work to avoid trouble; empliasizes the group
as the key unit; encourages friendliness and harmony.
Th£..i-1 Style:—Dor^t make waves . The leader exerts minimum
effort, shows little concern for production or people, passes blame
along, carries messages between layers of the organization, and rarely
initiates criticism except for self defense.
1-9 Management
Country Club
Leader
1-1 Management
Impoverished
Leader
1
Low
9-9 Management
Team
Leader
5-5 Management
Middle of the -
Hoad Leader
9-1 Management
Autocratic
Leader
7 8 9
High
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Ills 5-5 StYl»: Let's yotP on it . The leader seeks to maintain
balance; emphasizes people as much as production, communicates with
subordinates but censors information; tends to develop two counter-
balancing systems—formal and informal; holds meetings to hear sugges-
tions and convey to people a sense that they have a hand in making
decisions.
Ihe 9~9 styl e:—Lfi.t'9 get involved. The leader utilizes the
capacities of himself and subordinates for creative thinking and
problem-solving; uses goal setting; exhibits a high concern for people
and production; involves those responsible in work planning and
execution; emphasizes the organization as the key unit; creates
commitment in subordinates to have a stake in the outcome through
interdependent effort.
Blake and Mouton began their book with a statement that seems
to imply a situational approach to leadership; however, their concluding
remarks show a resounding preference for the 9-9 style which places
them with those who promote "a best style".
Managerial styles based on 9-1 (direction with
compliance), 5-5 (conformity with compromise),
1-9 (security and comfort through convenience),
1-1 (acquiescence and complacency, or ’clever’
but corrupt facades) are, at best, second best.
Actually they are quite unacceptable, long term.
In comparison with 9-9* s condition of candid
communication based on conviction and commitment
which results in creativity, other bases for work
relations seem to fall short.... 9-9 defines a
trend leading to maturity and relationships among
men toward which production organizations seem to
be evolving [p. 318].
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Conclusion: No On^ Best Shy ]
a
As we have seen, the study of leadership passed through several
stages. First it was studied as qualities in individuals. Many
writers stressed specific qualities in an individual's behavior which
could be identified as leadership. This focus was in keeping with the
views of leadership stemming from earliest times, that leaders are born,
not made, and must therefore possess special qualities in common. At
the same time, society held the traditional view that the best style of
leadership was paternalistic, task oriented, and authoritative.
After it had been proven that there were no qualities,
characteristics, or traits common to all successful leaders, many
writers attempted to establish leadership as a behavioral continuum
from autocratic to democratic. Beginning in the 30' s, theoreticians
supported the democratic or human relations approach as the best style
of leadership.
However, research began to show that leadership was not an
either-or proposition. When the task leader showed high scores on task
attitudes and behaviors, he or she did not always score low on socio-
emotional attitudes and behaviors. This indicated that task and
relationships behaviors were probably independent variables; not two
ends of one continuum, but two separate factors entirely. A leader
could be high in both, low in both, or high in one and low in the
other. Based on this, some researchers, such as Blake and Mouton,
suggested that the best leader was high on both the task and relation-
ships scales.
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However, other theoreticians who adopted a more relativistic
viewpoint, began to conclude that leadership was not an independent
entity, existing on its own. It was, on the co„trary, linked to the
followers and the situation in which th*e leader was operating. In 1949
Hemphill had stated:
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Some researchers, such as Hemphill, came to the conclusion that
there was no one
-best style" of leadership, but rather that leadership
is situational in nature. The nature of the followers, and the environ-
ment in which the leader and followers are interacting, become important
factors in the study of leadership. Part Two of this chapter will show
the development of situational leadership theory, by presenting a brief
chronological description of the work of some key situational theorists.
Part Two - Leadership As Situational
Introduction
In an autocratic society, the leader's ability to influence
rested upon the leader, by virtue of "divine right", birth, or money.
In a democratic society leadership becomes "a function of the leader’s
personality and the social system in interaction (Gibb, 1959, p. 917)."
Followers become important because of their influence upon decision
making, an influence they did not possess in an autocratic society.
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In a democratic system, the leader must accomplish objectives
not only through people, but with people. Leadership thus becomes a
process in which the leader attempts to influence others to achieve
certain goals (Gibb, 1959; Hersey 4 Blanchard, 1972). Since people are
different, by virtue of education, ability and personality, no ana
leadership style will be effective in influencing all people. Thus a
leadership style must be considered as it relates to the situation at
hand. As Gibb (1959) states:
It is important for the use we can make of our
resources and of our groups that we recognize
authoritarianism and democracy as poles of a
continuum neither of which is wholly good or
wholly bad, but which represent extremes of a
variable "leadership technique" that should be
adapted to all the elements of the situation
[p. 911].
Faced with a new field to explore — the situation — theoreti-
cians turned their attention to new questions: what were the important
factors in the situation that had a bearing on leadership style? What
was the relationship between effective leadership style and the
situation? How could this be determined? It was to these, and related
questions, that the following researchers in situational leadership
addressed themselves.
Hemphill : Leadership Depends Upon the Group Situation
John Hemphill, one of the early researchers of situational
leadership, carried out his investigations during the 40' s at Ohio
State University. His studies were among the first of a number to
become known as the Ohio State Leadership Studies. Blake and Mouton,
who have been previously discussed, drew heavily upon his research.
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Hemphill was not concerned with discovering which leadership
style was best - authoritarian, democratic or some point in between -
but with what causes a leader to be seen as excellent, fair or poor.
Starting with the hypothesis that the leader is inextricably bound to
the group situation, Hemphill focussed his investigations on the
relationship between leader behavior and group situation.
Hemphill first devised a questionnaire that would describe a
group according to fifteen dimensions on a scale of one to nine. He
then developed a questionnaire by which group members could judge the
adequacy of the leader’s behavior as "high" (excellent or good), or
"low" (fair or poor). His assumption was that if there was a high
degree of correspondence between the behavior demanded by the group
situation and the leader’s behavior, then the leader would be judged to
be excellent. But if there was no correspondence, the leader would be
judged to be poor.
Hemphill's assumption was borne out. After analysing 500
questionnaires, he found that leaders were seen as effective or in-
effective, adequate or inadequate, depending on the nature of the group.
Hemphill was one of the first to open the doors to future research into
the nature of the relationship between leader behavior and the situation.
Fiedler: A Contingency Theory of Leadership
The research of Fred Fiedler at the University of Illinois has
spanned more than fifteen years. In his early work, Fiedler and his
associates attempted to identify the factors underlying group effec-
tiveness. The results of this early research (1958) showed that group
Performance could not be predicted on the basis of , „n ° leadership alone,
only when three other factors were considered:
1- the group's socio-metric structure
2. the leader-keyman relationship
3. the demands of the task
Fiedler-S later research investigated the relationship between
the leader s attributes, group performance and the situation. The
basic hypothesis underlying his research was that the leadership style
required for effective group perforce depended upon the degree to
Which the group situation was favorable or unfavorable to the leader.
In order to test his hypothesis, he developed the Contingency
Model of leadership (Fiedler, 1964
, p . 164 ). (See figure 7.)
The three factors influencing the situation are arranged along the
horizontal axis of the model, from conditions which are favorable for
the leader (1) to conditions which are very unfavorable for the leader
(8). Fiedler had identified six factors in a situation likely to
affect a leader’s influence on a group:
1 ‘ t
p
e
4ieader
’
s j^sonal relations with members
or the group
2
- the mwer and authority which the leader’s
position provides
3* the degree of structure in the task
the relative abilities of the leader and the
members
5. the member’s motivatinn
6. the extent to which the group is operating
under conditions of external stress
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Figure 7. Fiedler's Contingency Model
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In his investigations Fiedler found that the first three of these factors
were the most important situational variables. The vertical axis of the
model measures the leader's attributes, from the active, controlling,
high task leader (Low LPC) to the passive, permissive, high relationihips
leader (High LPC). It also shows group performance.
Through the use of this model, Fiedler concluded that: 1) a
high task leader is associated with high group performance when the
situation is either highly favorable or unfavorable to the leader, and
2) a more lenient or high relationships leader is associated with high
group performance when the situation is moderately favorable or
moderately unfavorable.
In the light of these results, Fiedler (1967) suggested that
leadership training should focus on giving an individual methods to
diagnose their group-task situation, and adapt the situation to their
particular style of leadership. Fiedler argued that matching the
situation to the individual would be more successful than trying to
train a person to develop a flexible leadership style and adapt their
style to the situation.
Criticism of Fiedler’s theory . Fiedler's work has inspired
many researchers to replicate and attempt to verify his studies, and
many to criticize his theories. Korman (1971) criticised the fact that
Fiedler's research was carried out in laboratory environments only
remotely relevant to those of organizations. He expressed doubt about
the contingency approach in general — "While intuitively appealing, it
has yet to be shown to be of value in the study of organizational leader-
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ship [p. 129]" — and took issue with Fiedler's "static" contingency
approach which Korman felt did not take into consideration the possible
value of changing people to fit the situation.
While Hemphill focussed on the leader in relation to the group,
and Fiedler on the relationships of leadership style and situation to
group performance, Lawrence and Lorsch concentrated on the organization
in relation to the situation.
LavirenQe and Lorsch:
—
A Systems Approach to Organizational Effectiveness
The research of Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch (1967) attempted
to answer the question "What organizational characteristics are
required to deal effectively with external market and technological
conditions"? After studying ten organizations intensively, they
concluded that in order to be effective in today's rapidly changing
society, 1) an organization has to be able to successfully integrate
the functions of many different departments within it, and 2) must have
many different leaders to carry out different roles.
Each department of an organization will have a different
structure, interpersonal orientation, time orientation and goal orienta-
tion. Each department must relate inwardly to the other departments of
the organization and the management of the organization, and outwardly
to the social environment in which the organization operates. These
complex relationships of integration and differentiation are illustrated
in the following chart.* (See figure B.)
*Chart developed by J. Ferrie, Department of Educational Planning
and Management, University of Massachusetts.
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Lawrence and Lorsch also concluded that multiple leadership will
be required in an organization today; many leaders will be responsible
for decisions of
-great consequence". As well, several different leader-
ship roles will be required: the innovative, risk-taking leader, the
traditional routine leader, the integrator, and at the top, the formula-
tors. The formulators are the most important leaders who will need
integrative creative capacities in order to formulate "frameworks of
purpose" to "guide the efforts of the parts of the organization".
The management style required for organizational effectiveness
in any area depends on many factors: the department of the organization,
its structure, its interpersonal orientation, its time orientation, its
goal orientation, and its degree of certainty. Lorsch and Sheldon (1972)
conclude that no one management style is appropriate to all situations:
What style of management will facilitate subsystem
performance depends on the other inputs to the
system [p. 169 ].
L.QMi-h snci Cr&iS »—Fjjrris and Lim: The Followers Affect Leader Behavior
Some researchers examined leadership as being determined by the
followers. Aaron Lowin and James Craig (1968) conducted a laboratory
study to test the hypothesis that group productivity influences leader-
ship style. They found that fourteen out of sixteen "supervisors"
behaved in a high task, low relationships style when faced with a non-
productive "employee", and twelve out of sixteen "supervisors" behaved
in a high relationships low task style when faced with a highly
productive "employee"
.
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Figure 8. Differentiation - Integration Chart
KEY
1 - Structure (a) span of control
(b) number of levels to a shared superior
(c) tine span of review
(d) specificity of review
(e) importance of formal rules
(f) criteria for evaluation
2 - Interpersonal Orientation (a) primary concern for task
(b) primary concern for social
relationships
3.- Time Orientation Estimate of 5 of total time used working on
activities affeetin; organisation's profits
within, a specific time period.
4 - Goal Orientation criteria which managers night consider in making
decisions relevant to product and process
innovation.
5 _ Certain. tv (a) rate of change of conditions over time in
subenvirorment
(b) certainty of information about conditions in the
subenvironnent at any particular time
(c) rate of feedback
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Following the same line of investigation, George Farris and
Francis Lim (1969) found that leaders who were told their groups were
highly productive were perceived as behaving in a high relationships
style, more so than leaders who were told their groups were low
producing.
Both of these studies re-confirmed that leadership style and
follower behavior are inter-dependent, and raised the possibility that
leadership style is a consequence of follower performance.
Conclusions:—
L
eadership is Situational
Researchers who began with the assumption that effective leader-
ship is relative to the situation spent much time attempting to
determine what the important factors in the situation were that had a
bearing on leadership. A wealth of situational factors have been
advanced. For Hemphill, it was the nature of the group and the nature
of the leader. For Fiedler, it was the nature of the leader, the
leader-manber relations, the leader's power and authority, the nature
of the task, the abilities of the leader and the members, the members'
motivation, and the amount of environmental stress. For Lawrence and
Lorsch, it was all of these, plus the structure of any department in
the organization, its interpersonal orientation, time orientation, goal
orientation, and the relationship of the organization to its environ-
ment. For Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, it was the productivity of
the followers. These many situational factors can be contained in
three general categories: "leader", "follower" and "other" (including
the organization, the environment, time, task, superiors and associates).
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While there has been general agreement on key situational
factors, there are many different theories as to what the relationship
is between effective leadership and the situation. Hemphill advanced
several hypotheses; Fiedler suggests his Contingency Theory; Lawrence
and Lorsch put forward their Integration-Differentiation Theory. The
Life Cycle Theory of Leadership, to be described in Chapter Three, is
a situational theory which suggests that the relationship between
effective leadership and the situation lies in adapting leader style to
follower "maturity".
This chapter has presented a brief overview of leadership
theory, showing the development of the two main streams of thought with-
in this body of theory: the one best style school, and the situational
school. In so doing, this chapter has provided a background for the
Life Cycle Theory, and a theoretical reference for the analyses of the
cases to be presented in this paper.
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CHAPTER III
THE LIFE CYCLE THEORY OF LEADERSHIP
Introduction
This chapter will describe the Life Cycle Theory of leadership.
Chapter Four will compare the Life Cycle Theory to the previously
discussed situational leadership theories of Hemphill, Lowin and Craig,
Farris and Lim, Fiedler, and Lawrence and Lorsch. Through this compar-
ison, the components of the analytic framework will be selected. They
will be used to analyze the cases presented in this paper. The analytic
framework will encompass all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory,
and some additional variables from related situational concepts.
Through applying this analytic framework to the cases under considera-
tion, we hope to demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of the
Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method for determining the most
appropriate leadership style in any given organizational situation.
The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model
The Life Cycle Theory of Leadership (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972)
is an outgrowth of the Ohio State Leadership Studies. The various
theories contributing to the Life Cycle Theory are illustrated in
figure 9. The work of Hemphill, Blake and Mouton, and the Ohio State
Leadership Studies have already been described. This section will
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Figure 9. Derivations of the Life Cycle Theory
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Leadership Studies have already been described. This section will
briefly describe the Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model
(Hersey & Blanchard, 1972) and the theories of Reddin, Argyris, and
McClelland as they contribute to the Life Cycle Theory.
The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model formulated by
Hersey and Blanchard (1972) is based upon the Ohio State Leadership
Studies and the work of William Reddin (1967). The Ohio State
University researchers identified two fundamental dimensions of leader
behavior: "initiating structure" and "consideration". These were
defined by Fleishman and Peters (1962) as follows:
Initiating Structure (S) reflects the extent to which
an individual is likely to define and structure his
role and those of his subordinates toward goal attain-
ment [p. 130],
Consideration (C): reflects the extent to which an
individual is likely to have job relationships char-
acterized by mutual trust, respect for subordinates'
ideas, and consideration of their feelings [p. 130].
Results of these studies showed that leadership was not univariate but
bivariate. Thus, the researchers plotted "initiating structure" and
"consideration" behavior on two separate axis at midpoint, they
created four quadrants which showed four combinations of "initiating
structure" and "consideration" behavior. See figure 10.
The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model uses the Ohio
State Leadership quadrants (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972, p.74), two axis
"task behavior" (for "initiating structure") and "relationships
behavior" (for "consideration"). Hersey and Blanchard (1972) define
"task" and "relationships" behavior as follows:
Consideration
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Consideration
and
Low
Structure
High
Structure
and
High
Consideration
Low High
Structure Structure
and and
Low Low
Consideration Consideration
Low Initiating Structure High
Figure 10 Ohio State Leadership Quadrants
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Task Behavior. The extent to which a leader is
likely to organize and define the roles of individuals
and group members by explaining what activities
members are to do as well as when, where and how
tasks are to be accomplished. It is further char-
acterized by the extent to which the leader defines
patterns of organization, formalizes channels of
communication and specifies ways of getting jobs
accomplished [p. 83].
Relationships Behavior . The extent to which the leader
develops personal relationships between him or herself
and individuals or group members; the amount of
socioemotional support and psychological strokes
provided by the leader for members, as well as the
extent to which the leader engages in interpersonal
communication and facilitating behaviors [p. 83].
The four quadrants of the Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model
(Hersey & Blanchard, 1972, p. 82) are illustrated in figure 11.
Attempting to integrate the concepts of leader style with the
situational demands of a specific environment, Hersey and Blanchard
added an effectiveness dimension to the two dimensional model shown in
figure 11 and created the Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model
(Hersey & Blanchard, 1972, p. 84) illustrated in figure 12. In doing
so, they drew upon the 3-D Management Theory of William J. Reddin
(1967) whom, they state, "was the first to add an effectiveness
dimension to the task and relationships dimensions of earlier models
[p. 83]." Hersey and Blanchard define a leader's style as "the
behavior pattern he exhibits when he is involved in directing the
activities of others [p. 82]." If a leader's style is appropriate to
a given situation, they term it effective. If inappropriate, they term
it ineffective. The effectiveness dimension is not however, an either-
or situation, but one, they believe, that should be represented as a
continuum, since effectiveness is a matter ot degree.
Relationships
Behavior
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44
Figure
12.
The
Tri-Dimens
ional
Leader
Effectiveness
Model
45
The Tri-Dimensional Leader Effectiveness Model combines the Ohio
State Leadership concepts and Reddin’ s effectiveness concept into one
situational model. However, there are differences between the Leader
Effectiveness Model and Reddin’ s Model. Unlike the Managerial Grid (a
two dimensional Model), the Tri-Dimensional Model does not depict a
single ideal leadership style as being appropriate in all situations,
but suggests that any leadership style is effective or ineffective
depending on whether it is appropriate or inappropriate to the situation.
Hersey and Blanchard (1969) further explain that the Leader Effective-
ness Model is behavioral, does not contain value laden labels, is
concerned with leadership, and emphasizes both intervening and output
variables, while Reddin' s Model is attitudinal, contains evaluative
labels, is concerned with management, and emphasizes only output
variables.
The Maturity Continuum in the Life Cycle Model
If effective leadership depends upon a leader behaving appro-
priately in a given situation, the question becomes 'how can a leader
judge the situation so as to know which leadership style to use'? The
Life Cycle Theory of Leadership attempts to address this problem by
adding a maturity continuum to the Tri-Dimensional Model. In so doing,
Hersey and Blanchard attempt to relate task behavior, relationships
behavior and maturity, in order "to provide a leader with some under-
standing of the relationships between an effective style of leadership
and the level of maturity of his followers [p. 134]". Maturity of the
followers is shown on the continuum drawn below the four quadrants.
This continuum, proceeding from low to high maturity, right to left,
is divided into three sections: below average maturity on the right,
average maturity in the centre, and above average maturity on the left.
Figure 13 illustrates Hersey and Blanchard's Life Cycle Theory of
Leadership Model (1972, p. 135).
Argyris’ Definition of Maturity
In defining maturity, Hersey and Blanchard drew upon the
theories of Chris Argyris (1957) and David C. McClelland (1953, 1961,
1965, 1966). Argyris’ developmental stages leading to maturity, and
McClelland's theory of achievement motivation will be briefly described,
and related to the maturity continuum in Life Cycle Theory.
Argyris (1957, p. 49) describes seven developmental trends of
people in North American culture. He states that human beings in our
culture tend to develop:
1. from a state of passivity as infants to a state
of activity as adults
2. from a state of dependence upon others as
infants, to a state of relative independence
as adults
3. from being capable of behaving only in a few
ways as an infant, to being capable of
behaving in many different ways as an adult
4. from having erratic, casual, shallow, quickly-
dropped interests as an infant, to having deeper
interests as an adult
5. from having a short time perspective as an
infant, to a much longer time perspective as
an adult
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6. from being in a subordinate position in thefamily and society as an infant, to aspiring
to occupy an equal and/or superordinate
position relative to their peers
7. from a lack of awareness of self as an infant
to an awareness of and control over self as an
adult.
These are seven dimensions of the growth of the individual towards
self-actualization. He further notes that when an individual is
expressing needs related to the adult end of each developmental
continua
,
that individual is approaching maturity.
McClelland's Definition of Achievement Motivation
David C. McClelland (1953, 1961, 1965, 1966) has identified
seven characteristics of people with high "n Ach" (needs to achieve).
Risk-Taking. In the area of risk-taking, those with high
achievement motivation take moderate, calculated risks, not high or
low risks. As well, the goals they set are moderately difficult, but
potentially achievable (McClelland, 1966, p. 212). The attraction of
the moderately risky situation for the person with high n Ach is that
the outcome depends more clearly on the person's skill.
The greater preference that subjects with high n Ach
have for situations involving moderate risk in all
likelihood appears only when they have some chance
of influencing the outcome through their own skills
and abilities (McClelland, 1961, p. 214).
Creative Problem Solving . Highly achievement motivated people
do not do well at routine jobs, but prefer "nonroutine tasks that
require some degree of personal initiative, or even inventiveness for
solution (McClelland, 1961, p. 216)". Such people are always setting
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challenges for themselves, tasks that make them stretch themselves a
little (McClelland, 1966, p. 259). Argyrls too, mentions the search
for challenge in connection with his fourth developmental stage of
shallow, quickly-dropped interests to deeper interests. Expanding on
this stage, he notes that
the mature state is characterized by an endless series
01 challenges
,
where the reward comes from doing
something for its own sake (Argyris, 1957, p. 50).
Positive
_
Attitude
. McClelland discovered that people with high
n Ach tend to have a positive even overconfident attitude toward the
probability of their being successful, even when there are no facts to
justify their estimates. (McClelland, 1961, p. 222). He feels that
this attitude is based upon the person's conviction that "he can modify
the outcome of an uncertain situation by his own personal achievements
[p. 224]."
Goals. People with high n Ach "think ahead" more. They tend
to deal more often with the remote future (McClelland, 1961, p. 237).
Once set upon accomplishing a goal, McClelland found that those who are
highly motivated to achieve will work just as hard for a group goal as
an individual goal. Public recognition is not the key motivating
factor, but rather
the achievement satisfaction arises from having
initiated the action that is successful, rather
than from public recognition for an individual
accomplishment [McClelland, 1961, p. 226].
Personal Accomplishment . People with high n Ach appear to work
harder only when there is a chance that personal efforts will make a
difference in the outcome (McClelland, 1961, p. 226). Personal achieve-
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“"t iS “ incentive to the person who is highly achieved
motivated. This incentive becomes stronger when "winning" at the task
can be interpreted as a personal achievement (McClelland, 1961, p. 216).
Feedback
. People, who are highly motivated to achieve, prefer
to work in situations in which they get concrete feedback on how well
they are doing. A business executive, or salesman would be in such a
situation; a teacher would not, (McClelland, 1966, p. 259). McClelland
found that those with high n Ach perform significantly better when they
have positive and definite feedback on how well they are doing.
-
oney * Pe°P!e with high n Ach cannot be motivated by money
alone; in fact, they have been found by McClelland not to be much
influenced by money rewards (McClelland, 1961, p. 235). Money is the
measure of success, and those who are highly achievement motivated
want it primarily as a symbol of higher achievement.
Given the theory developed by Argyris and McClelland above,
Hersey and Blanchard (1972) formulate a definition of maturity. Their
definition however, is restricted to task relevant subordinate
behaviors, and is defined as being a function of the following
variables:
1. achievement motivation
2. the willingness and ability to take
responsibility
3. task relevant education and experience of
an individual or a group [p. 134].
In this definition, age may be a factor, but it is not directly
related to maturity as used in Life Cycle Theory. Figure 14 illustrates
the relationship between Argyris’ description of maturity, McClellands'
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Figure 14. Relationship Between Argyris' Maturity
Characteristics, McClelland's Characteristics
of the Achievement Motivated Person, and Hersey
and Blanchard's Definition of Maturity
achievement motivation theory, and Hersey and Blancterd's definition
of maturity.
Reviewing again briefly the Life Cycle Theory of Leadership
Model (figure 13), we recall that this model attempts to relate task
behavior, relationships behavior and maturity of followers. We have
reviewed the derivation and development of the four quadrants in the
model. These represent four combinations of task and relationships
behavior:
1. Quadrant One: high task - low relationships
2. Quadrant Two: high task - high relationships
3* Quadrant Three: high relationships - low task
4. Quadrant Four: low task - low relationships
As well, the derivation and components of the continuum
representing the maturity of the followers has been discussed. The
continuum is generally divided into above average, average, and below
average maturity, in order to provide some bench marks for degree of
maturity. Maturity is defined as achievement motivation, the willing-
ness and ability to take responsibility, and task relevant education
and experience.
The curve superimposed over the four quadrants is a graphic
illustration of distribution of leader styles. Hersey and Blanchard
suggest that the majority of leader styles fall within quadrants two
and three; that is, most people practice a leadership style falling
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between quadrant two, bigb relationships
- high task, and quadrant
three, high relationships
- low task, while fewer people practice
leader styles at the extreme of the curve: quadrat one, high task -
low relationships, and quadrant four, low task - low relationships.
Life Cycle Theory postulates that when working with people of
below average maturity in relation to a particular task in a particular
situation, a high task - low relationships style (quadrant one) has
the best probability of success. In dealing with people of average
maturity, the high task, high relationships style (q^drant two) and
the high relationships, low task style (quadrant three) appear to be
most appropriate. Quadrant four, the low task, low relationships
style has the highest probability of success with people of above
average maturity.
Based on the inconsistancies in the theory and research on
leadership evident in the previous chapter, Hersey and Blanchard have
formulated a position which attempts to explain and account for these
inconsistancies. Ihey draw examples from a variety of situations,
including parent-child relationships, a military setting in the far
north, teacher-student relationships in a college setting,
administrator-trustee relationships, and administrator-faculty relation-
ships, to illustrate their thesis that effective leadership style varies
with the maturity of the followers.
As a child matures, it is appropriate for the parent to increase
socioemotional support and decrease structure; research personnel working
on the DEW line responded poorly to a high task-low relationships leader-
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ship style—a low task-low relationships style would have been more
appropriate for them in light of their education and experience. So
too, unstructured programs do not succeed universally with all students;
for those with clear goals and objectives, they are advantageous. For
students who lack self-direction and ability to structure their own work
schedule, a low-task-low relationships teaching style can be detrimental.
With these, and other examples, Hersey and Blanchard support
their contention that structured task behavior is appropriate for work-
ing with people of below average maturity. If one's followers progress
from below average to the above average maturity, a leader's behavior
should move through (2) high task-high relationships, (3) high relation-
ships-low task, to (4) low task-low relationships. Indeed, a leader can
assist followers in maturity development by changing leader behavior in
this sequence.
In order to determine the appropriate leader style in a given
situation, the practitioner must first have the diagnostic ability to
assess the maturity level of his or her followers. This is followed
by marking the assessed maturity level on the maturity continuum of the
Life Cycle Model, and drawing a vertical line from this point to
intersect with the style curve, (figure 15) The point of intersection
with the curve will fall within one of the four quadrants, and indicate
the appropriate leader style for that situation. This process is based
on two assumptions: that the practitioner has diagnostic skills, and
flexibility of leadership style. As Hersey and Blanchard emphasize:
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Figure 15. Determining Appropriate Leader Style
The importance of a leader’s diagnostic ahilii-.y
cannot be overemphasized.
. .Yet even with gooddiagnostic skills, a leader may still not be
effective unless he can adapt his leader
personality (style) to meet the demands of his
environment [p. 133],
57
CHAPTER IV
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
Introduction
This chapter will develop a framework which will be used to
analyze the cases under consideration. In order to develop this
analytic framework, two steps have already been taken. First, in
Chapter Two, a brief history of leadership theory has been presented,
showing the evolution of situational leadership theory. Secondly, in
Chapter Three, the Life Cycle Theory of leadership has been described,
demonstrating its development from, and relationship to, existing
theory. In this chapter, a comparison will be made between the Life
Cycle Theory and the situational theories previously discussed. From
this comparison, the components of the analytic framework will be
selected. In Chapters Five and Six this analytic framework will be
applied to the cases under consideration in this paper. It is hoped
that this application will demonstrate the usefulness and applicability
of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic tool for determining the most
appropriate leadership style in any given situation.
Content of the Analytic Framework
The framework (see figure 16) consists of three basic sections:
1 . Leader
2. Followers
3. Other factors in the situation
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Each section contains a number of sub-categories taken from the Life
Cycle Theory and related situational theories.
Since the purpose of this study is to demonstrate the usefulness
of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method, parts A and B of the
analytic framework include all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory.
Part C of the framework includes some situational variables which,
although not specifically stated in the Life Cycle Theory, are included
by Hersey and Blanchard in their discussion of leader effectiveness.
For them, a leader must diagnose not only the needs of the followers,
but also the needs of the situation, in order to determine the most
appropriate leader style.
An effective leader is able to adapt his
style of leader behavior to the needs of
situation and the followers [p. 80].
They illustrate this concept in the formula, effectiveness is a
function of the leader, followers, and the situation. E=f(l,f,s). The
function of leader has been defined as being divided into task and
relationships behaviors. The function of followers has been defined as
task relevant maturity, divided into achievement motivation, willing-
ness and ability to take responsibility, and task relevant education
and experience. The above are the two variables included in the Life
Cycle Theory.
Using the term 'environment’ and 'leadership situation' inter-
changeably, Hersey and Blanchard (1972, p. 109) view the leadership
situation as being made up of:
1. leader's personality (style) and expectations
2. followers' personalities (styles) and
expectations
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They suggest that this is only a partial list, and that
specific organizations may have additional
vanabies that are unique to themselves
which must be evaluated before determining
effectiveness [p. 121]. 6
Variables three through eight in the above list are not
incorporated in the Life Cycle Theory per se, but are part of the
general leadership situation which Hersey and Blanchard (1972, p. 80)
include as a function of leader effectiveness. As such, these variables
of the situation will also be considered in the following discussion.
This chapter then, will compare the variables of the Life Cycle
Theory delineated above, and the variables of the situation described
by Hersey and Blanchard, to those variables presented by the major
situational theorists in Chapter Two. The assumption here is that
there is a substantial agreement among all these various theories.
This comparison will provide the criteria for the analytic framework.
The following situational theorists reviewed in Chapter Two will
be included in the comparison:
1. Hemphill
2. Lowin and Craig
3* Farris and Lim
4. Fiedler
5. Lawrence and Lorsch
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While this writer has made every attempt to include all of the
situational factors mentioned by the writers cited above, and to compare
them to definitions used in the Life Cycle Theory, it must be acknowl-
edged that because of the different use of language, and the differing
degrees of comprehensiveness of each writer, all of these comparisons
can only be approximate.
Format of the Analytic Framework
This comparison of theories will be divided into three sections,
each focusing on one of the three variables which are postulated to
account for leader effectiveness: the leader, the followers, and the
situation. Each of these three sections will be accompanied by a chart
which will attempt to illustrate the comparisons. Because of the amount
of detail in the definition of the leader, the leader chart has been
expanded into two; one dealing with task behaviors, and the other with
relationships behaviors of the leader.
In each of the charts, the variable of leader, followers, and
situation as defined by Hersey and Blanchard appears in the centre of
the page. Surrounding it are the related dimensions set forth by the
situational theorists listed above.
Each of the variables as defined by Hersey and Blanchard is
shown in a circle divided into two parts: the upper portion gives the
name of the variable and general title for the definition, and the
lower portion gives the detailed definition of that variable.
Some of the theorists to be compared give a general reference
to a variable; such as, ’the leader: initiating structure behavior',
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or
-the leader: consideration behavior’, and do not give any details
or further definitions for that variable. Where this is the case, an
arrow has been drawn connecting the reference of the writer being cited
to the upper portion of the central circle. This indicates a general
comparison to the variable under consideration. Where writers have
given detailed definitions of a variable, an arrow has been drawn
connecting to the lower portion of the central circle. This indicates
a comparison between specific definitions of writers.
Leader
Task Behavior (figure 17). House, and Lowin and Craig divide
leadership generally into two broad categories of behavior, correspond-
ing to the task and relationships behaviors described in Life Cycle
Theory. House (1971) divides leader behavior into high initiating
structure behavior and high consideration behavior, and suggests when
each will be successful according to the nature of the task. Lowin and
Craig (1968) measured three aspects of supervisory behavior: closeness
of supervision, initiating structure and consideration for the sub-
ordinate, in relation to subordinates’ competence. For the purposes of
this comparison, closeness of supervision and initiating structure have
been combined under the heading 'initiating structure'.
Fiedler, Farris and Lim, and Hemphill divide leadership into two
broad categories, and elaborate on the behaviors in each category.
Fiedler (1958) described two types of leaders: one distant, rejecting
to those whom he considers to be potentially poor co-workers, and who
tends to judge the personalities of others in the light of their ability
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to do their job. The other type of leader has relatively greater feel-
ings of closeness, acceptance and warmth, even to those with whom he
cannot work, and would be less willing to reject a person just because
he cannot perform in a team situation. In his later work (1964),
Fiedler continued to explore the relationships between group performance
and leader attributes such as human relations orientation, close inter-
personal relations, and permissive accepting attitudes. In his
Leadership Contingency Model (1964) he divided leader behavior into two
types which bear resemblance to his 1958 leader descriptions. Measured
by Fiedler's Least Preferred Co-Worker questionnaire, one type of leader
(high LPC)
,
permissive and passive, is relationships oriented. The
other (low LPC), controlling and active, is task oriented.
Farris and Lim (1969) investigated the relationship between
leader behavior and subordinates' performance. They had leaders rated
according to Bowers and Seashore's (1966) four aspects of leadership
behavior: support, interaction facilitation, goal emphasis, and work
facilitation. Within these four categories, they measured a leader's:
1. sensitivity
2. giving of recognition
3. trust
4. stressing a feeling of price in the group
5. allowing freedom
6. encouraging speaking out
7. emphasizing teamwork
8. degree of punitiveness
9. pressure for performance
10. maintaining of performance standards
11. communication
In the above list, one through seven seem to relate to relationship
behavior, eight can refer both to task and relationships behavior, and
nine to eleven seem to relate to task behavior.
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Hemphill (1949), in his study of the relationships between
successful leader behavior and the characteristics of group situations,
developed six general descriptions of leader behavior:
1* ^ leader exhibits behavior that advances the
purpose of the group
2. indicates competence in administrative
functions
3. inspires members to greater activity
4. sets the pace for the group
5. enables the individual to feel secure in
his place in the group
6. does not serve his own interests
One through four in the above list fall under task behavior, while five
and six are a part of relationships behavior.
Relationships Behavior (figure 18). House (1971), and Lowin and
Craig’s (1968) second broad category of leader behavior - consideration
behavior - is compared to the relationships behavior of Life Cycle
Theory. Fiedler’s (1964) other extreme of leader behavior - high L.P.C.,
permissive and passive - is compared to the definition of relationships
%
behavior in Life Cycle Theory.
As well, Farris and Lim's (1969) previously noted list of
leader behaviors including sensitivity, giving of recognition, trust,
stressing a feeling of pride in the group, allowing freedom, encouraging
speaking out, emphasizing teamwork, and being non-punitive are shown
compared to the definition of relationships behavior of Life Cycle
Theory
.
As mentioned above, Hemphill (1949), in his general descriptions
of leader behavior, included enabling the group member to feel secure in
his place in the group and not serving his own interests.
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As Hemphill explored his hypothesis that the behavior of a
leader which results in being recognized as a good leader may also make
group membership a pleasant, satisfying experience, and foster unity
and cohesiveness, he tested several leadership betaviors. His purpose
was to see under what conditions a leader acting in this way would be
seen as effective or inadequate in the eyes of the group. These tested
behaviors included:
1. quickness of, confidence in, and keeping to
decisions
2. control of emotions
3. being authoritative
4. showing obligation to the group
5* acting as a member of the group
While number one above appears to relate to task, or initiating
structure behavior, two to five in the above list seem to relate to
relationships or consideration behavior, in that they would affect the
relationships between the leader and group members.
When tested, all of the behaviors in the above list were
verified as being situationally effective. Control of emotions was
tested as the degree to which a leader maintains emotional control over
him or herself, even loses control of emotions. Emotionality was seen
as influencing the reactions of the group to the leader. Authoritative
behavior was shown to have an impact on leader-member relationships,
either improving or destroying the attitude to the leader, depending
upon the nature of the group. Leader obligation is the extent to which
a leader will risk his or her personal welfare for the group. Again,
this behavior influenced the relationships between leader and group,
either positively or negatively, depending on the type of group.
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Finally, membership is the extent to which a leader becomes a member
of the group, as opposed to seeking socioemotional support outside it.
Whether a leader prefers the company of superiors, rather than the
group, will affect leader member relations positively or negatively,
depending upon the nature of the group.
Position Power and Personal Power . Before leaving the discus-
sion of leader behavior, a word must be said about position power and
personal power, two aspects of leadership that cannot be ignored.
Position power (figure 19), is mentioned by Hemphill, Fiedler, and
Hersey and Blanchard as a variable affecting leadership effectiveness.
It has been placed here as a separate item, for unlike task and
relationships behaviors which are within the control of a leader, the
power derived from position is outside the control of the leader. He
or she cannot act to create this power within themselves} it is inherent
in the position, not in him or herself.
HERSEY & BLANCHARD
LEADER FUNCTIONS
POSITION POWER OF LEADER
HEMPHILL & OHIO STATE FIEDLER
STUDIES
POWER & AUTHORITY
PRESTIGE OF LEADER IN
LEADER POSITION
Figure 19. Leader Position Power Comparisons
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Harder to define is personal power. References to personal
power are not abundant in the writings of the situational theorists
being compared in this section. In their analysis of five types of
power, French and Raven (1959) describe "referent power [p. 28]" as
power based on the follower’s identification with the leader. They
define identification as the follower's "feeling of oneness [p. 29]"
with the leader, or "a desire for such an identity [p. 29]." Thus
because of attraction to the leader, the follower will desire close
association, and the leader will have the ability to influence the
follower without attempting to do so. French and Raven suggest as
a further hypothesis that the more the follower is attracted to the
leader, the broader the range of the leaders referent power will be.
However, after describing French and Raven's study, Cartwright (1965)
concludes that "little is known about the determinants of the range
of referent power [p. 29]."
French and Raven's definition of referent power seems to echo
Redl's (19^2) description of how a leader influences a group or person.
According to Redl, when a relationship exists between a person and a
group which is characterized by love of the central person by the group
members, then the group or followers will attempt to incorporate the
personality of the central person into their ego ideal; that is, they
will wish to become the kind of person he or she is (Gibb, 1959, p. 881).
Hersey and Blanchard (1972) describe both Etzioni's and
Machiavelli's concept of personal power. According to Etzioni, it
accrues to a leader who derives his or her power from followers. Gibb
(1959) restates this as occurring when the leader's authority is
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spontaneously accorded him or her by fellow group members, the followers.
For Machiavelli, personal power comes from a relationship built on love.
Fiedler (1958) described two attributes that a leader must have,
concurrently, and the first is that the leader must be acceptable to his
or her followers. Fiedler defines that operationally as "sociometric
acceptance [p. 1)3]." This is of such importance that without it, group
performance cannot be predicted.
It is conceivable that a leader could pratice all the relation-
ships behaviors previously discussed, and still have little personal
power. There seems to be an additional element to personal power which
is not explained in the definitions of relationships behavior.
Machiavelli associated personal power with lovej others associate it
with charisma. Allowing it to evade behavioral definition, it seems
clear that personal power is associated with the relationship between
leader and followers, and must be considered in any analysis of leadership.
Followers
Fiedler, Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, Secord and Bachman
and Hemphill all describe the followers as a variable affecting leader-
ship. (See figure 20). Fiedler (1964) lists six situational factors
likely to affect a leader’s influence:
1. personal relations with group members
2. the power and authority provided by the
leader's position
3. the degree of structure in the task
4. the relative abilities of the leader
and the group members
5. members' motivation
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6
.
the extent to which the group is
operating under conditions of external
stress.
Of these six factors, four - the relative abilities of group members,
and five - members' motivation, are factors relating to the followers.
In their 1968 study of how managerial style can be affected by
subordinate productivity, Lowin and Craig set up a laboratory situation
in which 'subordinates' were to perform their jobs in a highly produc-
tive and non-productive manner; that is, they acted as competent and
incompetent employees. Thus in this experiment, Lowin and Craig defined
followers in terms of their productivity.
Farris and Lim (1969) investigated how performance of sub-
ordinates affects leadership. In this experiment, leaders were told
that their group was high performing, or low performing. As in Lowin
and Craig's study, followers were described in terms of their
productivity.
Although Lowin and Craig, Farris and Lim, and Fiedler, all
discuss followers as a situational variable, none details characteris-
tics of followers to Hemphill's extent. In order to investigate the
characteristics of group situations as they are related to leader
behavior, Hemphill (1949) developed fifteen dimensions by which he
measured and described groups:
1. size
2. viscidity (morale)
3. homogeneity
4. flexibility (how formal or informal)
5. permeability
6. polarization (group's purpose: single or diverse)
7. stability
8. intimacy
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HemDhill
.degree of dependence .size
.degree of participation .homogeneity
.degree of petency .permeability
.position .degree of control
.autonomy .degree of satisfaction
.stability (hedonic tone)
.type of purpose-single or .degree of intimacy
diverse (polarization) .morale (viscidity)
.flexibility (decree of formality
Figure 20. Followers Comparison of Variables
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9.
autonomy
10. control
11. position
12. potency
13. hedonic tone (satisfaction)
14. participation
15 . dependence
Three of Hemphill's group dimensions refer exclusively to
interpersonal relations among the followers: 1) degree of satisfaction
(hedonic tone), 2) degree of intimacy, and 3) morale (viscidity). These
dimensions, all relating to feelings among the followers, are not
included in the definition of maturity in Life Cycle Theory. They
suggest that a further exploration (beyond the scope of this paper)
into member relations might discover another important variable
influencing leader effectiveness.
Situation
For the theorists being compared in part two of this chapter,
the situation is a key variable in effective leadership. (See figure
21). In Management of Organizational Behavior (1972), Hersey and
Blanchard describe eight variables in the situation, previously listed
in this paper, and suggest there may be many more. From their list, we
have discussed so far the leader and the followers, the variables in the
Life Cycle Theory. However, according to Hersey and Blanchard, the
situation also includes superiors, associates, the organization, job
demands, and time. They point out that to be effective, a leader must
diagnose not only the followers, but also the needs of the situation.
Superiors, associates, and the organization are focused on by
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in their study of organizational effective-
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Fiedler
.degree of complexity
of task
.extent to which group
operating under conditions
of external stress
Lawrence & Lorsoh
• factors in the environment :
-rate of change
-certainty of information about conditions
-rate of feedback
•
,organizational structure in each dept .:
-span of control
-number of levels to a shared supervisor
-time span of review
-importance of formal review
-importance of formal rules
-criteria for evaluation
. interpersonal orientation of each dept .:
-concern for task
-concern for social relationships
. time orientation of each dept .
..goal orientation of each dept.
Figure 21. Situation Comparison of Variables
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ness. They outline four factors influencing the organization. With
respect to each department in the organization they consider:
1. its structure
2. its interpersonal orientation
3* its time orientation
4. its goal orientation.
Lawrence and Lorsch also discuss the environment as an influence upon
the situation. Gibb (1959) mentions this as one of his five categories
of behavioral determinants in the situation and describes it as "the
characteristics of the total culture in which the group exists and from
which the members come [p. 901]."
In Fiedler's (1964) list of six situational factors likely to
influence a leader, previously cited in this paper, two factors not
referring to the leader or the followers are:
1. the degree of structure in the task
2. the extent to which the group is operating
under conditions of external stress.
As Lawrence and Lorsch, Gibb and Fiedler consider situational
variables other than the leader and the followers, the following emerge
as commonly mentioned:
1. the organization
2. the environment and stress in the environment
3. the nature of the task.
Summary of the Analytic Framework
In order to arrive at the final analytic framework, this section
will summarize what has been said by the situational theorists discussed
in this chapter. All theorists reviewed agree on the behavior of the
leader as one key variable in effective leadership, and divide leader
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behavior into two categories. Using Life Cycle Theory terms, these are
1) task behavior and 2) relationships behavior. As well, five theorists
cite personal power and position power as important variables in leader-
ship.
All of the theorists reviewed agreed that the followers are
another key variable in effective leadership. The definition of
followers according to Life Cycle Theory is supported. In addition,
four writers include productivity in their description of followers.
One theorist discussed interpersonal relations among followers as
important in describing the followers. This may be summarized as
morale
.
Ten writers agreed on the situation as a variable in effective
leadership. Most included the leader and followers as variables in the
situation. Out of the many situational variables mentioned, those
frequently described which will be included in this framework are: the
organization, including superiors and associates, the task (job), the
environment, and time.
Not all writers defined these aspects of the situation opera-
tionally. Therefore each of these situational variables will be defined
according to different theorists. For the variable of the organization .
Lawrence and Lorsch's definition will be utilized. The variable of
superiors and associates will be defined according to leadership style
using the Life Cycle Theory of leadership, and personal and position
power. The variable of the task or job will be defined according to
Fiedler’s degree of complexity. The variable of time will be defined
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according to Lawrence and Lorsch as short term or long term. The
variable of the environment will be defined according to Fiedler in
terms of degree of stress. The final framework is presented in figure 16
Methodology for the Study
1. For each of the five cases to be considered in this study,
first a brief account of the case will be given. This account will be
a precis of approximately twenty pages drawn by the writer from the
original published case source. This account will be presented in three
stages, so divided by the writer:
A. Before change
B. During change
C. After change
2. An analysis of the case will follow the account. The
analysis will be divided into three stages corresponding to the three
stages in the account of the case:
A. Before change
B. During change
C. After change
Each of the three parts of the analytic framework — the leader, the
followers and the situation — will be applied to each stage in the
analysis. Given the information available in the case description, the
writer will attempt to classify the data according to the categories
in the analytic framework. Through this classification, the writer
will attempt to diagnose the nature of the situation, leadership style
of the key leaders in the case, and level of follower maturity, in each
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stage of the ease. The appropriateness of the leadership style to the
follower maturity and situation will be determined using the Life Cycle
Model
.
3. Each analysis will conclude with a siranary of the factors
which, in the writer's opinion, contributed to the success or failure
of the attempted change effort in each case. This summary will be made
in the light of the analytic framework, with particular reference to
the Life Cycle Theory.
4. After presenting and analyzing five case studies, the
writer will present her conclusions on:
A. the usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory as a
diagnostic method for determining the most
appropriate leadership style in any situation
B. any patterns in leadership styles for the
successful and unsuccessful cases.
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CHAPTER V
UNSUCCESSFUL AND MIXED SUCCESS CASE STUDIES
Case One:
—Creating an Onen Snhnni
Background
This case is taken from Anatomy of Educational Innovation by
Louis M. Smith and Pat M. Keith (1971). In the early sixties, a
uniquely designed elementary school building was constructed in the
Ohio River valley. In keeping with its architecture, the school was to
pioneer a new, innovative program of open education. Louis Smith and
Pat Keith, funded by The United States Office of Education, undertook
as a research project the study of the development of the school. Their
foci included! the development of the faculty social system, the
teachers’ innovations in education, the development of the pupils’
social system, the influence process, what and how cliques are formed,
and the Principal's decision-making role.
At the invitation of the Superintendent, the Curriculum Director
and the Principal, Smith and Keith spent one year in the school as
observers. Their copious "on the scene" observation notes were
supplemented by informal interviews, verbatim accounts of meetings,
and intensive analysis of school records. Both were "in the building"
at all times; from the beginning of the teachers' summer preparatory
workshop to the June close of the first academic year. What follows is
a precis of their chronicle of a failed attempt in innovative education.
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The Area
Before Change
Kensington school was built in the early 1960's in a lower
middle class white suburban district outside a large deteriorating
metropolitan area in the Ohio river valley. The Milford district,
grown several times over
,
was peopled with new arrivals who wanted
their children to have a better education than they. The parents
projected aspirations for their children that were higher than the
district wide ability tests indicated were feasible.
The District
The Milford district's reputation as a community that fought
over its school program had been gained through its record of bond
and tax problems, squabbles in firing, rehiring and then retiring the
previous superintendent. The district also sought outside funds
continuously.
Educational Leaders
In public schools, the community elects the school board
which in turn hires a superintendent who is responsible for staffing
the schools. (See figure 22). The prior superintendent had been
articulate and bright, a "comer", who held strong interests in develop-
ing a unique, novel and ultra contemporary educational program in the
Milford district. Steven Spanman, the present superintendent, had
intentions of national leadership by Milford. While the board and
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PRINCIPAL OF KENSIN(
Eugene Shelby
DEPUTY SUPERINTEND]
CURRICULUM DIRECT(
Jerl Cohen
SUPERINTENDENT
Steven Spanraan
SCHOOL BOARD
and
Hired by
Superintendent
Hired by
School Board
Elected by
public
Figure 22. Structure of Educational Leadership in Milford
District
central office staff supported Spanman in the majority of decisions,
they were split over the grand design for Milford and the specific
program at Kensington; the old guard viewed Kensington with suspicion.
Spanman, deputy superintendent and curriculum directly Jerl
Cohen, and Eugene Shelby, principal of Kensington, were friends and
intimate colleagues. Shelby was not a part of the old guard group of
elementary school principals in the district; in fact, they viewed him
as a deviant newcomer. An observer noted that "Spanman, Eugene and
Jerl are the in-group or ruling clique of the school". All three had
a strong desire to have an impact on American education.
Though apart from the district patrons, Spanman, Cohen and
Shelby assumed the district to be ready for change. The populace,
only partly aware of the changes underway, circulated a number of half-
truths about Kensington, which remained uncorrected, for Spanman,
Cohen and Shelby felt that parents would not understand what they were
trying to do.
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Kensington’s Formal Dnot-nino
The formal doctrine of Kensington developed out of two docunents:
the Maodate, issued by the superintendent, and the Insti fitinn^i p 1a „
developed from the Mandate by the principal. The Mandate was first
presented by Spanman to the total school faculty during the summer work-
shop preceding the beginning of school. Said Spanman:
We want adults who have developed effective
language techniques, life-long habits of
continuous learning and values which guide
them as individuals and as members of society.
To accomplish this,
We are looking for ways of re-organizing the
curriculum.... The curriculum (will be)
determined by the needs of the pupils
The faculty will do this The faculty is
the curriculum.
He continued, stating that the school should have varied lengths of time
in the school day, no bells, pupils coming and going at will, be open to
two, three and four year olds, have a completely individualized program,
and operate on a twelve month schedule. Further, Kensington was to be a
"protected subculture" which "will protect good teachers from being
influenced by group norms". Spanman concluded his remarks with "A man's
reach should exceed his grasp or else what's a heaven for?"
The Institutional Plan was the design of the school according to
the principal. Its three goals, as presented to visiting reporters,
educators and parents were:
1. To assist pupils to become fully functioning
mature human beings.
2. To meet the needs of individual differences
by providing a differentiated program.
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3. To provide the skills, structures and under-
standings which will enable pupils to identifv
worthwhile goals for themselves.
1 y
The doctrine treated issues on an abstract level and did not define
terms operationally.
Organization of the Snhnni
Figure 23 shows the organization of Kensington according to
Shelby’s plan. According to the Institutional Plan,
Principal
Secretary
Instructional
Materials Specialist
Library Clerk
Audio Visual
Technician
Physical Education
Specialist
Creative Arts
Specialist
Counselor
(one-fourth time)
Teacher Aid
Instructional
Clerk
INDEPENDENT STUDY DIVISION
Language Arts
Specialist
Science
Specialist
Math
Specialist
Social Studies
Specialist
Academic Academic Academic
Counselor Counselor Counselor
Transition Division
Teacher Teacher Teacher
90 Pupils
Basic Skills Division
3 Teachers 3 Teachers
V
90
V'
90
Pupils Pupils
Kindegarten
Figure 23. Kensington's Organization
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0f individualized learning was
o include team teaching, ungradedness and totaldemocratic pupil-teaching decision making.
The organization of the school was to depend
on the program.
Aware, and skeptical of classical management theory, Shelby told an
observer that at Kensington "span of control" and "unit of authority"
were being deliberately violated, and he was interested in the
consequences of this.
Jargon
Along with the doctrine, a jargon arose. One teacher,
complaining she felt brainwashed, said that when she was finished with
the year, there were three words she would never use again: "Concep-
tualize", "fully functioning", and "process". An observer noted:
The program of the school is so clouded with cliches
and razzle-dazzle that it is very difficult to see
clearly what will happen to the children.
The Building
For the first time in the United States, such a program was to
be implemented with a corresponding new uniquely designed building.
(See figure 24). The building won an award for architectural design,
and was much visited.
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1 . Covered play shelter 2. Stage 3. Administrative suite
4. Childrens' Theatre 5. Projection Room 6. Acting Tower
7.
10.
Curriculum Center
Laboratory Suites
(101-120)
8. Aquarium 9. Perception Core
Figure 24. Floor Plan of Kensington School
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It was described in the document from the Architectural Design Institute
as follows:
fact a prototype of evolutionary progress is
educational growth. It is a facility offering
facility and speed, mobility and flexibility to
a nongraded, organic, fluid approach to inquiry.
The Teachers
Shelby hired a teaching staff he felt would be compatible with
the school doctrine. In general the twenty-one faculty were:
3. Very able intellectually Three had completed all but their
doctoral dissertations.
According to an observer, they seemed an unusual group: young, more
than a little bit bright, enthusiastic, with an excitement about
teaching "even though they are not very specific and clear about this
yet". During the first few days of the summer workshop they had high
morale, and an aura of 'We can do it and what we're doing is important'.
1. New to the district So they could be trained more easily
in new procedures.
2. Inexperienced Seven had no experience; two more than
twenty years; the rest less than five
years
4. Politically liberal One of the central office staff said,
"Not a Republican in the group".
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The Summer Workshop
A summer workshop was held for the faculty between August 10 and
September 8. For the first week, primarily through Shelby's efforts,
National Training Laboratories conducted T-group training. Because of
his past experiences in similar programs, Shelby thought his decision
was "intuitively good", and that he "could build a rationale after the
fact about it". The purposes of the T-groups were to plan for the
coming year, to enable the faculty to "begin to become a group", "to
get to know one another, and to learn to work together".
During the T-group week the principal introduced his Institu-
tional Plan. It was presented as a given, and he indicated that a
serious problem would arise if personal goals were radically different
from the plan. He was most reluctant to depart from the plan and
create new and different structures with the staff. One of the
observers commented:
Eugene's comments came like a blast a lunch yesterday.
His feelings and continual reiteration of the plan
raised some skepticism in a few of the people.
This week was characterized by revelations of self, revelations
about salary, and some intense development of empathy. Teachers'
reactions to the T-groups subsequently appeared in The Bulletin:
Although a group development laboratory is never
a comfortable thing to participate in, it should
prove helpful to us as we work together during
the year. . .
.
We will not deny the frustration of the experience,
but undoubtedly it will prove to have been most
profitable as we work together toward our goal
this year. . .
.
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According to an observer, the T-groups highlighted and legitimized high
emotionality, self-revelation, and decision making by consensus. Inter-
personal communication was of the utmost importance
. There was a
minimum of concentration on nuts and bolts issues. These effects were
felt all year long.
At the beginning of the second week, the principal chaired a
total staff meeting at which he stated that for the remainder of the
workshop, the faculty were to meet in their teams as they deemed
necessary to prepare for school opening. In addition, the faculty
were to indicate which of eight committees they would like to be on,
fill out daily logs, and to be on individual schedules with the
principal.
During this period, difficulties in the team and committee
meetings arose. One teacher noted that when the principal was not in
the group, it made tremendous progress. Another teacher expressed
irritation at the railroading of items, the inability of anybody to
get anything done in the committee, and the number of committees she
was on (three). She said, "If things don’t straighten out very soon,
I'll pack up my bag and go home". None of the committees produced any
authoritative position papers.
At the end of the third week . Bill Kirkham, an experienced
teacher on the ISD team, was fired. The stated reasons were that his
point of view was too different and that he blocked the smooth
functioning of the team. The apparent group decision was made at an
Independent Study Division (I.S.D.) team meeting. Various reasons were
put forward for why this happened:
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1 .
2 .
3 .
The outside consultant who was working withthis team had behaved inappropriately.
A scapegoating because of the team's failureto progress.
Bill's curriculum ideas
principal.
were a threat to the
This episode increased distrust, fear and guilt in the ISD team.
In the final week two parent meetings were held. One was a
large protest meeting over the book and fee assessment that had been
levied against each pupil. In the second meeting, the principal and
faculty sought to explain the program. The parents asked specific
questions: How do the teachers know what the individual children are
doing? How do the children get instruction in spelling? What happens
to the children if these two years turn out to be a failure? They
were concerned, confused and hostile over the promotion, grading, and
report cards. In short, the parents were divided into a small loyal
group and a large opposed group.
During Change
Opening Dav
When the summer workshop ended on September 8, the opening day
of school, the staff were still making organizational plans. Because
the new building was not finished, the three divisions were given
temporary quarters in three nearby schools.
ISD Division . The 210 students in the Independent Studies
Division gathered on the first day in the Milford High gym. These
observations were recorded during the day:
90
MorriiDg. Children arrive well dressed and well
seriibhed
- parents angry over lack of bus
schedule - noise level rising - temperature
rising - humidity increasing
- only David's
group reading - teachers and kids milling
about - some horseplay - some students sit attables and gaze about - kids in David's group
sitting like chained muted animals as David
Pyifig to conduct a T—group — noise high -
observer about to get a headache.
Noon. Tremendous amount of listless behavior -
one teacher left her group because the students
would not do anything - a few of the older and
brighter kids seem able to handle freedom and
are working on their log sheets.
Four. Staff seems exhausted.
Four-thirty pm . Kids lined up for buses - no
one knows when or where they will come - they
arrive at 4:45 pm. - kids passive.
After the first day the teachers realized that it was possible
that the children in ISD would not be able to work in an individualized,
independent program. Many of the students could not write, and there-
fore could not fill in their daily log, even with supervision. As the
teachers had not agreed upon a uniform method for signing up for learn-
ing groups, many children were unable to schedule instruction. At the
close of day two, two ISD teachers decided on a self-contained area.
Transition Division . The 90 students in the Transition Division
were housed in one large room and two classrooms in Milford Junior High.
An observer noted that on the first day "nothing went right". Some of
the students arrived before 9 am. and the buses did not come until 5 pm.
leaving a very tired staff. The teachers described the noise as "chaos".
At the end of the first day, they decided to go toward more traditional
teaching methods, and assigned 30 students to each team member while
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noting that this was contrary to the Kensington philosophy, which none
of them was sure would work anyway.
Basic Skills Division
. The 180 students and six teachers in
Basic Skills were located in Hillside Elementary School. Because of
disagreements during the summer workshop, the teachers had already
split into a team of four and a team of two. The team of four had
a difficult time holding the childrens’ interest the first day. Very
tired and confused, they met at the end of the day and commented that
the lack of structure actually bound them a great deal, inhibiting
their freedom.
The team of two, composed of one very experienced teacher,
and one new teacher, presented an academically—oriented and traditional
program the first day. An observer noted that "It will be interesting
if this team works the smoothest and most efficiently".
October Developments
The teachers coped with long bus waits, with a lack of materials
and facilities, with a high noise level which caused some teachers to
get whistles, with attempting to get to know about 200 students each,
with a majority of children who were unable to devise and carry out
individual work plans, with great demands on their time, and with teach-
ing a variety of subjects though hired for two areas of competency.
Team teaching was affected. Experienced teachers said they
could provide more individual pupil decision making in a self-contained
classroom where their behavior was not contingent upon their (inexpe-
rienced) teaching peers. At a team level, there were no norms except
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for the lack of rules. Risks were high, for when one did act, his or
her assumptions and actions were subject to team scrutiny. To act at
all came to be identified with a lack of concern for the team, and to
risk being charged with directiveness.
Many teachers were discouraged. Sick of the dust, dirt,
confusion, lack of order and noise, two members of Basic Skills were
thinking of quitting at mid-term. One said, "Almost everybody is
giving serious thought about not coming back next year".
There was reluctance to tell the principal. As one teacher
put it, "It's his baby, and you can't tell a person that his baby is
no good". On his part, the principal told an observer that he was
troubled by the sterile programs being offered in some classes, by
personal anxiety, by his relationship with an outside consultant, and
by feelings of "general apprehension and anxiousness". Further, he
felt that some of the staff did not appreciate the freedom he had given
them, and that some teachers were inadequate.
November: The New Building
The building had won an award for "Imaginative architecture
leading to intriguing design This building is flexible, free flowing
and functional...." Differences between the ideal, as described in the
architect's design, and the real, as experienced by the teachers and
students, developed. These differences caused new problems for the
teachers to cope with.
The Teacher Work Center (see figure 24) became an informal
gathering place for teachers and office personnel to liave lunch, drink
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coffee and talk, and for staff and community meetings. The Perception
£org, for student study, became used as extra teaching space and a
hallway, as the building had no corridors. Lavatories were individual,
and became gathering places and playgrounds for the children. Teachers
had continual problems keeping the students out of them.
The classrooms, called Learning Laboratory Suites
,
were twenty
open spaces separated by moveable dividers and equipped with overhead
projectors. Because of the emphasis on "process curriculum", no teacher
would admit to having a prepared set of transparencies. As well, time
and energy restrictions caused teachers to move to blackboard use.
The ampitheatre-1ike Physical Education Shelter , substituting
for a gymnasium, was to be surrounded by shrubbery, warmed by infra-red
heaters, and used by students for physical education, and the community
for concerts. Because the shrubbery was never planted, the wind blew
rain, snow and dirt into the area. The heating units, designed for
California, were totally inadequate. The field could not be used
because of the new grass. Thus the planned physical education program
could not be carried out.
Because the Satellite Kitchens were too small, hot food had to
be brought in daily from other schools. There were no lunchrooms. As
a result, classroom spaces were used for eating, and litter and garbage
accumulated. The open Administrative Suite afforded no privacy to the
principal, secretary, nurse and speech teacher who all worked there.
The Auditorium was never used instructionally; on several occasions it
was used by large parent groups.
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The ~lIdrens ' Theatre was a large open space surrounded by
three acting areas, two joined by a bridge which crossed a life science
stream. This area was carpeted, as was the whole school. According to
the observers, the theatre was the most successful and creative part of
the school. Through the efforts of the teachers, many productions took
place.
December: The Rules
In response to the discipline problems just after the move,
parental pressure, and his own feelings of anxiety, the principal
issued two sets of rules. The first set, on December 8th, contained
35 rules relating to general policies and operating procedures. Some
of the rules covered: where and when lunch would be served, the use
of permission slips to go home for lunch, and to enter the Perception
Core, when pupils should arrive at school, where the students should
walk in the school, how the teachers were to write reports about mis-
behavior and keep records of chronic misbehavior which were to be given
to the principal.
The second set of ten administrative regulations appeared
December 14th. Some of the rules covered: not keeping children after
school without the consent of the parents, not allowing children outside
the building unless the teacher had given permission, making requests
for custodial help to the office instead of the custodian, the use of
permanent passes to the Perception Core for consistently conscientious
students, and limitations on the use of AV equipment to three office
personnel.
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The staff reacted to these rules with hostility, particularly
those who most closely identified with early versions of the formal
doctrine. The rules were perceived both as a retreat from Kensington's
doctrine, and as coming from the principal. An observer noted a lack
Of spirit in the overall staff. The dejected teachers appeared to have
lost any faith they previously had in a democratically functioning
staff. When asked if the staff were consulted, one teacher said:
Yes, we were consulted, and we told him (the
principal) what we did not want. After we
told him this, he left it in anyway.
She did not hide her feelings that this had been a fake democratic
approach by the principal.
Christmas holidays found the faculty tired, frustrated and ill.
The majority took full vacations away from the area. An observer noted
that this would leave little time for planning for the next semester
and "should put them in the soup all spring".
January; Publicity and Reorganization
After Christmas, many reporters and observers visited the
school. Kensington also achieved prominence as the major plank in the
Milford school district’s bid for private and federal funds to support
the curriculum reorganization project. All of this created excitement,
enthusiasm and euphoria in the staff. An observer noted, "Everyone
is kind of high".
However, behind the scenes, problems continued. Clerical
problems were severe; parents were dissatisfied; teachers spent long
96
hours producing instructional materials; supplies frequently ran out;
the lack of textbooks began to be felt.
On January 9th, in response to parental reaction, the principal
initiated a change to a series of self-contained classrooms in the ISD
Division. The principal chaired the meeting at which this decision was
made. According to the transcripts of that meeting, members hardly
talked. After the meeting was over, The Bulletin announced that as of
February 1st, the ISD Division would consist of five academic advisors
who would be totally responsible for 40 pupils each. Co-operative
teaching would be encouraged, but on an informal basis. Teacher re-
actions varied:
I'm quite opposed. I don't like the large
group instruction and it doesn't fit what
I want to do.
I'm in agreement. This is more what I wanted
anyway.
I see it as a necessary step.
April and Mav Developments
In April and May, the district was in the throes of a tax
campaign which failed. Following this, scapegoats were sought;
Kensington was a plausible possibility. The superintendent had
problems with growing board opposition, lack of teacher support, and
trouble with central office staff with whom he had only had a couple
of general meetings in the last three years. At a May meeting, the
parents said they did not understand what the school was trying to do.
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The teachers expressed various frustrations. One of the
teachers with 28 years of experience said she felt she had been a total
failure during the year, and for that reason decided not to return.
This sentiment was echoed by other experienced teachers. Another
teacher, looking back, said he felt problems had been aided by the T-
groups which ironically had caused some of the difficulties they were
trying to overcome.
The Final Staff Meeting
On May 24th, the principal set the agenda and chaired a meeting
for the next year’s staff. Eight of the old staff and two new staff
were present. The principal outlined the situation for the coming year:
1. 40% reduction in custodial budget
2. reduction of two teacher aides
3. interns turned down by the board, one of whom
said people were tired of everything going to
Kensington
4. materials budget cut from $10,000 to $2,500
5. plans for a two week summer workshop contingent
on foundation support which the principal
thought was not probable.
Discussion ensued about the pupils, curriculum, other schools,
and record keeping. Doubts were raised about pupil grouping; no
decision was made. The principal stated that:
Curriculum development will have to be done
locally. My own feeling is that next year we
should emphasize local need. The other goals
require additional financial and human resources.
We must be realistic.
Along with this, visits to other schools were discussed. The principal
broadened this to "improving relationships with the other schools in
98
the district". Formalized record keeping was raised; though the
principal tried for a motion on the subject, none was forthcoming. No
decision was made.
After Change
The Principal
The principal left in the middle of the second year. A going
away party, "quite an emotional undertaking" according to an observer,
was held for him in February. At the party, the principal stated that
the school would not be so tied up with local control in the future.
In his eyes, the reasons for the difficulties were public opinion in
the community, and the lack of resources to carry out the task.
According to a teacher
,
the "villian" was the district which wouldn't
support the idea the school was trying to convey. With Shelby's
departure, the administration chose a conservative successor.
The Faculty
With a new principal, policy shifts occurred in the school,
causing a continued faculty turnover. Almost all the teachers who
came in the second year left before the third year. New faculty were
more traditional. Classes became pretty much self-contained.
Educational Leaders
Two years after Kensington began, the school board changed.
The curriculum director left after the first year. The superintendent
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resigned after a year-s leave of absence, to be replaced with a more
conservative successor. Kensington was now, both in philosophy and
action, part of "the old Milford".
Analysis of Case Onp
The natural tendency of all systems is toward
disorder, or entropy.
.. .There is no escaping
the need for some system of control in organiza-
tions, including participative organizations...
to forestall the inevitable deterioration into
randomness.
Arnold S. Tannenbaum
Control in Organizations
Before Change
The Situation
Ideal—structure of the organization
. In this case, the organiza-
tion did not yet exist; it was to be created. Let us look then, at the
organization as it was supposed to be. In general terms, this school
was to be a completely participative organization, akin to Likert’s
(1961) system four organization:
1. Motivational forces arise from group processes.
Group participates in setting goals, improving
methods, and appraising progress toward goals.
Strongly favorable attitudes toward implement-
ing organizational goals.
2. Favorable cooperative attitudes throughout the
organization with mutual trust and confidence.
High job satisfaction.
3. Communication flows freely vertically, and
horizontally.
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5. Decision making widely shared. Widespread
responsibility for the control process.
The principal said that "span of control" and "unit of authority" were
to be deliberately violated in this school. There were to be no
department heads, but teaching teams. Neither formal rules nor formal
review were to exist. Review and criteria for evaluation were not
mentioned. There was to be total democratic teacher-pupil decision
making
.
In terms of interpersonal orientation, there was to be a high
concern for social relationships. The summer T-groups were to socialize
the staff to this behavior.
The Mandate and Institutional Plan set forth many general goals
for the school which might be summarized as: to produce a "fully
functioning pupil", able to work independently, who will become a
"fully functioning" mature human being. The means to attain this end
were to be left completely up to the teacher and the individual student.
Each student was to develop his or her own program; there was to be no
set curriculum.
Ideal task. With a freely developing curriculum, the task of
the various teachers would be ambiguous (no set methods), highly varied
(each student would have an individual program), and highly interdepend-
ent (total democratic teacher-pupil decision making and team teaching).
Ideal environment . The rate of change in the environment was
slow, marked by the re-election of the school board every two years.
Information about conditions in the environment would be certain,
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through the central office, the principals in the district, and the
parents. Rate of feedback to the school would be high, through the
parents. However, this was not to affect Kensington which was to be a
"protected subculture". The teachers would thus not be affected by
"group norms" from the environment. Any stress in the environment was
not to affect the teachers and students.
What a System Four Organization Nppd.^
According to Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), this type of organiza-
tion requires a high degree of integration. Likert himself (1961)
posits system four, participative management, as an "ideal". In order
to achieve it, an organization will need:
1. a leader who can create a situation in which
members establish high performance goals for
themselves
2. good communications
3. an atmosphere free of hostility, fear,
distrust, unreasonable pressure, conflict
between employees and supervisors
4. machinery to handle conflict
5. personnel skilled in group process
6. a work group with high confidence, trust,
loyalty and co-operative motivation.
The leaders who created Kensington attempted to achieve these
conditions by providing:
1. a one month summer workshop with T-groups
for the total staff
2. a system of team teaching
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3» complete freedom to the teachers in creatine
the curriculum K
4. democratic decision making
5. a specially designed open building; a
"protected" environment.
Yet in spite of all these things, the creation of this open school
failed completely. How did it happen? To clarify this, let us look
more closely at the various groups of people involved.
Real environment
. The Milford district generally held
traditional attitudes toward schooling. Half of the school board,
hslf of the central office staff, and all of the elementary school
principals were described as "old guard". The previous superintendent
who had ideas of developing an ultra contemporary educational program
had been fired, rehired and retired.
The district was active in educational affairs. The central
office sought outside funds continuously, as for example, the curriculum
reorganization project. Parents fought over bond and tax problems.
They frequently held meetings at which they protested over actions of
which they did not approve, as in the case of the student fees levied
by Kensington, and the matter of the previous superintendent. Ambitious
for their children, the parents were actively involved in school affairs.
Principal's Superiors and Associates . Close friends and
colleagues, the superintendent, Steven Spanman, deputy superintendent
and curriculum director Jerl Cohen, and principal Eugene Shelby worked
together to bring about the dream of Kensington. Spanman wrote the
Mandate for the school; Cohen sought a foundation grant to support the
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project, and Shelby designed the school in his Institutional Plan,
derived from the Mandate. All three had a strong desire to have an
impact on American education.
In working together they looked more to each other for guidance
and support than to their constituencies. Spanman held only two meet-
ings with his central office staff in three years. Cohen spent most of
his time at Kensington. Shelby did not become part of the powerful
group of elementary school principals in the district. As a result,
they viewed him as a deviant newcomer. An observer commented that
these three men were the "ruling clique" of the school. All three
largely ignored the parents whom they felt "would not understand what
they (were) trying to do".
They seemed to want to create an isolated educational utopia
,
a "protected subenvironment", in spite of the fact that Kensington was
a public school in a traditional and insistent environment. These
factors prevented integration and communication between the organization
and its environment. An organization cannot ignore its environment.
The Followers: The Teachers
Achievement motivation . The twenty-one teachers were described
by an observer as young, excited about teaching, and "more than a little
bit bright". Three had all but their doctoral dissertations completed.
Upwardly mobile, most had "places they wanted to go and things they
wanted to do professionally beyond Kensington school". Enthusiastic
about the school, they began the summer workshop with an attitude of
"We can do it and what we’re doing is important".
According to McClelland
-s theory, they would be highly achieve-
ment motivated people. They preferred a non-routine job that required
personal initiative and inventiveness; they had a positive, confident
attitude toward the probability of their being successful at Kensington;
they were thinking ahead, and had goals for the future; they were not
motivated by money, but by the ideal of Kensington and teaching. Only
through their personal efforts would the goals of the school be achieved.
While teaching at Kensington might appear a high risk to some, it may
have appeared initially to them to be a moderately difficult but poten-
tially achievable task. McClelland does not believe that a teacher is
in a situation where he or she gets concrete feedback on how well he or
she is doing. Those who have been teachers might disagree. In all,
this group exhibited many characteristics of high n Ach.
Their willingness to take responsibility was evident in their
eagerness, enthusiasm, excitement and espousal of the Kensington
doctrine. They were willing, though not "very specific and clear"
about what that entailed. Although their educational level was high,
their task relevant experience , and their ability to take responsibility
in this type of teaching situation was low. Only two had more than
twenty years experience; seven had no experience at all and the rest
less than five years experience in traditional schools.
According to Life Cycle Theory, their "maturity" level at the
beginning of the summer workshop would be low to average. (See figure
25). This indicates that the appropriate leadership style for this
group initially would be high task and high relationships.
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The Principal;—During the Summer Workshop
The Mandate had declared that Kensington would be a non-
structured, open school. The school’s organization was to follow its
program, and its program was to develop spontaneously. The principal
reinforced this in his Institutional Plan in which he stated that
since learning only results from experience, one can only structure
the environment. Process development, not content development was to
be emphasized. Total democratic decision making was the rule.
During the summer workshop, Shelby adopted a laissez-fai rg
leadership style which he believed was in harmony with this doctrine.
He participated in the T-groups. He told an observer that part of his
decision making style was to deliberately delay decisions, as he did in
the ordering of the textbooks. During the committee meetings in the
workshop, he generally played a laissez-faire role.
During the workshop, some of Shelby's behaviors indicated a
second leadership style of high task and low relationships. He
announced his Institutional Plan to the staff, for the first time,
during the week of the T-groups, stating that it was a given, and that
a serious problem would arise if the teachers' personal goals were
radically different from his plan. It came, said an observer, "like a
blast". In the second week, he instructed the faculty to meet in their
teams as they deemed necessary, sign up for already named committees,
fill out daily logs, and report to him on an individual basis during
the remainder of the workshop. As the workshop progressed, a teacher
noted that when the principal was not in a group, it made "tremendous
progress"
.
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These actions show the principal organizing and defining roles,
explaining what activities to do, establishing patterns of organizatiol
formalizing channels of communication, and establishing ways of getting
the job done. This high task and low relationships leadership style
was opposite to the doctrine of total democratic decision making and
the laissez-faire style. This difference in leadership styles became
manifest in Shelby's variation between laissez-faire style and high
task, low relationships style in the committee group meetings, as
noticed by one teacher.
According to Life Cycle Theory, Shelby's basic leadership style
during the summer workshop was low task and low relationships ( laissez-
faire) and his secondary leadership style was high task and low
relationships. (See figure 26). In either case, according to Life
Cycle Theory, neither style would be appropriate for the initial
"maturity" level of the teachers which, as previously diagnosed, calls
for a high task and high relationships style initially.
The results of the summer workshop support this diagnosis. The
goals of the summer workshop were not fully met. Teachers reactions to
the T-groups were generally unfavorable:
Although a group development laboratory is never
a comfortable thing to participate in, it should
prove helpful....
We will not deny the frustration of the experience,
but undoubtedly it will prove to have been most
profitable. . .
.
They felt it would have been more appropriate "to begin group action by
working on an actual problem instead of studying group process". None
of the committee produced any authoritative position papers. Because
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Figure 26. Shelby's Leadership Styles During
Summer Workshop
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of the emphasis on group process and the de-emphasis on nuts and boits
issues, the staff were not organised for the opening day of school.
During Change
The popular practice of letting children have
unrestricted freedom has made tyrants of
children and slaves of the parents.
. .Well-defined restrictions give a sense of security
and certainty of function within the social
structure. Without this, the child feels at
a total loss His ever renewed efforts to
himself take a destructive course...
Without order, there can be no freedom.**
Rudolf Dreikurs
Children the Challenge
Staff Leadership of Students
Thus far, we have considered the principal's initial leadership
style as it related to the teachers (followers). This relationship,
however, is also affected by the interaction between the teachers as
leaders and the students as followers.
The students at Kensington were assumed to be ready to learn in
an open school. Yet before school opened, a district-wide ability test
revealed that the childrens' abilities were lower than their parents'
aspirations for them. As well, the children were coming to Kensington
from traditional schools. During the first days of school it became
apparent that only a few children could operate in the environment. Many
could not write. Behavior ranged from horseplay to passive listlessness.
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According to Life Cycle Theory, the childrens’ "maturity" level
in this situation was low. (See figure 27). Unused to learning in this
type of school, only a few "of the older and brighter" students showed
any achievement motivation. One teacher estimated that only about
fifteen percent of his science class were able to follow. The students'
experience and education in an open school was nil; hence their ability
generally was very low. Except for a few, overall willingness to learn
in this setting ws.s low#
According to the school doctrine, the curriculum was to develop
out of the individual student’s interests. Ideally, teachers were to
follow the student’s direction, and facilitate his or her learning in
whatever way possible. The role of the "academic advisor" was to
support and encourage, but not initiate. In Life Cycle Theory terms,
the teachers were to adopt a quadrant three style of high relationship
and low task. (See figure 13). A few teachers, such as David, who
conducted the student T—groups, used a quadrant four low task and low
relationships style.
Largely inexperienced and unprepared for students' reactions,
some teachers began to move toward more traditional methods after the
second day of school. Although some moved more quickly than others,
by the end of the first semester, most of the staff were teaching in
self contained units. In terms of Life Cycle Theory, the teachers'
leadership style gradually became more structured; they moved backward
through the quadrants from low task and low relationships (quadrant
four), to quadrant three (T-groups, free movement in the building, no
structure initiated by teachers), to quadrant two (whistles, self-
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contained units, breakdown of team teaching), to quadrant one
(permission slips, students marching from one place to another in
groups at specific times.
According to Life Cycle Theory, the ctenge cycle is effective
only when leader style changes through each quadrant in turn from one
to four, but not in reverse. Movement forward will be seen as positive
reinforcement by followers, while movement backward through the cycle
will be perceived as punishment. The negative consequences of a reverse
style development were shown in the increasing frustrations and
difficulties within the school as the year progressed.
The Principal: During the Ypap
During the summer workshop, the principal’s leadership style
varied between a basically low task and low relationships style, and a
secondary high task and low relationships style. As the first semester
progressed, the principal became more and more dissatisfied with the
"sterile programs being offered in some classrooms", and increasingly
used high task and low relationships style in an attempt to remedy the
situation. The following chronology shows his change to a quadrant one
style:
1 . October principal anxious, dissatisfied
2. November move to the new building
3. December principal issues two lists of
45 rules
4. January principal changes ISD Division
to self contained units with
individual teaching
113
fires outside consultant
changes organization of physical
education program to more
traditional approach
5 * announces budget cuts and
advocates more traditional
curriculum and closer co-
operation with other schools
The principal's issuing of the December rules provides a
critical example of his high task and low relationships style. Parental
dissatisfaction, teacher dissatisfaction, problems and frustrations with
the new building and personal anxiety all drove the principal to take
action in December. In an attempt to create order, he issued some
rules. While a logical step, the manner in which he did this caused
more problems. In his eyes, he acted democratically, for he consulted
with the teachers before issuing the rules. The teachers, however,
perceived this as a "fake democratic approach" for he did not incor-
porate any of their suggestions. Essentially, the principal drew up
the rules as he saw them necessary, and issued them. As Tannenbaum and
Schmidt (1958) caution:
If (a leader) actually intends to make a certain
decision himself, but the subordinate group gets
the impression that he has delegated this authority,
considerable confusion and resentment are likely
to follow.
In this instance, the rules created hostility against the principal,
disillusionment with the principal's doctrine of complete democracy and
apathy in the staff.
Thus, this high task and low relationships action by Shelby was
inappropriate; even initially a quadrant two style was called for. As
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well as being inappropriate, the action came too late; at this point in
the year teacher morale was already low, and needed building up. A
high task and high relationships style might have been more appropriate.
The fact that the rules created not anger, but apathy, indicates the
low level of staff morale.
Shelby’s inability to practice relationships behavior prevented
him from using a quadrant two or three leadership style. During the
summer workshop, there is no record of Shelby providing socio-emotional
support, or psychological strokes for the staff. In October, though
unhappy and frustrated, teachers were reluctant to tell this to Shelby.
This in itself, indicated a certain amount to fear and distrust. In
turn, though Shelby was beset by many anxieties, he told an observer,
but not his staff. This lack of personal communications prevented
relationships behaviors. Though, as one observer commented, Shelby was
an expert teacher himself, he did not share this, or attempt to assist
floundering new teachers. The reasons why were never advanced. Unable
therefore, to adopt a quadrant two or three leadership style, and only
able to use a quadrant four or one style, Shelby was unable to develop
the "maturity" of his teachers by varying his style through all four
quadrants. This difficulty was compounded by the fact that, like the
staff, Shelby progressed backwards through the cycle jumping from
quadrant four, to quadrant one. This had an effect of increasing
hostility, fear and distrust, and decreasing morale in the staff, so
that when most support and cooperation was needed, there was the
least possibility for it.
115
Summary
Why did Kensington Fail?
The principal blamed Kensington's failure on adverse public
opinion, and lack of resources. Some of the teachers blamed the failure
on the non-supportive Milford district. While these were some of the
factors working against Kensington, there were others. To summarize,
some of the reasons Kensington failed include:
1* diagnosis of student population; hence
leadership style of teachers inappropriate
to students' needs.
2. Principal's leadership style inappropriate
to teachers' needs. Principal lacked
flexibility in leadership style; hence
could not adapt to changing teacher needs.
3. Both teachers and principal attempted a
reverse change cycle according to Life
Cycle Theory, creating confusion, fear,
hostility, and distrust. This contributed
to a breakdown in communications.
4. Educational leaders ignored community
environment; thus cut off support and
increased hostility from environment.
5. Qnphasis on process in the school doctrine
resulted in poor administration of nuts
and bolts items which in turn resulted in
all round frustration.
6. The design of the building created
frustration.
7. The Milford district's failure to obtain
outside funding for its curriculum project
caused Kensington to become a scapegoat.
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Case Two;
—Change In A Newspaper
Background
This case is taken from Behind The From- by Chrl3 Argyri3
(1974). Motivated by his interest in "the processes needed to enhance
organizational health and create effective on-going renewal activities
within organizations (p. ix)," Argyris, during the sixties, chose as a
field for his research a major American newspaper of considerable
renown.
He had three reasons for electing to study this successful
organization.
1. So far as he could see, the communications
media had shown little interest in learning
how healthy organizations can be designed
and managed effectively [p.x.].
2. He had never studied an organization that
was skeptical about the value of behavioral
science. If he could be admitted to do
research in an un-cooperative organization,
he ’might learn more about the process of
gaining credibility where we need it most
[p.x]. ’
3* He wanted to learn what impact the internal
system of the newspaper had upon the per-
ceptions, thoughts and writing of those
who worked for it [p.x].
After initiating an interview with the President and senior
executives of the newspaper during which he declared his motives and
outlined his proposed study, Argyris was invited in.
For three years Argyris interviewed top management, observed
and analyzed their meetings and conducted training seminars. At the
end of the third year, his attempt to bring about organizational self
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renewal quietly ground to a halt. Because of increasing fear and
resistance, the newspaper executives decided to discontinue the seminars
and the change program ended, "not with a bang, but a whimper."
Before Change
The Environment
The American press had been under attack for having grown remote
and unresponsive to its public. A national blueribbon task force,
privately financed, cited as causes of this situation, a lack of nation-
wide standards, non-competitive salaries, too much emphasis on the
sensational and dramatic, decreased competition between newspapers, and
control of newspapers by individuals who are forced to be profit
conscious. In response, the task force recommended that a national
press council be established to control these problems.
The Organization
The increasingly critical environment was beginning to cause
some creditility problems for the Daily Planet. However, in spite of
this, the Planet had a fine reputation, was acknowledged to be a news-
paper of high professional standards, and was judged both by the
sponsors of the task force and others in the field to be an excellent
newspaper.
Organizational consultant Dr. Chris Argyris chose to study this
newspaper for three reasons:
1. He wanted to learn how healthy organizations can be designed
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and managed effectively so as to create within themselves on-going
activities. So far as he could see, the communications media ted
little interest in such activities.
renewal
shown
2. He wanted to learn what impact the internal system of the
organization ted upon the perceptions, thoughts, and writing of the
employees.
3. He wanted to study an organization that was skeptical about
the value of behavioral science. He felt that in a resistant organiza-
tion he could learn more about the process of gaining credibility for the
behavioral sciences "where we need it most [p.x]." According to Argyris,
the Daily Planet was "full of executives who genuinely did not believe
[p.x]" in his approach. As one informant told Argyris, "To put it mildly,
they would consider your views to be nonsense [p.x]."
In order to preserve anonymity, Argyris did not supply many
details about the newspaper's organizational structure. We can glean
however, that the Daily Planet was a heirarchical bureaucracy with the
following structure:
®°ar^
.
Board of the corporation that
publishes the newspaper
President member of the Board and
publisher of the newspaper
Executive Vice-President
Vice Presidents
Senior Editors
Editors
1
- Executive Committee
Copy Editors
Reporters
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Argyris focussed his study on "the top forty executives [p. 2 ]»
at "the highest levels of editorial, news and administrative activity
tp- 2J." After he asked for their cooperation, declared his motives,
and described possible pay-offs for them, they invited him in to make
the study, although expressing reservations. One old timer warned
Argyris, "Hell, it's like tilting with windmills to think you can
change anything in this place [p. 40]."
The Tod Forty Officials
For one year Argyris interviewed and carefully observed the meet-
ings of this group. From this study, he formed a diagnosis of their at-
titudes and behavior regarding work, competitiveness, meetings, decision
making, leadership, conflict, self perceptions, and feelings of pessimism
Work. Over three quarters of this group believed that being
task oriented, working hard, and producing led to promotion and raises,
and that their effectiveness was measured by how well they performed
their tasks. Working hard also fulfilled a need to feel essential to
the success of the newspaper which was, in turn, essential to the
nation. Working for the prestigious Daily Planet also satisfied the
need for confirmation that professionally one was above average to tops.
An overwhelming majority said their need for security was satisfied by
the Planet's backing up its employees' articles. 84# expressed enjoy-
ment in overcoming intellectual challenges which were seen as personal
challenges. Almost all said they sought jobs which provided this kind
of challenge, and 80% said that working for the Planet was intellectually
challenging.
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Competition
Almost all described colleagues as very competitive.
They're competitive as the devil; they're
competitive for a sandwich [p. 10].
Furthermore, almost everyone, including the president, felt that compet-
itiveness is a good quality in news people. Stories were often secretly
assigned to several different reporters, who were thus placed in severe
competition. As support for this, two administrators cited a letter by
the president which said in effect that a good staff is a restless
staff, and that the company is not an old age home.
If we're honest, I'd have to say that we're
so competitive that our reaction is... who
cares about the old guys (those demoted)
just so long as it isn't me [p. 2].
Discussions of important issues were commonly competitive win-
lose interchanges, enjoyed and seen as "fun" by most of the group.
"That's the name of the game [p. 11]" said one administrator. Said
another:
Somebody defined a good newspaperman as being
like a kid who murders his parents and then
pleads sympathy from the court because he is
an orphan [p. 10].
After observing fifty meetings, Argyris commented that the scores for
members not helping others were the highest he had recorded in all his
studies. Those scores indicated that people were cutting each other
off in order to seize scarce air time.
According to Argyris, this focus on winning intellectual
challenges resulted in managers speaking in a persuasive or selling
manner in meetings. Others immunized themselves by deflating him,
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cutting off his speech, tuning him out, or listening to find
weaknesses.
Meetings. The general feeling was that group meetings were a
waste of time, and what was needed was a good, strong leader. 82% of
the top group spoke in a derogatory manner about meetings.
If I had my way
,
I’d cancel all group meetings....
They re a big waste of time.... You get people
who. . .repeat, repeat, repeat—to impress the
boss, I guess—and who are unbelievably stupid
[p. 15].
Meetings were considered poor places to explore new ideas.
Members characteristically resolved ambiguous issues immediately, with-
out discussion. One executive said:
You can throw them anything and they’ll have
the answer [p. 13 ].
As a result, meetings were considered places where only unimportant
issues were discussed.
Almost three-quarters of this group saw meetings as a place for
the chairman to set forth his ideas, and thought this was appropriate.
Because the superior's needs were made the center of attention, comments
and ideas of the superior often became orders to those below, often to
the superior's surprise:
There's a tendency for some people to walk out
of the room thinking they heard an order and
pass it down as a command, when in fact the
intention most of the time is to raise a
question [p. 27 ].
Decision-making . In meetings, subordinates presented their
views persuasively, argued down the other side, and waited for the
ruling from on high. Threatening decisions were passed upward, often
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to the president. This helped lower levels play it safe and "get off
the hook [p. 26].» Argyris observed that when the buck landed at the
top, the top accepted it, and even seemed to enjoy making the decision.
Important decision-making was thus centralized at the top.
Hany were aware of the dependency of executives upon the president, and
their easily given acquiescence to what he asked. Disagreement with the
president was often difficult to discern because it was put so mildly.
It was usually followed by the individual assuring the president that
having raised his doubts, he would now go along with the president's
decision, even before the president had reacted.
The executive committee, advisory to the president, was seen by
the majority of its own members as being ineffective. Said one member
of that committee:
It's not a very effective group First of all
by and large, the executive committee has not
dealt with important issues, and has tended to
deal with minor matters. Secondly, it is highly
indecisive. Thirdly, there is little evidence
of trust, and there have been few indications
of past successes on which we could build. There
is very little data brought to bear, and decisions,
when they are taken, all too frequently are taken
by default; we don’t take any action, but that
in effect, is making a decision. In other cases
we are in a crisis situation and time has run out,
and something has to be done. And we just walk
out on it [p. 36].
As well as being passed upwards, decisions were made in secrecy.
70$ of the top forty believed, "This is a management by secrets and
conspiracies Our management wants to do something without saying so;
it's the hallmark of our style [p. 22]."
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' m 0f these administrators believed that groups
are effective when they have a strong leader. A leader is one who runs
disciplined meetings, and knows what the decisions should be before the
meeting begins. They identified two types of leaders in their organiza-
tion; one type was directive and controlling, the other passive and with-
drawn. Most said that the majority of leaders in the newspaper were in
category one.
1. Most of the top people are brilliant,
insecure, emotional, with a need to
dominate [p. 29].
2. Most of the executives really want
participation until we disagree with
them [p. 29].
Though approved of, strong leadership was nevertheless risky in
this organization. As an example: for supervising conflicted situations
in which performance was relatively effective, management sought exec-
utives who were "diplomatic [p. 40]" and could "help the situation defuse
[p. 40]." If performance was highly ineffective, they sought more
aggressive executives who were charged with "cleaning up the mess
[p. 40]," while warned to "go easy lest there be union difficulties or
someone hurt [p. 40]." However, executives who upset the system while
"cleaning up the mess", even if successful, were apt to find themselves
ostracized and not supported. One administrator described what happened
to another in such a situation:
What I admired S for most, when he took over, he
had to get rid of the old layers, and he did.
In doing that, in my opinion, S committed suicide
on this paper. It is too bad in many ways. That
was the mission that descended upon him, and I
admire him for having done it. At the same time
I admire him... I don't want to do it myself... [p. 40].
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Because of this, cautious administrators spent much time and
effort "setting up [p. 41]" people for change.
You have to start a long way in advance,
say three or six months and longer. You
have to plant seeds in people's minds [p. 41].
Being cautious reached a point where some key executives felt forced to
use subterfuge to manage change.
Conflict.. One executive summed it up this way:
Conflict resolution is conflict supression.
Now you see it; now you don't [p. 19 ].
The prevailing opinion was that conflict should be managed "diplomat-
ically [p. 19]," that is covertly. "Diplomatic" handling meant, for
91%, that when interpersonal conflict arises, an effective leader "tells
a joke to cool things off [p. 19 ]." "Bury it [p. 19 ]" or "hide it
[p. 19]" were other methods. Said one administrator:
I have a horror of conflict So I idle
around the thing, and only go to confront-
tation when it is the last desperate resort [p. 19 ].
Management dealt with a dispute between the reporters and the
copy editors by setting rules that reporters were not permitted to talk
to copy editors directly, only through "channels". Demotion, another
conflict-ridden situation, was handled by "easing out a person and
putting him on the shelf [p. 21]." One executive explained:
We don't demote a person around here. He doesn't
get a demotion on the chart. In fact, it may
show up as a promotion. This company is known
for cushioning the shock [p. 21 ].
Self-perception . Top management had a desire to run a "humane"
system, and rated themselves high on encouraging the expression of
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others’ views, and on openness to new ideas. Said one executive:
I am trying to get people to be open. Thisis unusual in our business [p. 3.].
Said another:
Every morning I assign them their work I
try to be gentle with them. I try to avoidbeing authoritarian. Of course, it is up
to me to show then the way to do the job.
I’ve got to assume that the way I do it is
correct [p. 31].
The executives were seen by their subordinates as being unaware
of the gap between their self-perception of openness, and their be-
havior which caused conformity and dependence. Subordinates feared
breaking the norms of the system. To do so would make an individual
appear "like a damn fool [p. 39 ]." Said one reporter,
If you ever tried to deal with issues openly
and directly, everyone would ask, 'What the
hell does he think he's doing [p. 39]?'
Pessimism. The group, according to Argyris, had a deep and
open pessimism about changing human nature. Many expressed a sense of
helplessness about changing internal conditions. "Not you, or anyone
else will ever change this place [p. xi]," was a prediction Argyris
heard often. One editor said:
After a while, you wonder if this is all worth it.
What the hell is life all about? Is this what I
should be doing? Maybe I should go back to my
typewriter [p. 32].
The Reporters
According to Argyris, "resistance from the upper levels [p. 45 ]"
prevented him from studying the reporters. Therefore they will be
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included in this study only as they bear upon the upper administration.
Some important facts that emerged from interviews of twenty young
reporters were that they:
1. have a need for recognition [p. 49].
2. have a need for immediate feedback [p. 49].
3 . doubt their capacity to take action: "Host
of us like to rattle things around—but what
the hell would we do if it were our job to
resolve them [p. 54]?"
4 . expect authoritarian leadership: "The boss
has to show tight control, and it's our job
to complain about his control [p. 63]."
During Change
Feedback of the Diagnosis
Feedback Meeting
This was the first meeting in a two year series of interventions.
For one and a half days, the top fifteen news, editorial and admin-
istrative executives discussed the report containing Argyris' analysis
of the newspaper’s "living system [p. 1 ]." At this meeting, the exec-
utives were concerned with nine issues. How desirable or undesirable
were the findings? Said one, "How else would you run our business
[p. 73 ]? M They asked Argyris how they compared with other organiza-
tions. They sought explanation of the technical details of his
analysis, and challenged the validity of his research methods. They
asked Argyris to identify persons whose behavior was being discussed.
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They questioned the results of the study:
A: I thought (those meetings) were well
conducted and very productive. Are
you saying I'm wrong about that?
Argyris: I'm saying that almost none of the people
I interviewed would agree with you [p. 77].
They expressed disappointment and anger at being misunderstood by sub-
ordinates:
Hell, people may think that, but that's not
our intention (said with anger) [p. 76].
Some openly questioned the advisability of continuing with the
program. Argyris' suggestion of periodic half day meetings to discuss
organizational issues and to diagnose the behavior of group members,
was met with many questions. Why was training necessary? Should feel-
ings be discussed?
I just question the desirability of having a
sort of group theraputic self-examination [p. 85].
Should the president's leadership be discussed?
If we are going to talk about leadership, we're
going to have to discuss the president's leader-
ship. Do we really want to do this [p. 85 ]?
Argyris suggested they hold a meeting without him (Argyris) present to
decide whether to undertake a change program.
The Meeting with the President
The president told Argyris three weeks later that all but one
had voted to go ahead. He went on to state that he was planning
certain changes, and asked Argyris to guarantee that promotions,
demotions, and the jobs of each top executive would not be discussed
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in the learning experience. He felt such discussion would threaten the
men who had questions about their jobs. Argyris said no, and suggested
the president think carefully about continuing to employ Argyris in the
study
.
After several weeks, the president independently made a round
of changes in the top management. He promised Argyris that this was
the final change, and that he would not now require any constraints in
a learning seminar. Argyris agreed to return in two months for a
planning meeting, if the president would tell the group the reason why
the program had been postponed. The president agreed.
Planning for the Learning Seminar
The Planning Meeting
The president opened the meeting stating its objective: to
discuss various designs for a conference away from the office. Argyris
then made a presentation in which he stated that the conference would
focus on "increasing our effectiveness in dealing with human relation-
ships [p. 90]," ways of using power effectively, and leadership styles.
Real life organizational problems would be gathered in pre-conference
interviews, and become the springboard for discussing these issues.
After giving his rationale for exploring behavior, he closed by
recommending a week long conference.
The executives responded with many questions. Would the
session be worthwhile? Said one:
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I can't see the value of it to us, in a way
that it would actually affect our future
actions as executives of the organization...
Maybe it will relieve people of feelings.
I can't see it myself, but that doesn’t mean
that I won't give it a try [p. 92].
Were they going to make real decisions about actual business problems?
In that case, said one executive, "We'd better reserve this place for
a month [p. 93 ]." Would examining personal behavior accentuate
difficulties?
How do you (Argyris) know a conference like
this might not make interpersonal conflict
even worse [p. 92]?
Can systems really be managed by focussing on personal needs; would it
not make more sense to discuss new kinds of structures rather than
interpersonal relationships?
Argyris responded to all these concerns, stating that the group
might experiment to see if the session was worthwhile, and that it
could be stopped whenever there was agreement it was not; that he
would work hard to see that no one got hurt; that no one would be
coerced to do or say anything; that the conference should be at least
five days; that the entire top group be invited but not required to
attend, and that effectiveness depends on making explicit the present
covert personality-centered management style of the group, so that the
system could be oriented towards growth and innovation instead of
defenses and anxieties. The meeting ended with a commitment for hold-
ing the conference, for two and a half days.
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The Learning Seminar
Session One: Dav One, evening
The group was composed of approximately fifteen members of top
management, men in their forties and fifties. On arrival, each member
was given an agenda containing the five issues gathered in the pre-
seminar interviews. These were:
1. The president: his role, his style of
leadership; his hopes and aspirations
for the organization [p. 96].
2. The executive committee: why is it
unable to take action [p. 97]?
3- The long-range development of the
newspaper [p. 97].
4. The relationship between departments [p. 98].
5. The total organization, including
subsidiaries: its future growth [p. 98].
Argyris began this session by reiterating the objectives for
the seminar. During the evening, the members attempted to decide which
of the agenda items to discuss, with no success. One member finally
said:
Look, let's face it. One and two are the guts
of the issue. A lot of us are leery. We're
dancing around it... We 're simply postponing
the moment of truth [p. 114].
The session ended with an agreement to discuss items one and two during
the next session, and a request for drinks.
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Session Four: Dav Two, afternoon
During this session, several agenda items were put forth and
ignored. When time ran out, members quickly agreed that in the next
session they would focus on "the new feature [p. 120]," an issue that
had a four year history in the paper.
Session Five: Dav Two, evening
In this session, one member proposed a compromise plan for
producing the new feature. No agreement was reached to accept this
plan.
Session Six: Dav Three, morning
Argyris opened this session by asking if people would like to
discuss how they felt about the previous night’s session. The director
of the editorial department revealed hurt feelings over the previous
session. He felt his department had been destructively attacked. There
ensued four hours of discussion, after which the director said that he
now thought the whole process of the seminar was worth a serious try.
Argyris noted that this was the first overt change of commitment to
the learning seminar.
Session Seven: Dav Three, afternoon
Most of the time in this session was spent in conceptualizing
the progress of the group to date.
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Session Eight: Dav Three, evening
Argyris opened this session by reminding the group that it had
made a commitment to discuss leadership styles, particularly the
president’s. Despite both the president’s and Argyris’ efforts, the
group avoided this issue, and instead attacked Argyris:
When we finish with this exercise, you (Argyris)
go back to your school. These men have to
live with each other. Your idea is to force
us to tell the truth directly to the president.
This will be clarifying, and you think purifying.
I think it could be destructive. That explains
the silence in the room [p. 131].
Session Nine: Dav Four, morning
During this session, several members gave feedback to other
members; one for fifteen uninterrupted minutes.
Session Ten: Dav Four, afternoon
The member who had received lengthy feedback during the previous
session, received more, and raised the issue of how to use it back on
the job.
Session Eleven: Dav Four, evening
Argyris gave a short lecture on the giving and receiving of feed-
back; discussion of feedback followed.
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Conclusion of the Learning Seminar
After the feedback lecture and discussion, all members said that
more progress had been made than they had expected. Several said it was
one of the most meaningful experiences they had with that group. Some
raised the possibility of continuing the seminar which had already gone
a day and a half over the set time. The decision was made to stop.
Some wanted to set a date for a follow-up session.
Evaluation of the Learning Seminar
Two weeks after the seminar, Argyris interviewed all the partic-
ipants. Some of the responses they gave in the evaluation included:
1. Little behavioral change had occurred.
Experimenting took place only with
fellow seminar participants [p. 142].
2. One executive wanted to start a similar
program in his department [p. 142].
3. The president reported no behavioral change;
however, he felt others showed signs of
taking initiative, though all too few [p. 142].
4. One person who reported positive feelings to
Argyris, secretly reported a contrary message
to the president, and asked to be excluded
from any experiences [p. 143].
One month later, a meeting was held to assess people's views, and
if desired, to plan the next step. Although members began at this meet-
ing, according to Argyris, for the first time to explore openly the connec-
tion between success on the job, and feelings of personal self- esteem,
opinion in the group was divided on whether or not to go ahead. The meet-
ing ended with members agreeing to another meeting to discuss next steps.
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Consequences of the Learning Seminar
The New Feature
The issue of the new feature, which had been raised at the
learning seminar, was continued in this subsequent meeting. Who would
have leadership of the new feature, the news department, or the editorial
department? The director of the editorial department felt that because
he had a long history of involvement with the new feature, it should be
part of his department. The director of the news department was
concerned that if his department had to give up ten percent of its
space to the editorial department for the new feature, he would be
"stoned [p. 155]" by his subordinates.
At this critical point in the meeting, when each side had
clarified its stand, the president stated he had to leave to catch a
plane, and asked that the meeting be stopped. He then asked if the
next step should be a series of one-to-one meetings. No one supported
this. He asked if the group wanted him to make the decision. They
said no. The meeting ended with a promise to meet again.
No such meeting took place. Several months later the president
announced his decision to place the new feature under the control of
the editorial department. "There wasn't enough time [p. 158]," he told
Argyris.
Besides, this decision has been over four
years in the making and I knew they weren't
going to make it. So I made it [p. 158].
The news director's reaction, according to Argyris, was mild
anger and disappointment. He said:
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The president does whatever he wants to do.lhat s the trouble with this stuff
(behavioral science). If the man at the
top doesn’t really believe in it. then I
wonder [p. 158].
The editorial director, however, was concerned about the hostility
emanating from the news department. Several days later he reported to
Argyris he had been ridiculed and humiliated at lunch by the director
of news, who was ’’out to knife [p. 160]" him. Argyris suggested they
meet to discuss these issues. Several weeks later, Argyris was asked
to attend such a meeting.
Editorial and News Explore their Prohlpm^
When the director of news gave his version of what had happened
at lunch, it became clear to the editorial director that there was no
intention to hurt him. The two executives then proceeded to discuss
other issues concerning them. They discovered areas of agreement; they
both agreed there was too much subjective interpretation in the paper.
The news director said his deepest concern was finding a way for both
of them to come together. At the end of the meeting both said it had
been very helpful; it had shown that their problems were solveable.
The director of news set a date for Argyris to meet with his department.
The Meeting with the News Department
This meeting was attended by the director of news and seven of
his immediate subordinates. Argyris outlined the problems as set forth
in his initial report, described the type of learning experience he
proposed, and its objectives. The members expressed many fears and
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objections, summarized in the following list:
1
- Homogenization
sneaky deling, not
that you are trying to pull
anything over on us, but that
leadership styles will get
homogenized. I’m not convin-
ced that any single leadership
style works the same way for
everybody [p. 186].
2. Feedback is
harmful and
negative
What bothers me is every time
I discuss something with you
(Argyris), your approach is
negative [p. 189].
3. Waste of time The reason I think it’ll be
a waste of time is because
we've been talking for maybe
an hour, and nothing relates
to me [p. 188].
4. Artificial We don't have councils of war
like this. When you were here
before and we had those meetings,
they were bullshit, if I can
be blunt [p. 189].
5. Unnecessary They maintained that things had
changed since the last report.
However, the director was resist-
ant to Argyris making a new study
of his department [p. 191].
After four hours, the news director asked for a decision. The
group s answer was that he should make the decision, saying:
If a director feels that this (project) would
be beneficial then we ought to do it, no
matter what [p. 198].
Argyris urged the director to let the group take responsibility for
this decision. The group then voted against the project: five voted
no, the director voted yes, and two remained undecided.
In interviews after the meeting, members expressed further
reasons for their resistance. Some of these include:
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1* belief that the president had pressured the
unwilling director into the meeting (two
members) [p. 203].
2. Argyris had pressured the unwilling director
into the meeting [p. 204].
3. Opening old wounds would destroy good
working relationships [p. 205].
4. Changing behavior would be ineffective.
"Let’s say you (Argyris) make me work at
a slower pace. I don't think this job is
manageable without a fast pace [p. 208]."
The President Meets the Editorial Demrtmpnt-.
During three meetings after the learning seminar, the president
and the director of the editorial department stated their concerns to
each other. The basic concerns are summarized in the following chart:
President Editorial Director
As president and publisher, we
have to keep this corporation
going and... have to perform
Although the president has
final authority and veto
power over the editorial
some very dangerous balancing
acts between the board and the
editorial group [p. 172].
page, he should not publish
an editorial promoting any
corporate interest, in-
cluding the paper's own.
The tone of the editorial page For years the editorials
is too strong, too much on the were flabby. I was det-
attack. The president described ermined that if I made it
his feelings when several board to the editorial group,
members read the editorial to I'd begin writing editorials
find their company's actions that said something [p. 173]-
condemned [p. 176].
Figure 28. A Comparison the President and Editorial Director's Concerns
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In the third meeting, in response to the president’s statement
that he had never been able to have a ’’rational discussion that would
lead somewhere [p. 179]’’ with his executive group, the editorial
director suggested the top people meet regularly to talk about important
issues. Such meetings had not previously taken place. Both the
president and the editorial director agreed that this had been a very
important meeting; it had broken down old barriers to action, old myths,
and created an atmosphere of willingness to experiment.
The president said the next step was to hold a meeting with a
few more top people. After several months, with no meeting called, the
president explained to Argyris that the problem was ’’getting these guys
together [p. 181]." Argyris asked to have a meeting with those who had
attended the seminar, to test their commitment. The president agreed.
The Final Meeting of the Tod Group
Three months after the president had agreed to call this meeting,
he called Argyris and apologized for the delay, saying several executives
had been travelling. The final meeting was attended by the president and
three top people in the news and editorial departments. Its objective
was to explore their commitment to further organizational development.
They began by describing important problems, some of which included:
1. The president was concerned that there be
a better dynamics of choice than previously
to fill several key positions during the next
few years. ”I’d rather not make the decision
in a little dark room by myself, and then have
arguments with you for the next three or four
years [p. 221]."
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3- The group's willingness to discuss
tional problems and their behavior
group [p. 225].
organiza-
as a
After these and other issues had been discussed, the president asked if
the next step was not to set up another meeting. All agreed. The news
director then said to Argyris:
I really admire you... The desire to stay with
us through all these years—that's great If
I were him (Argyris)
,
I would have walked out
two years ago [p. 226].
After this meeting, Argyris received letters and telephone calls,
assuring him of "everyone's great interest" in continuing the program,
but no further meeting was ever called.
According to the president, there were two reasons why no
further meetings were called: one was extended travel and vacation
plans. The second, and more important, was that a new top management
team was being appointed. The president said he wanted Argyris to
continue working with the new top team. Argyris said he would if the
new team expressed interest. Up to the time this case was published,
it had not.
Argyris interviewed eight of the top ten executives to gather
their reactions to the whole program. Some concluded:
After Change
1. We became aware of our lack of
communication [p. 232].
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2 . I remember it as something fine that
came about [p. 232].
almost
3- Our problem was that we never learned the
concepts or the skills [p. 232].
4. We were unable to learn the language of
genuine openness [p. 232].
5. There is probably not very much behavioral
change.
.. .People didn't change their
'spots [p. 232].
'
The majority expressed feelings that, although the learning
session raised the level of openness and candor,
the behavioral patterns have not improved. In
fact, the results may be contrary. We have
more difficulties, such as competitiveness and
secrecy. I see growing signs of empire-building,
efforts at personal publicity, secrecy, un-
willingness to tell other people what is going
on—and I think it's going to get worse [p. 234].
One change that did occur has remained. "The strident tone of
the editorial page has diminished significantly [p. 236]."
Analysis of Case Two
Before Change
This newspaper will break your goddamn heart
The paper does not owe you a goddamn thing.
I tell my people that they should work hard
like hell because that is what they really
want.
An executive on the Daily Planet
The Situation
The organization . Although we are given few details about the
organizational structure of the Daily Planet, we do learn that it is,
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over all, a traditional bureaucracy. It has many departments, and many
managers with a short span of control. For example, there are forty
"top administrators [p. 2].» It emphasizes formal rules, "channels of
communication [p. 38 ]" and adheres to unspoken norms. Although there
is constant evaluation of effectiveness in performing tasks, negative
evaluation is withheld. As Baldrige (1971) states, an "emasculating
promotion" process is practiced, which promotes administrators who are
negatively evaluated, up and out of power.
The task of the newspaper requires it to be alert to almost
hourly changes in the environment, and to ingest constant feedback, in
an atmosphere of high stress and uncertainty. All departments, news,
editorial, and reporting, work under great time pressure, at complex
interdependent tasks, for immediate, short term goals. A newspaper
must meet daily deadlines. The executive branch must also be concerned
with long term goals, such as the future of the newspaper, and operate
with the time frame of years.
In general, this is a highly differentiated organization,
operating under conditions which require directive leadership and swift
decisions in daily operations. Integration is a constant and accepted
problem. Communications are commonly vertical, one a one-to-one basis.
Decision-making is centralized at the top executive level. It is
usually carried out in secret. This has helped erode trust. High
competitiveness and a win-lose orientation have further lowered trust
until it is non-existent. The interpersonal orientation of the depart-
ments is towards task; social relationships are usually attempted in
nearby bars where people "blow off steam [p. 55 J" and try to get close.
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However, as one reported said, "You feel elose (in barS)-yet you are
not close [p. 55]."
All this has resulted in internal diffieulties in the newspaper.
Decisions are often passed to the president, accompanied by subsequent
complaints. Turnover in administrators is fairly frequent, once at the
beginning of Argyris intervention, and again at the end. As Argyris
predicted, angry resignations and psychological withdrawals over
secretive job shifts were increasing; the younger more aggressive
reporters were increasingly demanding more influence in managerial
activities. There were increasing problems between the president and
the board over the growing subjective and anti-big business tone of the
newspaper.
The environment
. Without, the paper was just beginning to lose
some of its credibility with its constituencies. One prominent editor
had begun to publically criticize the newspaper. Nationally, a dis-
gruntled public had created a task force which had studied the American
press and recommended a national press council to raise standards. How-
ever, in spite of all this, the Daily Planet still maintained its ’'fine
reputation [p. 42]" as an excellent newspaper. Its problems had not yet
reached a crisis stage.
Resistance to change . This case presents a paradox. The
president and administrators allowed Argyris to carry out a study
involving a change program oriented towards participative management.
Yet, in the final analysis, they wanted to carry on in the traditional
bureaucratic way. Ironically, the administration met many problems by
repeating more strongly the behaviors and practices which had initially
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caused the problems. Why was there such resistance to the ctenge
program? And why did it fail? One answer may lie in the leadership
styles of the key group.
The Followers
The top forty administrators of the newspaper had two roles:
they were leaders in their own departments, and followers in their
relationship to the president. This analysis will concentrate on the
top forty as an administrative group subordinate to the president.
Ability to take responsibility
. The task relevant experience
of this group in the workings of a newspaper was very high. The Daily
Planet had a tradition of promotion from within; administrators rose
through the ranks. The director of the editorial department, for
example, had worked his way up from reporter. They were thus generally
able to take responsibility.
Achievement motivation
. According to McClelland’s definition,
this group was highly achievement oriented. Risks were taken in a
calculated manner, with great caution. For example, up to six months
was spent "setting up [p. 4 .]" for an attempt at change. Almost every-
one said they sought intellectually challenging jobs, and that working
for the Planet provided this kind of challenge. Intellectual challenges,
seen as personal challenges, were opportunities for win-lose inter-
changes which were enjoyed and seen as "part of the game [p. 11]." As
a group, they were highly competitive in everything. When Argyris
presented his diagnosis, they immediately wanted to know how they
compared to other organizations Argyris had studied. Competitiveness
1H4
was considered a good quality in news people, and was an approved,
accepted group norm.
Constant feedback was important as a check on effectiveness.
In itself, working for the prestigious Planet provided confirmation
that one was competent. Promotions and raises were a measure of how
well one was doing; success on the job was of prime importance.
Willingness to take responsibility
, in terms of willingness to
take responsibility, this group was divided. As leaders to the middle
echelons, they were very willing to take responsibility in their depart-
ments. This was shown in the training of reporters and copy editors.
As one manager said,
Every morning I assign them their work... It is up
to me to show them the way to do the job [p. 31].
In this role, their leadership style was high task and low relationships,
a style expected and considered appropriate by the reporters. All the
reporters interviewed agreed that "the boss has to show tight control
[p. 63 ]." Their effectiveness as leaders in their own departments was
reflected in the Planet’s reputation for high professional standards
and excellence in writing.
As a policy making executive group reporting to the president,
this group was unwilling to take responsibility, as illustrated in
their decision-making process. The procedure for handling policy
decisions was well established. First, the lower echelons met to
discuss the problem. Each side stated its position, argued the other
side down, and waited for the superior to make the decision. If two
departments were involved, the middle management met, argued the other
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side down, and waited for top management to make the decision. This
process was often repeated until the buck stopped with the president.
In this manner, meetings became competitions for air time, and decision-
making was avoided.
Maturity of the followers
. Although, according to Argyris'
description of maturity, this administrative group would be generally
immature (see figure 14), according to Life Cycle Theory, these
administrators would be "mature" in relation to their departments, and
"immature" only as they related to the president. In their own depart-
ments, their "maturity" would be very high, as discussed above. (See
figure 29). Thus, the appropriate leadership style for their superiors
to adopt for them as leaders within their department would be quadrant
four; low task and low relationshps
. This in fact was generally the
practice.
On the other hand, the "maturity" level of these administrators
as executive decision makers relating to the president, would be low.
(See figure 30). They were unwilling to accept responsibility; they
were not motivated to try, and they had no experience in acting as an
administrative unit because they had never been trained to do it. Thus
the appropriate leadership style at this time for these executives, if
the president wanted group decision making, would be quadrant one; high
task and low relationships. This in fact was the primary leadership
style adopted by the president. Yet the executives avoided making
decisions. In order to account for this apparent contradiction, let us
examine the president’s leadership style in more depth.
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Figure 29- Maturity Level of Administrators as Leaders in
their own Departments
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The President: Primary Leadership si-yio
Task behavior
. Over the two year intervention period, the
president's leadership style ma one to on* was primarily
quadrant one; high task and low relationships. He usually explained
when, where and how to accomplish tasks; for example, he customarily
opened meetings by stating their objective. He attempted to set the
length of the learning seminar with Argyris. He endeavoured to formal-
ize channels of communication when he established the executive commit-
tee, and when he volunteered to become a mediator between the director
of news and the director of the editorial department. He established
patterns of organization when he placed the new feature under the
control of the editorial department. He attempted to establish better
ways of getting the job done when he supported Argyris' change program,
and set up various meetings for Argyris. During the learning seminar,
he attempted to focus the discussion on his leadership style.
Relationships behavior . We have almost no evidence of the
president developing personal relationships with members of the exec-
utive group, giving them socio-emotional support or psychological
strokes, or of engaging in interpersonal communication.
The President:
—Secondary Leadership stylp
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The president's secondary leadership style, in respect to his
executives aa^roup, was quadrant four; low task and low relationships
As we have shown, the appropriate leadership style, according to Life
Cycle Theory, for the floudering executive co^ittee, would be q^drant
one; high task and low relationships. (See figure 31). Yet the
president largely ignored the executive committee, the group which he
said he wanted to take an active role in policy making. Lacking
direction, the executive group became more and more ineffective. Their
ineffeciveness attests to the inappropriateness of the president's
quadrant four style with them.
Appropriate
leadership
style for
executive
committee
at this time
above average ! below Executive
average
;
average; < Committee ' s
* 1 »——I Maturity Level
Figure 31 • Diagnosis of Executive Committee
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It is interesting to note in passing, that according to Life
Cycle Theory, Argyris' leadership style as a consultant was also
inappropriate to this executive group. (See figure 32). In attempting
to use a T-group approach, with an emphasis on interpersonal relations,
Argyris was using a quadrant three high relationships and low task
style. Life Cycle Theory would predict that this approach would fail
with this group, as indeed it did.
Leadership
style
practiced
by Argyris
o’
Leadership
style Q ( ht )l I R -w> /by president
T
I
I
Leadership
style
initially
appropriate
to executive
committee
Maturity Level of
Executive Committee
Figure 32. Leadership styles of Argyris and President in Relation to
the Executive Committee
The President: Lack of flexibility
Although according to Life Cycle Theory the president's basic
leadership style was appropriate to the present "maturity" level of his
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administrators, he 1) did not adopt the appropriate style on a group
level, and 2) he lacked leadership flexibility. Life Cycle Theory
postulates that when a group is low in task relevant "maturity", an
effective leader begins by adopting a quadrant one high task and low
relationships style. As the group learns the task and gains in
"maturity", the leader should reward the new behavior, while gradually
increasing his or her relationships behavior and decreasing task
behavior. In this way, followers "mature" in the task as the leader
progresses through quadrant two and quadrant three leadership styles,
and finally adopts a quadrant four style when the followers are highly
"mature" and no longer need the leader. The president, like many of
the executives in the organization, was able to adopt quadrant one and
quadrant four styles, but not quadrant two and three styles — those
involving relationships behaviors. (See figure 33).
^President’s
style
Figure 33. The President's Leadership Styles
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Results of the President ’s Leadership st-.yig
According to Life Cycle Theory, a high task and low relation-
ships style is initially appropriate for followers with below average
task relevant
-maturity". However, if a leader lacks the flexibility
to adopt different styles, and maintains a quadrant one style, he or
she will prevent followers from developing "maturity" in the task, and
keep them dependent. Eventually the continued use of a quadrant one
style will become inappropriate. Follower growth will be stalemated.
This postulation is borne out in the present case. The Daily
Planet administrators waited for the president to tell them what to do.
The frustrated president tried various tactics to get his administrators
off their behinds. For example, he emphasized competition, reflected
in his remark "The company is not an old age home [p. 30]." When they
did not respond, the president's frustration increased. In order to
get decisions made, he practiced secret decision-making, such as when
he discussed issues with one member of the executive committee, and
asked him not to tell any of the other members. He went around exec-
utives, and talked directly to their subordinates. Although ambivalent
about Argyris' theories, he allowed him in, verbally supported his
change program, and asked for feedback in the learning seminar.
The discrepancy between the president's verbal espousal of a
theory Y participative management approach, and his on the job theory X
behavior was clear to his subordinates. As the director of news
observed
,
If the man at the top doesn't really believe in
it (participative management), then I wonder [p. 158].
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Thus, despite the president’s verbal efforts in the learning seminar, the
executives would not give him feedback on his leadership style, make
decisions, or initiate action. As Likert (1961) observed, "Authoritarian
organizations tend to develop dependent people and few leaders [p. 236]."
As the president’s frustration grew, he made more unilateral
decisions. This increased fear and uncertainty in the executives, who
became more cautious and secretive in their activities. They increased
their avoidance of decision-making, and disagreeing with the president.
The president, at the end of the change program, felt as though he was
"in a little dark room by himself [p. 221]" with respect to policy
• Top administration was caught in a downward spiral.
After Change
Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.
French proverb
Orientation of the Change Program
In this change program, Argyris was attempting to raise the
awareness of administration so as to move toward a participative system
of management. In the following chart (see figure 34), some of the
values expressed by Argyris during this case are compared to Likert's
(1961) system four of participative management [p. 223-233-]
Orientation of the Daily Planet
The orientation of the Daily Planet was more in keeping with
Likert's (1961) system one of exploitive authoritative management.
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feelings and lustrations
should be dealt with when and
where they are occurring,
confronted in their natural
setting [p. 34].
2.
People liking subterfuge could be
a sign of sickness in the system
Lp. 80].
3. Planet executives accept this low
quality of life because they
accept a Calvanistic-Masochistic
view of life which allows them,
and others to continue working
even though it is not much fun
[p. 43].
4. Healthy organizations are self-
examining and contain on-going
renewal activities [p. ix]
.
Likert’s System Four
Members are skilled in
group process. Machinery
for handling conflict
exists. Atmosphere is
free of conflict.
The atmosphere is free of
hostility, fear and dis-
trust. Good communica-
tions.
There is extensive,
friendly superior-sub-
ordinate interaction.
The work group has high
confidence, trust,
loyalty and cooperative
motivation.
Figure 31*. Argyris' Values Compared to Likert's System Four of
Participative Management
Decisions and goal setting were made at the top. Subordinates worked
under fear, punishment and occasional rewards. In addition, as Kelly
(1970) states, the attitude was taken that conflict is to be avoided
at all costs, and scapegoats are inevitable.
Rejection of the Change Program
The clash between these two opposing value systems was one of
the causes of the rejection of Argyris' change program. Rather than a
gradual developmental approach, the change program with its previously
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described orientation, was introduced at once. In ten* of Life Cycle
Theory, in order to get from quadrant one to a quadrant four leadership
Style, a leader must gractally progress> in order, through aU ^
quadrants. So too, to develop from system one to system four, it
would seem appropriate to start where the people are at, in system one,
and progress grdually towards system four. Indeed, in planning for the
learning seminar, the administrators said they felt it would make more
ense to start by discussing new kinds of budgeting, information, and
long-range planning structures, rather than interpersonal difficulties.
Results of the Change Program
The results of the change program were negligible. Although some
people reported temporary changes in attitudes, behavior remained the
same. The president seemed to follow his previous behavior pattern. In
the final meeting, he made a plea for a new, more participative personnel
selection process, so he wouldn't have to take decisions about filling
new key positions "in a little dark room by myself [p. 221 j." The
president and all members present agreed another meeting was necessary
to discuss this and other issues. Some time after, the president told
Argyris he had not called a further meeting because a new top management
team was being appointed — we can infer, by the president's usual
methods.
Some administrators reported that behavior had, in fact, become
even more bureaucratic after the change program. There was more
competitiveness, secrecy, and empire-building than before, and they
felt it would grow.
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Summary
Why Did the Change Program Fail
9
Some of the reasons include:
The quadrant one high task and low relationships
style practiced by the president and administratorswas expected by subordinates; considered approveby subordinates, to a newspaper, and was an Sorted’norm of leadership throughout the organization.
The quadrant one leadership style was, to thatime, effective. The newspaper was nationally
recognized with an excellent reputation.
Although the president supported the participative
management approach of Argyris change program, his
subordinates perceived his behavior as supporting
a system one autocratic approach, and behaved
accordingly.
4. The values underlying Argyris' change program
suddenly introduced, clashed with the values
of the organization.
5. Argyris perceived problems in the organization; the
majority of members in the organization did not.
Thus according to situational leadership theory, the Daily Planet,
although ineffective in its human relations, was efficient in production.
It was a theory X, system one organization that produced a high quality,
nationally recognized newspaper. It did not change because in the eyes
of the employees, its leadership was, and remained, appropriate to
organizational needs.
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Caa? Three: Change i n the state Den*^,,,-
Background
This case is taken from Making Waves In Foggy Bottom by Alfred
J. Marrow (1974). In 1964, Alfred Marrow was invited to a luncheon
meeting by Deputy Undersecretary of State William Crockett, to talk
With Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other businessmen and betevioral
scientists about the management problems besetting the State Department.
From this beginning, Marrow became an advisor to Crockett's change
program which had as its aim the reorganization of the State Department
into a more participative system of management. He advised and observed
the progress of the reorganization through to Crockett's resignation in
1967. Crockett's successor, Idar Rimestad liquidated the reorganiza-
tion program, restored the State Department's management system to its
former status quo, and dismissed Marrow, along with the other advisors
and consultants to the program.
When William Macomber replaced Rimestad in 1969, Marrow
received another invitation to lunch. On this occasion, along with
Professor Harry Levinson of Harvard, he met with Deputy Undersecretary
Macomber, Secretary William Rogers, Undersecretary Elliot Richardson
and other senior staff members to discuss Crockett’s reorganization
program, and future reform of the management system of the State Depart-
ment. Once again, Marrow became an advisor to a change program which
culminated successfully one year later in July 1971.
What follows is a summary of Marrow's personal account of the
progress of change over seven years in a massive bureaucracy. In it he
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describes two change cycles: one unsuccessful under Crockett, and one
successful under Macomber.
Introduction
Before Change
Effecting change in the United States Department of State, often
called the "Fudge Factory [p. 3]" would appear to be nearly impossible.
Established in 1789, grown in the days of Yankee Clippers, the State
Department is the oldest federal department. At the time of World War
II, its 2000 employees, including diplomats trained in the classic
tradition of messages sealed in red wax, were housed in one building.
In 1973, the State Department employed 11,950 people.
The Secretary of State, first ranking officer in the President's
cabinet, heads the State Department. The deputy undersecretary of
administration is chief administrator. Employees in 1973 included 8750
support staff, administrators, department managers, lawyers, and
secretaries, and 3200 foreign service officers.
Prior to World War II, foreign service officers were most often
sons of prominent eastern families. After World War II, a selection
test, patterned after the traditional image, resulted in a corps of
FSOs primarily liberal arts scholars from Ivy League schools. The
difficult foreign service examinations administered by the Foreign
Service Institute, admit a group of competent and committed people,
largely men with 5$ women. They regard themselves as the State Depart-
ment's elite corps, are proud and jealous of their rank, perquisites,
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and the intellectual and social status implied by their FSO title They
see themselves as "hunanistic, subjective, cultural, qualitative, and
generalizers detached from personal conflict".
Problems in the Sta te Department
For fifty years the Department of State and its foreign service
have been criticized for inefficiency. Critics have made charges of
overstaffing, and under-employment of human resources. Possessed of an
enormously long chain of command, the Department has earned the repu-
tation of being administratively rigid, choked by red tape, sluggish
and overcautious. These are attributed to its hierarchical structure,
emphasis on authority as the indispensible means of managerial control
,
detailed prescriptions for carrying out each job, outmoded personnel
practices, and sanctified routines. Over the years the State's manage-
ment problems have been examined, chided, reported on, and experimented
with. Sweeping changes affecting organizational structure, staffing
and training the foreign service corps were always recommended and
resisted.
The Bypassed Organization
Agreeing with President John Kennedy's 1962 characterization of
the State Department as a "bowl of jello [p. 7]," the bright, slightly
disrespectful young men of the Executive Branch of government devised
methods to bypass the Department's bureaucracy whenever speed in
decision making was required. They were annoyed by the "timid" nine-
teenth century pace of foreign service diplomats in a twentieth century
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wond. in developing internatio,*! policies, all Presidents chose to
rely on a few trusted men, bypassing the 6000 people in the Department
at home, and 6000 people abroad. Thus, with the power shifted to the
White House, and the general belittling of the State Department
Washington power structure, morale in the Department plunged and
resentment was high.
by the
Change Cycle One
Enter the Dragon
William J. Crockett was appointed deputy undersecretary of
state for administration in 19 6 3 . His reputation for unorthodox
approach to management had been gained at the United States Embassy in
Rome. "Results are more important than regulations [p. 13] ,» Crockett
said. "Regulations are not chisled in stone. They are printed on
paper... they can be changed [p. 13]." Crockett took on duties
following the inability of two capable administrators to reform the
foreign service system. His aim was major reorganization — one that
would encourage wider participation in problem solving and decision
making
.
Through conferences and reading, Crockett had become highly
interested in Douglas McGregor's theories of management. Recognizing
that McGregor's Theory X assumptions underlay the authoritarian system
operating in the State Department, Crockett hoped to replace this with
a Theory Y based system of flexibility and participation.
Action One: Con sul tat inn
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Crockett consulted with Alfred J. Marrow, a psychological
consultant to organizations. During their discussion of the Department's
problems, Marrow suggested that the T-group training method might help
bring about a participative management system.
Action Two: A dvisory Groups
In 1964 Crockett set up five groups of advisors. Group one was
composed of three prominent business: E. E. Fogle, vice-president
union Carbide; Dr. F. A. L. Holloway, president Esso; Dr. A. J. Marrow,
chairman of the board, Harwood Manufacturing. Their task was to advise
Crockett on introducing a more participative management system into the
department. Group two
,
a team of National Training Laboratories
behavioral scientists, led a series of T-group training seminars for
State Department personnel that were to increase the participant's
awareness of their behavior. Group three was composed of internal and
external specialists in art and architecture, building construction,
food supply, education, and others. Their purpose was not specified
in the original case study.
Group four
,
a scientific task force from the University of
Michigan, was to evaluate the effectiveness of the reform program.
Group five
,
a consortium of behavioral scientists and some State Depart-
ment officers, were to develop and implement a program to administrate
the total reform effort, and serve as a link to N.T.L. This was called
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D Action for Organizational Development. All of these
separately and directed their efforts to help Crockett.
groups worked
Action Three:
—Change in Structure
In June 1965 Crockett announced a major reform designed to reduce
bureaucratic stratification. With Secretary of State Rusk-s agreement,
he abolished six supervisory layers between himself and the operating
managers, cutting the time required for a problem to reach him from six
months to two days. This eliminated 125 positions, and caused 160
employees to be transferred to other parts of the Department. This
announcement was couched in Theory Y concepts of openness, participa-
tion, self management, decentralization, responsibility, and management
by objectives. In a speech Crockett stated:
I believe that our present concept of decentralized
management by objectives and programs will accomplishthese objectives by: decentralizing our managementinto self-contained, semi-independent, and semi-
autonomous programs, each with a manager; elimina-
ting every intermediate supervisory level; dele-
gating almost complete authority for daily operationsto the program managers
....[ p . 20].
The staff perceived the reorganization as an order, and were
dismayed at its inconsistency and premptoriness. Grumbling, complaints
and fears were evident among those who had no opportunity to participate
in the decision, and their resistance helped limit Crockett's original
objectives. The old climate of suspicion, fear, and anger was only
slightly improved. State Department officials were generally pleased
for they could now reach the deputy undersecretary in one step. For
timid young officers, suddenly deprived of the security of the six
layered superstructure, there was anxiety.
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Action Four: T
-Groups
Several months after the reforms had begun, upon the advice of
his advisory group, Crockett instructed the team of NTL behavioral
scientists to conduct training seminars for the staff. More than 200
FSOs and senior officials attended. Some were coerced into attending.
Each seminar lasted one week and was held away from the work site. The
seminars were taped.
We will focus briefly on one seminar as an example, conducted
in the summer of 1965 by Chris Argyris of Yale University, and Warren
Bennis, then of MIT. Six months prior to the seminar, Argyris held
thirty-one interviews with young FSOs to determine critical problems.
The FSOs stated that the foreign service community was characterized by:
1. suppression of interpersonal issues
2. minimal openness and trust
3- withdrawal from interpersonal difficulties and
conflict
4. little risk taking and acceptance of
responsibility
5. overdependence on the superior
6. crisis orientation
7. cautious memo writing
8. an attitude of "Don’t make waves [p. 55]."
During the seminar, these issues surfaced. The attitudes of the
foreign service officers and the administration towards each other were
revealed as illustrated in figure 35.
The seminars were rated very valuable by most participants.
Typical of the positive feelings is the following:
I’m prepared to testify personally that the
value of my week of T-group training was
higher than that of any week of foreign
service institute training to which I have
been exposed [p. 56].
The FSOs thought the
administrators would
see them as [p. 30]:
The administrators
actually saw them as [p. 31];
. arrogant snobs
. cliquish
. effete
. resistant to change
. resourceful and serious
. inclined to stability
. dedicated to job
. externally oriented
. cautious and rational
. masked, isolated
. surrounded by mystique
. manipulative and defensive
The administrators thought
the FSOs would see them as
[p. 31 ]:
The FSOs actually saw
them as [p. 31]:
. bureaucratic
. practical
. preoccupied with minutiae
. limited perspective
. educated clerks
. defensive
. inflexible
. a necessary evil
. doers and implementors
. decisive and forceful
. noncultural
. limited goals
. interested in form
.
jealous of us
. drones but necessary evils
Figure 35 . Attitudes of Foreign Service Officers and Administration
Those less enthusiastic were those irritated at being "sent". Clarify-
ing of perceptions produced some lessening of antagonism and made the
climate a bit less hostile to change.
The report . Argyris was asked if a summary of what happened at
the seminars could be produced. The report presented an objective and
unvarnished summary of the actual taped statements made by FSOs during
the seminars. The FSOs described the following norms as influencing
their organization:
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y to withdraw from interpersonal
difficulties and conflict
2. not being open about interpersonal problems
or substantitive issues that could be
threatening to others, especially superiors
and peers
3. distrust of aggressive or openly competitive
behavior in others
a tendency to withdraw from aggression andjudge the other man negatively, but not tell
him [p. 53-54].
In his report, Argyris stated that the FSOs feared being engulfed
by "the system [p. 54]" and felt helpless about changing it. Under the
system as it was the FSOs learned to check with everyone, develop
policies that upset no one, take positions in such a way that their
superiors had to bear the responsibility for them, and to make
protection of one’s "bureaucratic skin [p. 55]" the prime concern.
Initially the report was sent only to participants. However,
it created a furor. One senior FSO told Argyris it was harder to get
than one stamped top secret. In order to counter accusations of
censorship by critics of the State Department, several top level FSOs
decided to publish the report to symbolize the Department’s interest
in improvement. Crockett volunteered to write the introduction in
which he gave a detailed explanation for reasons for publishing the
report. Nevertheless, arguments over making the report freely acces-
sible were heated and acrimonious.
Action Five: The Executive Group
In response to pressure from his superior, Secretary Dean Rusk,
Undersecretary Ball, and his own staff, Crockett created an executive
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group in 1966 to assist him in managing the administrative area. Rusk
and Ball had grown concerned that Crockett was moving too far too fast
and that his span of control was excessive. Rusk asked "What to you
substitute for a hierarchy? How do you ensure that it isn't running off
in all directions without much guidance [p. 42]?" Crockett felt that:
The executive group was introduced to establish
the window dressing' for the span of control
problem because this was a persistent problem
on the part of my bosses.
... [p. 41].
As well as pressure from above, Crockett was being pushed by his staff.
He stated that:
They wanted greater clarification of the functions
and responsibilities of the special assistants
whom I had appointed as coordinators [p. 42].
Crockett saw the executive group as a 'council of elders' staff
members with no line responsibilities.
My concept was that almost anything that came to
my desk was something that the executive group
might take on. I was willing to relinquish much
—
most all of the authority—so that I wouldn't be a
single authoritarian voice in it. I was willing
to play the game absolutely open in dealing with
the executive group [p. 42],
The executive group accomplished little. Despte Crockett's
view of them, they found it difficult to separate themselves from their
role as line managers. Ambiguity, arising because their duties and
functions were not clearly established, created misunderstandings and
rocky group functioning. When news of Crockett's impending resignation
moved through the grapevine, they moved even more cautiously, hesitating
to make any change that could jeopardize their position under a new
undersecretary.
Action Six:—The Evaluation of the Program
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Fourteen months after the first reforms were ordered, and at
Marrow’s advice, Crockett directed the evaluation team under the
direction of Rensis Likert, Director for Social Research at the
University of Michigan, to begin its study. They reported that:
1* ^he stripping away of six layers of hierarchy
had increased managerial autonomy. Response was
generally positive. However, several managers
who spoke negatively said they felt isolated
'
and frustrated because no one was near enough
to notice if a good job was done. Crockett
saw that dependent managers were threatened
by the new program [p. 37-38].
2. There were inadequate and erratic resources,
especially in funds, to develop the new program.
Crockett agreed and explained that the budget
appropriation was late in being submitted.
"Too bad", he said, "but we are grown-up and
people ought to understand [p. 38]."
3- The manager's role in the decision making
process was slightly to moderately increased.
In matters affecting operations of the program,
subordinates felt an increase of influence on
superior’s decisions [p. 38].
4. There were slight gains in communication in all
areas. Some managers complained of longer delays
in communication. This was because in the
preceding six months, Crockett had been away for
about five months [p. 39].
5. Generally, the new program did heighten incentive
for better performance in the operating unit [p. 39].
6. Net effect of changes on motivation and attitudes
of managers was positive [p. 40].
7. There was a reduction in coordination. The reforms
resulted in excessive fragmentation. There was
uncertainty about responsibilities and little
direction from above [p. 40].
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Action Seven: Resignation
The strife caused by his reforms played a large part in
Crockett’s resignation. He had expected to meet resistance, but not
as strong as it turned out to be. Attacks on "Crockett's Rockettes
[p. 44]" were growing more frequent and intense. His superiors were
not supportive. Budget problems and job stresses grew. Some FSOs who
overtly supported his reforms, covertly were sabotaging them. Progress
was sluggish. He feared distorted reports of shattered morale being
leaked to the press. When a job offer was made from IBM, Crockett
accepted. From there, he took an executive position in Saga foods
which he still holds. Eighteen months after he had started the
reorganization program, Crockett announced his resignation in January
of 1967. Simultaneously with his announcement, he left.
After Change
Idar Rimestad, whose experience was limited to his having
worked in a traditional hierarchical structure, replaced Crockett in
January 1967- As an old line administrator, Rimestad had little
interest "in making waves [p. 47].” Rumor spread that the Crockett
program would be eliminated or drastically altered. Before long,
Rimestad made it clear he considered the new system a mess.
Angered at the reports of the Michigan evaluation team,
Rimestad declared to Marrow that it was ridiculous to spend money on
a project that found so much negative to report. Negative information,
in his view, encouraged employees to express dissatisfaction. When he
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learned the Michigan evaluation team planned to feed back the data to
the staff, and involve the staff in planning, he suggested that the
University of Michigan cancel its contract. Because the data was
already in the computer, Rimestad instead cut $25,000 from the
Michigan contract, leaving enough to complete the analysis of the data.
Likert had to receive a private grant to publish the results.
Rimestad saw no value in continuing to use specialists from
industry and behavioral scientists, even though they had been volunteer-
ing their time. He removed them, and cancelled the contract with NTL.
In December 1967, he abolished ACORD, and restored line supervisors to
their old jobs.
About four months after he had taken this post, the Argyris’
report was published and Rimestad appeared at congressional appropria-
tions hearing. Chairman John Rooney, irritated because he had not been
informed about this report, questioned Rimestad and expressed his
displeasure at the report. Rimestad responded:
I have no exception to a study (such as the
Argyris’ report). I do not agree with this
study in its rather clinical approach; its
very small sampling of people. I think we
could have arrived at this type of information
without spending $3000. I also do not agree
with having it printed for public distribution.
I think it should have been for the use of
officials of the Department and the foreign
service. . .
.
[p. 49]
.
This episode seemed to stiffen Rimestad 's resolve to return to the old
style authoritarian bureaucratic system based on Theory X assumptions
about people.
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Eager to shift to a less turbulent atmosphere, Rimestad bid for
the opened post of special Ambassador in Geneva, Switzerland, and was
appointed. He left in October, 1969, after a little over two and a
half years as deputy undersecretary.
Change Cycle Two
Pressure For Change
William B. Macomber replaced Rimestad in October 1969. The new
leadership of the State Department was under pressure to reorganize.
The new President, Richard M. Nixon, dissatisfied with the operations
of the State Department, declared he wanted to "clean house in the
State Department [p. 59]." He wanted the Department's managerial
capacity strengthened through modern techniques. The foreign service
officers pressured in a similar manner through their professional
association. Their drive culminated in the American Foreign Service
Association becoming an independent professional union in 1973. Calls
for change also came from the junior Foreign Officers Club.
In response to these urgings, undersecretary Elliot Richardson
invited Professor Harry Levinson of Harvard University, Alfred Marrow,
Macomber, and several top members of the State Department staff to meet
with him. They discussed the failure of the previous reform efforts.
Levinson and Marrow advised Richardson and his staff not to bring in
outside experts, but have the Department undertake to change itself
from within. Secretary of State Rogers, Richardson, and Macomber,
after further discussions among themselves, agreed on a self study
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conducted by an in-house set of task forces. They would also encourage
the widest possible participation by all FSOs.
Macomber' s First Stpp
On January 14, 1970, Macomber spoke to a large meeting of exec-
utives of the State Department. His chief theme was that a reform
program was imperative, and that there were many outside the Department
who would happily impose reform ideas; earlier rimours had it that
Senator Fullbright was planning a full-scale hearing on Department
effectiveness. Macomber described the situation clearly:
Management had not been out bag.
. . .We have
tended to be intuitive in nature, weak in
planning, and unenthusiastic about management.
In retrospect, it is clear that these resistant
instincts have caused a great share of our
difficulties The key fact is either we
produce the improvements necessary to meet
this challenge, or, as I have suggested, this
this will be done for us [p. 63 ].
An absolutely essential requirement for our
future ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission,
assistant secretaries, deputy assistant
secretaries and counterparts in our sister
agencies is the capacity to manage [p. 63 ].
Macomber pointed out that the Secretary of State, the Under-
secretary and himself believed that outside efforts would not be as
effective or informed as those of the staff members themselves. Some
outsiders claimed the job could not be done from within. But, said
Macomber, he did not agree with them.
Macomber acknowledged the helpful studies previously made, and
how useful this work would be. He affirmed his confidence in the staff,
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and stated that in his view, the competence level of the foreign service
officers was unequalled.
The "Diplomacy of the 70' s" Program
Enthusiastically
,
the staff responded by creating thirteen in-
house task forces, working under the title "Diplomacy of the 70’
s
[p. 64]." Their aim was to study basic questions troubling the State
Department. The thirteen task forces comprised more than 250 career
professionals of State, and forty officers from other foreign affairs
units. Each task force was composed of about twenty members. Chairmen
were chosen from the most outstanding men in the Department. Members
were selected through a nomination system, and through volunteers.
Macomber and his staff carefully avoided suggesting chairmen or
members. Each group set its own meeting schedule; on the average they
met weekly. They were given complete freedom to examine any problems,
and come up with whatever recommendations they chose. Macomber set
loose guidelines, so that questions could be discussed in a very frank
spirit.
Results of the Program
Slightly less than one year later, a summary report written by a
member of Macomber' s staff was presented to the Secretary of State. In
addition, each task force submitted its own report. The thirteen reports
contained slightly over 500 recommendations. This process was probably
without precedent in the history of any government agency.
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Secretary of State Rogers quickly approved about 400 recommenda-
tions in principle. A few recommendations needed further study, and some
were rejected. Macomber was directed to begin implementation at once,
and in July 1971, about six months later, he reported about 75% had been
put into effect.
In February 1972 Macomber again addressed Department personnel.
Reviewing what had been accomplished, he described the self-study as:
the most comprehensive and searching critique
ever written about the Department no other
document can match it [p. 66].
He continued, praising the staff as he outlined their achievement:
The past two years have been a time of turmoil....
No effort of this kind starts without antecedents.
Much of the credit must go to those career officers
among you who, in increasing numbers in the years
immediately preceding January 1970, pressed for
reform; and to the many who joined you in the past
two years, we owe a considerable debt [p. 66].
For the first time, under the reform program,
members of the foreign service will have an
important and formal voice in the development
of all personnel policies Furthermore,
modernization and reform, if they are to be
really effective, require the development of
an increasingly effective, fair, and enlightened
system of human relations [p. 67].
Here too, we have had a remarkable two years
with much progress being made What has
emerged is a system under which the men and
women of the foreign services can have a real
voice in the policies and regulations affecting
their careers [p. 67]-
The self-study program was supported by Secretary of State Rogers.
When he received the report he said:
The efforts we are making in-house speak very
well for the vitality and dynamism of the
Department and the foreign service. I continue
to believe that if we could leave behind us
an improved and modernized system for dealing
with this country’s foreign policy problems,
this could well be a more lasting and
significant contribution to the public interest
than success in handling many of the more
transitory matters which necessarily occupy
our attention [p. 67].
Analysis of Case Three
Before Change
We trained hard, but it seemed every time we
were beginning to form up into teams we would
be reorganized. I was to learn later in life
that we tend to meet any new situation by
reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can
be for creating the illusion of progress
while producing confusion, inefficiency, and
demoralization.
Petronius Arbiter, ca. 60 AD
The Situation
The organization . This organization is a massive bureaucracy
nearing two centuries of age, employing nearly 12000 people. According
to Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) Integration-Differentiation Model, it
is a highly structured organization, highly differentiated, with little
or no integration between departments [p. 169-171].
1. Hierarchically ordered , the great number
of administrators in the long chain of
command have short spans of control in
overstaffed departments.
2. Formal rules and review are exceedingly
important; in fact they are the modus
operendi of the entire organization.
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3- Traditionally, time orientation has bepn
.long term
;
it took six months for an
issue to travel through six supervisory
layers up to the chief administrator
of the organization.
4. Primarily concerned with tasks , the inter-
personal orientation of this organization
is formal and cautious. Qnphasis is on
authority as the means of managerial control.
5. When making decisions, formal rules and
immediate superiors are considered first.
Saving one's bureaucratic skin and making
decisions in such a way that responsibility
does not fall on you, are the prime criteria.
The
,
environment
, fete of change in the world of foreign affairs
is meteoric. Certainty about conditions is low; conditions, for example,
in the current oil crisis, change hourly, fete of feedback on the envi-
ronment is high, to top administrators. The time available in which to
make decisions is very short; the non-stop Henry Kissinger attests to
this.
There is then a disparity between the organization and its envi-
ronment. Lacking methods of integration and adaptability, the organiza-
tion cannot respond to the demands of the environment. This has resulted
in two things: 1) the environment has become increasingly hostile;
witness the derisive names assigned to the organization, and the many
attempts at wholesale reform. 2) The organization has been bypassed.
Presidents have assigned foreign policy responsibilities to a few trusted
politicians, taking matters out of the hands of the organization. These
have had an effect rather like poking a porcupine with a stick; instead
of moving any faster, the porcupine merely rolls up into a fiercely
bristling, untouchable ball, and refuses to move at all.
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Ihe_task. The main task of the State Department is dealing
with the foreign policy problems of the United States. As may be
appreciated, this is an enormously complex task; one requiring the
highest amount of interdependence, and performed under conditions of
stress. When one is a lower-echelon employee, one of 11,950, the
satisfactions of working on any part of that task must be small. By the
time the task has filtered down through the maze of layers, it has been
diluted, divided, and specialized, so that a secretary sees only a
fragment of the whole. Satisfactions, such as they are, are experiened
more by those at the top of the organization.
The Followers
There are two general categories of employees in this organiza-
tion; support staff, and foreign service officers. The 8750 support
staff, domestic and foreign, who do not travel, are composed of
administrators, department managers, lawyers, and secretaries. For the
purpose of this analysis, the FSOs will be focussed upon.
Achievement motivation
. According to McClelland (1961), the
foreign service officers have many of the characteristics of high
achievers. In McClelland’s theory, a person with high achievement
motivation is a moderate, calculated risk-taker, prefers non-routine
tasks, tends to be overconfident, tends to think ahead, works harder
when there is a chance his or her personal efforts will make a
difference in the outcome, prefers concrete feedback, and is not
motivated by money alone [p. 211 -237].
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All of these apply to the FSOs. In order to become a foreign
service officer, one must compete for the position in the difficult
foreign service examinations. This results in the selection of a group
of FSOs who are intelligent, competitive, and committed. They are seen
by the administration as resourceful, serious, dedicated, cautious,
rational, manipulative and externally oriented. Their self image is
confident; they see themselves as subjective, cultural, qualitative
and generalizers detached from personal conflict. Thus they may be
described as persons with high n Ach.
Ability to take responsibility
. Well educated, the best of the
brightest, the FSOs are part of an elite tradition of Ivy League
scholars. They are described by Marrow as proud and jealous of their
rank, perquisites, intellectual and social status. Trained by the
Foreign Service Institute, their ability to take responsibility is
high.
Willingness to take responsibility . However, their morale,
productivity, and willingness to take responsibility is low. Why is
this? Though they enter the State Department highly motivated, the
organization soon teaches them to check with everyone, develop policies
that upset no one, take positions in such a way as to place responsibil-
ity on their superiors, and cover their ass. The organization has
caused the FSOs to:
1. supress interpersonal issues
2. give minimal openness and trust
3. withdraw from interpersonal difficulties
and conflicts
4. take few risks and accept little
responsibility
5. be overdependent on the superior
6. be crisis oriented
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7- write cautious memos
8. adopt an attitude of "Don't make waves [p. 55-56]."
In Herzberg's terns, they tave been "overhired". The effect is akin to
putting racehorses in a starting gate that never opens. Peeling helpless
about changing the system, and fearing being engulfed by it, the FSOs
watched power and opportunities shift to the White House. They became
frustrated and resistant.
Maturity of the followers
. According to Life Cycle Theory,
although the "maturity" level of the FSOs was potentially high, it was
reduced by the organization. At the beginning of this case, it would
fall in the middle of the maturity continuum. (See figure 36). Achieve
ment motivation is generally above average, though little expression is
allowed by the organization. Ability to take responsibility is above
average, though the situation allows few opportunities. Willingness to
take responsibility is below average because of the situation. Taking a
midpoint between these three would place the FSOs at an average level
of maturity. Thus the appropriate leadership style called for in this
situation would be a combination of quadrant two, high task and high
relationships, and quadrant three, high relationships and low task.
Change Cycle One
One of the most fascinating spectator sports
of the last ten years has been watching the
responses of large bureaucratic organizations
to efforts of change Most of them have had
the impact of thrusting a fist into a feather
pillow, holding it there for a while and
withdrawing it. While many of the feathers
have been ruffled, the shape of the pillow
remains unchanged. How does this happen?
Richard S. Underhill
First Tango in Boston
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Leadership style
appropriate
for FSOs
Maturity Continuum
l
Maturity Level
of FSOs
Figure 36. Foreign Service Officers' Maturity Level
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Crockett's Leadership Style
Basic Style: Quadrant One
Reliance on experts. Crockett’s first act was to seek the
advice of Alfred Marrow, an outside professional consultant. Of the
five groups Crockett set up, the first was formed of three external
businessmen, including Marrow; the second, of a team of NTL behavioral
scientists; the third, of individual specialists containing some State
Department personnel; the fourth, of University of Michigan researchers;
the fifth, of behavioral scientists, and some State Department officers.
In seeking advice, training, and evaluation, Crocket did not assess the
skills within the organization but relied on outside experts. Being
bypassed was a familiar condition to Department employees, one that had
already caused much resentment. It might be expected that the presence
of so many external consultants would fuel the fires of resistance even
higher.
In setting up these five groups, Crockett was establishing a
structure for the reform program, and channels of communication. The
groups worked separately, and each directed their efforts to help
Crockett. Thus Crockett was the central point of the communications
system. (See figure 37).
Coercive change stragegy . Crockett's first step in the reform
program was the elimination of six supervisory positions, 125 jobs, and
the shifting of 160 employees to other departments. We are not told if
he was advised to take this step, so must assume it was largely his own
181
Business
Team
J
External
Behavioral
\
Science
Researchers
\
/ NTL
! Behavioral
\ Scientists
Crockett i
V
University
of
Michigan
Researchers
Individuals
Specialists
Figure 37. Relation of Five Consulting Teams to Crockett
decision. In this action, Crockett was using his position power in a
coercive change strategy, illustrated in figure 38 - (Hersey & Blanchard,
1972, p. 160). It resulted in greater efficiency of communication and
it also intensified resentment, fear, suspicion, and lowered morale.
Chris Argyris (1971) has noted that people who do not own up to
feelings, who are not open, who reject experimenting, and who do not
help others, can attitudinally support Theory Y assumptions that people
position
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have the capacity for creative problem solving, motivation, and self-
direction. And, similarly, people who do own up to feelings, are open,
do experiment, and do help others can attitudinally support Theory X
assumptions that people are unambitious, have no desire for responsibil-
ity, no capacity for creative problem solving, and need to be closely
controlled, if not coerced into action. Though attitudinally Crockett
sympathized with Theory Y assumptions, his behavior followed Theory X
assumptions.
Given the situation, speedier communications were desired, but
this short term result was achieved at the expense of lowering already
low morale, and increasing resistance, thus jeopardizing long term
success in the reform.
—
groups . Of all types of training, T-groups are most directly
concerned with interpersonal relationships, and good interpersonal
relationships with open communications are one of the foundations of
management based on Theory Y assumptions. How can we reconcile a high
task and low relationships quadrant one style with a series of T-group
seminars?
Crockett established the seminars upon the advice of his
external consultants, believing they would help bring about a system
based on Theory Y assumptions. However, once again, in the decision
and recruiting of participants, Crockett adopted a coercive change
strategy, and used a high task low relationships leader style. Those
who would be involved in the T-groups were not consulted or included in
making this decision. Furthermore, some of the participants were
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coerced into attending. His intentions notwithstanding, Crockett
attempted paradoxically to command openness and trust.
Another factor mitigating against the effectiveness of the T-
group seminars was the nature of the State Department itself. In a 1955
study of hunan relations training in industry) Fleistaan
,
Harris and
Burtt found that day to day climate is more important in determining
an employee's behavior than the human relations training he or she has
received. Training in isolation (which is how the training for the
State Department was carried out) was found not to last in real life
situations which are counter to the climate in training. Such was the
case of the closed, fearful attitudes in the State Department. Fleishman
et al concluded that:
to a considerable extent, the specific
training in human relations is wasted
unless the environment in the plant
(organization) is also strong in human
relations [p. 387].
Crockett's basic style. The behaviors above all fall under the
task category of leader behavior. If we look at relationships behavior,
we see very little recorded evidence of Crockett developing personal
relationships with his staff, giving them socio-emotional support,
psychological strokes, or engaging in interpersonal communications. His
basic leadership style falls into quadrant one of the Life Cycle Model:
high task and low relationships.
Secondary Style: Quadrant Four
MBO program . Crockett established the Management by Objectives
program because he believed that by decentralizing management into self-
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contained, semi-independent and semi-autonomous programs, eliminating
every intermediate supervisory level, and delegating almost complete
authority for daily operations to the program managers, a system of
management based on Theory Y assumptions would develop. Following his
previous pattern, Crockett used a coercive change strategy and instituted
the MBO program from the top, not by or with the managers who would be
involved. In setting up this program, Crockett exhibited a high task
and low relationships leadership style.
After Crockett reviewed and signed a manager's list of objectives
for the year, Crockett became absent, even to the point of being out of
the country five out of six months. In so doing, he was unavailable for
periodic review and support of managers unfamiliar with the system, one
periodic review and support of managers unfamiliar with the system, one
of the steps essential to the MBO process. Thus after setting up the
MBO program, Crockett adopted a Quadrant four low task and low relation-
ships style.
In terms of Life Cycle Theory, a quadrant four style is appro-
priate to followers of high "maturity". In adopting this leadership
style, Crockett appears to have assumed a high "maturity" level among
all his subordinates; however, this assumption proved to be incorrect.
Inexperienced and dependent managers felt threatened, as shown when they
pressured for more clarification of their roles, and complained they
felt isolated by the new program. Noting this problem, Hersey and
Blanchard (197*0 suggest that MBO could be more effective if superior
and subordinate negotiated the leadership style the superior would use
in helping the subordinate accomplish each of his or her objectives.
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m handling the MBO prog™, Crockett could not be said to teve
demonstrated relationships beteviors with his onagers such as allowing
them to participate in the decision nuking for change, developing
personal relationships with them, giving them socio-emotional support,
or engaging in interpersonal communication.
Executive group
. Crockett used the same low task and low
relationships leadership style with his executive group. Zoning
their "maturity" level to be high, as indicated by his calling them a
"council of elders", he did not define their duties, function, or roles
As previous program managers, they in fact, had little experience in
being members of an executive group. Crockett's quadrant four leader-
ship style would thus be inappropriate for this group, and was, as
evidenced by their lack of accomplishment.
Inappropriateness of Crockett’s Leadership Sty Ip
According to Life Cycle Theory, Crockett's leadership style
tends to fall into two quadrants. His basic style is high task and
low relationships; his secondary style is low task and low relation-
ships. He does not show a sequence of style, but alternates between
quadrant one and quadrant four. Previously, we diagnosed that the
appropriate leadership style needed by the followers, the FSOs, in
light of the situation, was quadrant two and quadrant three. Thus
Life Cycle Theory suggests that Crockett's style would be inappropriate
in this situation, and that in the long run, he would be ineffective.
(See figure 39).
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Style Appropriate to Followers
Figure 39- Comparison of Crockett's Leadership Style
and Style Appropriate to Followers
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Crockett's Effectiveness
If Crockett launched the reform program, how could he be said
to be ineffective? Bernard M. Bass (I960) distinguished between
successful and effective leadership. When person A attempts to
influence another to do something, and person B does it, then behav-
iorally speaking, person A has been successful. However, if B is
antagonized, and responds only because A has control over the rewards
and punishments, then A has been successful, but not effective. If B
responds becaue he or she wants to, because the activity is rewarding
to B, then A has been successful and effective.
If a leader is interested in success, he or she will emphasize
position power, which is delegated downward. If a leader is effective,
he or she will also depend on personal power which tends to be
generated upward through follower acceptance. Hersey and Blanchard
(1972, p. 93-94) illustrate this concept. See figure 40.
Figure 40. Successful and Effective Leadership
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As deputy undersecretary of state for administration, Crockett-
s
position power helped his short term success in launching a reform
program. However, his leadership styles hindered the long term develop
ment of his followers' human resources, and reduced his personal power.
Crockett's first action of reducing stratification created resistance
and resentment which steadily grew. By the time of his resignation,
Crockett's personal power was at a low ebb, as some FSOs secretly
sabotaged the program, while both staff and superiors verbally attacked
it. Thus, while Crockett’s leadership style was successful in the
short run, it was not effective in the long run.
After Change
A state official noted that he had not achieved
his position by jumping on quixotic bandwagons.
His position, when faced with proposals for
change, was to assume the position of a passive
observer, to provide minimum response under
pressure, to conform where essential, and to
wait for the tide to ebb.
Richard S. Undershill
First Tango in Boston
Rimestad 's Leadership Style
Rimestad 's leadership style paralleled Crockett's. Although
attitudinally Rimestad was Theory X and Crockett Theory Y, behaviorally
their styles had similarities. After reading the evaluation report,
and talking with the various external consultants, Rimestad cut the
University of Michigan team's budget, removed the outside experts,
abolished ACORD, restored the supervisory positions that had been
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eliminated and restored the fired supervisors to their former jobs.
All of these actions were aimed at restoring organizational structure,
organizing and defining roles of staff, formalizing channels of
communication and establishing ways of getting the job done. Rimestad
His initial comment that he considered the system a mess, and
the rumors that he would eliminate it, would have tended to increase the
tension and fear in the situation. His discussions with the external
consultants focussed on task, as did his meeting with the Congressional
Appropriations Committee. As did Crockett, Rimestad directed his
communications outward to consultants and upward to superiors. His
leadership style falls then primarily into quadrant one; high task and
Rimestad 's Effectiveness
Again, according to Life Cycle Theory, Rimestad' s leadership
style would be inappropriate to the followers and the situation, and
concentrated on task; we have little evidence of relationships behavior.
low relationships.
Figure 41. Rimestad 's Leadership Style
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as such would be likely to be ineffective. Rimestad laid coercive
change on coercive change. Some of the FSOs and administrators had been
involved in T-groups, and had found them beneficial, and some managers
had flourished under the MBO system. These people, who ted found
Crockett's low task and low relationships style appropriate, would find
Rimestad
' s quadrant one style especially inappropriate.
Reactions to Rimestad's leadership bear this out. Dissatisfac-
tion with the State Department and pressure to reorganize it grew, not
only from superiors, but also from subordinates. President Nixon
demanded a "house cleaning [p. 59]." The foreign service officers
joined forces; both their professional association, which unionized, and
the junior Foreign Officers Club, called for change. During the period
of Rimestad's leadership, pressure for change came to a peak, both with-
in and without the organization.
Change Cycle Two
Fundamentally, most efforts at bringing about
change in government organizations have failed
because they have not been directed at the needs
of the participants who are responsible for the
success of the change.
Richard S. Undershill
First Tango in Boston
Macomber’s Leadership Style
Macomber’s First Step
William B. Macomber's leader behavior was different from that
of his predecessors. It was Macomber’s superior, Elliot Richardson,
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who called the first meeting to discuss reorganization. Macomber,
several top members of the State Department, and twg outside consultants
were present. After seeking advice, Richardson and Macomber decided
upon a method of change — a study by in-house task forces. Thus
Macomber, his superior, and officers of the Department were collabor-
atively involved in planning for change.
Macpmber's Initial Leadership Style: Quadrant. Two
Having settled on a method, Macomber 's next step was to present
the situation and the proposed method for change to Department personnel
at a large meeting. He outlined the "now or never” aspect of the
situation to the assembled group, clearly setting forth the pressure on
the Department to change. At the same time he stated the reasons why
change was necessary in the long run: the capacity to manage was
essential to Department officers in the future.
In this speech which demonstrated Macomber' s Theory Y assump-
tions, he also acknowledged the helpful studies of predecessors,
declared confidence in the staff, and praised the FSOs competence level
as being unequalled.
Macomber in this action combined an emphasis on task, and an
emphasis on relationships in his talk; in Life Cycle Theory terms, he
practiced a quadrant two leadership style of high task and high relation-
ships. According to the previous diagnosis of follower "maturity”, this
would be an initially appropriate style. The response from the staff
in creating thirteen in-house task forces, attests to the appropriateness
of Macomber' s style.
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Ssqugnge of Macomber ' s Leadership i-
As the task forces were being fenced, Macomber and his me-
diate staff supported the effort, but deliberate^ avoided suggesting
Chairpersons, members, or selection methods, thereby giving people a
say in these decisions. Department staff themselves decided how many
persons on each task force, and selection methods of chairpersons and
members, fech task force decided its own meeting schedule. Macomber
set very loose guidelines so that the task forces could examine any
problems and make any recommendations they chose. During this stage,
Macomber moved into a quadrant three leadership style: high relation-
ships and low task.
During the year the task forces were at work, Macomber practiced
a quadrant four style: low task and low relationships. Each task
force presented its own report to Macomber's superior Elliot Richardson.
Macomber f s own report was written by a member of his staff.
According to Life Cycle Theory, given the "maturity" level of
the staff, this sequence of leadership styles would be appropriate and
effective in this situation. (See figure 42). Macomber's leadership
resulted in the formation of thirteen in-house task forces, thirteen
reports, 500 recommendations, 400 recommendations approved by
Secretary of State Rogers, and 75% implemented by Macomber in six
months. As well, morale had improved; the FSOs for the first time
had involvement and power in developing Department policies. Morale
was built up further by the praise of Secretary of State Rogers for
the "Diplomacy of the 70s" program.
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Figure 42. Sequence of Macomber's Leadership Style
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Summary
jjhy Was the Reorganization Under Crnokett UnSnnnp^rm 9
Based on the data presented by Marrow, as analyzed according to
the theoretical framework, some of the reasons why the reorganization
under Crockett failed may include:
1* Consultation of outside experts by Crockett,
rather than those within the organization
who would be directly affected by the re-
organization created resentment and resistance.
2. The first structural reform was accomplished
through a "top down" coercive change strategy.
This created resentment and lowered morale
among staff.
3. The T-group training seminars were "laid on"
by top management, creating resistance and
resentment among those who felt coerced into
attending.
4. Because the State Department was still closer
to Likert’s (1961) system one and two type of
organization, it presented an environment un-
supportive to human relations training. The
T-groups were an inappropriate intervention
at that time.
5. Crockett’s initial high task and low relation-
ships leadership style was inappropriate to
the initial "average maturity" level of the
FSOs, creating resistance and resentment in
them to the reform program.
6. The MBO program was inappropriately implemented,
creating insecurity among some administrators.
7- Crockett’s low task and low relationships
leadership style was inappropriate to the
"low maturity" level of the Executive Group,
resulting in their inability to take effective
action.
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Crocket's leadership style and reform program
were not fully supported by his superiors.
Crockett's high task-low relationships, andlow
^
tfsk~^ow relationships leadership styleprofile did not allow him the flexibility todevelop the task "maturity" of some staff
members, or meet the needs of those with
"average maturity".
Why The Reorganization Under Macomber Succeeded
1. Macomber and his associates had the benefit of
learning from Crockett's previous reorganiza-
tion program.
2. Some of the State Department staff had responded
responded positively to Crockett's progressive
program, and had grown in it. They were ready
to support another such program.
3- Forces from within (unionization of the FSOs)
and without (the White House) the State
Department were both pressing for reform
simultaneously
.
4. Macomber 's initial high task and high relation-
ships leadership style was appropriate to the
"maturity" level of his staff who responded
positively. His flexibility allowed him to
change his style as the program got underway,
and the staff increased in "maturity".
Ultimately he was able to leave responsibility
entirely in the hands of his staff.
5. Macomber 's collaborative approach was appropriate
to the needs and competence level of his staff.
Those who would be affected by the change responded
positively to being involved in and responsible
for it.
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chapter VI
SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDIES
£kanKe .In an Automobile Assomhly P]
n n +
Background
This case is taken from Chris Weisfelder's (1974) condensation
0f ^gaillZatl0nal The Effect of Suonessfi a Leadar.shi p by
Robert Guest (1962). In the early 1950»s, Robert Guest and his
colleagues at the Technology Project of the Yale Institute for Human
Relations conducted a series of studies in two large automobile
assembly plants. They wanted to discover "how modern technological
methods influenced intrinsic work satisfactions [p.4],» and how mass
production affected interpersonal relations among hourly workers.
In 1953 Guest focused his attention on "Plant Y", (a fictitious
name) the plant under consideration in this case. Poorest of the six
plants in its division, it was under the threat of being closed by the
corporation. In order to find out the causes of this critical condition,
the Yale researchers interviewed everyone from foremen to executive vice-
president, observed production, held informal discussions with workers,
and examined personnel and performance records.
During the two and a half years this study was in progress, a
new plant manager was hired, and word began to circulate that Plant Y
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was undergoing "some profound changes [p. 5]." Spurred by a desire to
discover what led to the positive changes in Plant Y, Guest began a
new full-scale research program in February 1956. Again, he conducted
interviews, and examined records of personnel, perfontance and technical
changes. By learning about "the way in which hunan beings actually
behave in our complex industrial society [p. 7]," Guest hoped to produce
findings which would shed light on the "broader theoretical questions
about leadership and change in complex organizations [p. 6]."
The following is a precis of his account of three years in the
life of Plant Y—a period which saw it rise from last to first place in
its division.
Before Change
The Organization
Structure . Plant Y is an automobile assembly plant, part of a
corporation employing more than half a million people. The corporate
structure, and brief job description for each level is shown in figure
43 .
Approximately one third of the plant population is made up of
non-production personnel including:
Resident Comptroller - in charge of the budget
Personnel Director - all personnel matters
Plant Engineer - in charge of maintenance
Director of Material
and Production Control
handling and supplying
materials
Supervisor of work
standards
in charge of work pro-
cedures and performance
evaluation
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Chief Inspector
- in charge of all product
inspection and responding
to reports from dealers
derations . Plant Y is a highly complex operation which requires
an enormous amount of planning and cooperation by specialized technical
groups. The assembly line, focal point of thousands of parts and units,
produced completed automobiles at a rate of over 350 each eight hour
day, or over 700 on a two shift basis. Parts are delivered mechanically
to and from operators working in a maze of conveyors and machinery.
Any mechanical breakdown, or human error in this sensitive assembly
line can upset the work flow of the entire plant, and create waves in
management from foreman to manager, and higher.
The Situation
In the mid-fifties, the automobile industry found itself "going
all out [p. 6]" to meet booming market demands. However, at Plant Y,
something was going wrong. Costs were too high, schedules were not
being met. In short, Plant Y was failing to meet the new demands. The
increasing demand from the public was accompanied by an increasing
number of urgent telephone calls, telegrams, letters, memos, and visits
from the division to Plant Y, demanding better performance. Dealers
were complaining about defects and poor delivery.
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Figure 43. Organizational Structure of Corporation, and Plant Y
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Ike Plant Manager
The Plant Manager was “on the spot [p. 6].» He explained his
bind to observer and case author Guest this way:
They just don't know in the central office what
we have to face They think everything can bedone by schedule, no matter how fantastic. Thevkeep saying to me, 'Why can't you do it'?....
When I get this kind of pressure on me, I getbutterflies in my stomach. It makes it hard
for me. I can't tell those below me I can't
do anything about this impossible schedule,
so of course I get blamed for a lot of it.
I can't treat my superintendents the way I
get treated. They would just pack up and go
hone 1 can't say these things to my people.
I can't say them to my superiors. Results
are all that matter to them [p. 7 ].
On two occasions, the Plant Manager made recordings of his
meetings
,
and played them back to the division manager. One
official said later:
He was trying to show the division manager that
he was carrying out orders. I think he was also
trying to put the blame on his own staff. They
knew this [p. 7].
The plant manager held sporadic meetings with his staff, which
he called as a result of a divisional complaint or an emergency in the
plant. With the focus in these meetings on short run solutions to
immediate problems, he generally requested information or explanations
from individuals, and frequently interrupted members with his own
opinions or orders. In these meetings, there were few lateral
discussions among staff. As one department head observed:
We spend most of our time making explanations
about why something went wrong and who made it
go wrong [p. 8].
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The plant onager's usual response to an emergency was a trip
to the production department, where he gave orders to individials or
groups. The trips were frequent; the pattern the same. One general
foreman put it this way:
’?e^
S
sS
e
[p!
r
8].?
nd laSt WOrd
' 1 Just **
Ihe Subordinates
Superintendents, general foremen, and others said that the
plant manager "puts the heat on us and we can't talk back [p. 7].»
All agreed that the manager's behavior was characterized by obedience
to orders, enforcement of rules, and the exercise of power through
threat of punishment. One superintendent observed:
This plant is a one-man show, so people are
taught not to be self reliant. Fear, that's
the trouble. Nobody questions an order
In the meetings we have, they just give us
hell [p. 9J.
Said a general foreman:
The only time I have anything to do with the
manager is when he comes down and chews me out,
usually in front of others [p. 9].
A section foreman commented:
The manager would come down and stand next to
me and point out some man and say 'What the
hell is that guy doing'? I get all nervous
and confused. .. .You can't work under a manager
like that [p. 9].
The foreman was caught in the middle. Subject to punishment from above
if he failed to carry out orders, he risked alienating his men if he
obeyed orders as given. His dilemma was the same as the manager's.
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In addition, superiors co^only ignored the chain of co^nd
one superintendent objected to the frequent by-passing of the general
foreman. The section foremen, most affected by discplinary measures
taken against the hourly workers, found officials above taking over
this responsibility. Said one foreman:
I get aggravated by all the interference
section
6 iT . to run the men in my'1 resent this [p . 11 ] . y
New foremen, promoted from the ranks, found themselves quickly
Changing to conform, to plant norm,s, even though they began their Jobs
with a desire to treat their men otherwise. As one new foreman said:
the
Cat!' t
v°
that (act differently toward
orkers). You can't change overnight what'sbeen going on for fifteen yea?s. Now I tnTtmy men the way they have been treated more orless in the past [p. 12].
Problems in Qnprations
Assembly line operations require close cooperation between the
operating (line) groups and the non-production departments. Because
this cooperation did not exist, there were many problems in operations.
Because the system of material flow and the layout of equip-
ment was inadequate in some areas, "bottlenecks [p. 12]" and shortages
were chronic. As technical difficulties worsened, interpersonal
conflicts increased. A general foreman described the problem this way:
A line like this depends upon good material flow.
A shortage holds up the operator I call the
material department. First time they ever heard
about it. Say they'll check. Nothing happens.
I go look for myself. My foreman in the mean-
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time is getting into other troubles, and I’m notaround to help [p. 12].
The
-lack of fiommunicatrion links between lower level
departments, along with the formal separation of function, created
frequent complaints. Inspectors were ultimately responsible to the
chief inspector, not to the section foremen or other production
supervisors, who expressed the need to be in close touch with the
inspectors in order to gain a fuller understanding of quality
requirements. In addition, standards varied because the inspectors
in different areas rarely communicated with each other as a group.
In like manner, the work standards department "dictated [p. l4]» how
a foreman should distribute his work load, without getting the
foreman's opinion. Production scheduling changed schedules without
due consideration of the current manpower situation.
Plant Y's performance record was abysmal. With the poorest
efficiency of all the division's assembly plants, it exceeded the
division's maximum standard of defects and rejections, and had the
poorest quality record of all the plants. Plant Y's safety record
placed it between last and second-last place in the division.
Grievances were substantially higher than those of other assembly
plants, and its turnover rate was double that of the average of the
other plants. This poor performance could hardly be accounted for by
chance; nor was there evidence that the plant's geographical location
or market conditions were significantly different from other plants.
205
During Change
When an unofficial and costly walkout hit the deteriorating Plant
Y, divisional executives decided to take action. They retired the plant
nager with an early pension arrangement, and hired Matthew Cooley as
new plant manager. In his previous position as manager of another plant,
Cooley had demonstrated his ability to increase efficiency.
introduction of the New Manager
The division manager escorted Cooley to an introductory dinner
meeting attended by all the members of the organization down through
the foremen. Both the reactions of the guests, and Cooley's behavior
at that dinner are captured in these comments by a general foreman:
When I went to this dinner meeting, the first
thing that struck me was the way they had the
seating arrangement. I think it was done very
well. Whoever arranged it made sure that the
old cliques they had in supervision were broken
up. We also noticed that the new plant manager
sat down among the foremen and general foremen.
We can remember when an earlier manager came
here, and he got rid of a whole lot of people
in supervision We wondered what the new man
was going to do.
After the meeting... he (Cooley) just kept
circulating on the floor and meeting as many
of the guys as he could. I was quite sur-
prised and so were the others [p. 16 ]
.
Early Davs Under Coolev
Attitude from the top . From the first day of Cooley's arrival,
there was an abrupt reduction of "interference from above [p. 26]."
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Specific directives, telling the onager what to do in response to each
crisis, came to a halt. What appears to have happened, based on the
comment of a high corporation official, was that the division manager
was urged by superiors, to let the new manager at Plant Y "run his own
show [p. 27]." Top management added a "blank cheque [p. 27]" clause
to their instructions to the new manager: "We don’t care what you do,
as long as you get the plant out of the mess it is in [p. 27]." Cooley
was told he could have whatever personnel he needed, and was advised to
"clear out the dead wood [p. 16]."
Cooley’s first meeting * In his first meeting with all supervi-
sion, Cooley put forward "a few basic goals [p. 16]" for the organiza-
tion in terms of expected efficiency and quality. Stating candidly that
Plant Y had a bad reputation, and that he had heard that many employees
were not capable of doing their jobs, he said he was "willing to prove
that this was not so, and until shown otherwise, I personally have full
confidence in the group [p. 16]." He declared, "I don't believe in
firing a lot of people and using threats and fear [p. 17]," and went on
to say that his job was "not to catch and punish people for doing a
poor job, but rather to help them in any way he could to do a good
job [p. 16]."
Letters to the foremen . One of Cooley's first steps was to
send a letter to each foreman, asking that the foreman invite Cooley
to his section. That surprised the foremen. As one said:
I guess this new fellow is a pretty good
manager. He wants to be invited to come
down to inspect my section. I'll be
very happy if he does come around [p. 17].
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Within the first three days
Cooley
.et with the union shop ec^ittee, and urged the. to^ any
’
cornments thev wanted tr> nny o on his general obiectivp^x uuj es. The union president
reported the meeting this way:
He (Cooley) said that before he camp in u .
i^sb1efed °" Plant > and SS he’ted heard
£ngle\n
-Xtl^^VSt^^? ^xe Dlt that m the couple of davs he had
were otay™
1
He
ttet people at Plant Y
way
y * 331(1 he was g°ing to operate this
He said he was inviting us personally to see him
He Sd hTwe?°Ut aays t0 raake the plant better -M said e welcomed any suggestions.
^i3 Y33 a completely new approach to the committee
r/uf en8^Td °f the b0ys Were skePtioai . most ’
a chang! [p %! 13 "lan meant uhat he »»t
Lack Cf Planning . Cooley recognized that there was little long
range planning at the local level, and that the "cooperate or else"
philosophy under which the plant had operated was not working. He said
I saw that the organization needed a long-range
program, spelled out in writing and reviewed with
department heads, the staf, and superintendents.
They needed to be in agreement on something that
was realizable and tangible and practical. It
had to come from the whole organization and be
explained to the whole organization [p. 18].
Reduction cf overtime . Another of Cooley's first steps was to
get permission from the division to begin reduction of the long over-
time hours. As one union officer described this:
We have had managers come in and give us a lot of
soft talk, but they never backed it up. This fellow
showed up, and one of the first things he did was to
cut down on the long hours which had been going on
for months. It had been ragged on the men [p. 18 ],
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In these first weeks, no measurable changes in performance were
o served. Nevertheless, Cooley's heavier evoked favorable counts.
&uor Changes in Communio^^
„
M2aat>iE^^ mm
r-ly in the change process, some members of material control, and the
production departments were assigned "to study the bottlenecks,
especially in the trim department [p. 31].» They discussed thlir
recommendations at weekly department meetings. These meetings were
among a series of regularly scheduled meetings initiated by Cooley
involving members of supervision at all levels. These meetings
continued for the balance of Cooley’s term of office. Thoroughly
discussed alternative proposals were presented to the plant manager
and his staff by this committee. In this new method of decision making,
management was able to choose a recommendation and implement it. As a
result of this committee’s work, foremen were able to concentrate on
planning that would avoid emergencies, rather than on handling crises.
Inspection • At weekly meetings initiated by Cooley, the
chief inspector and operating supervisors down through the general
foremen discussed critical problems. Ultimately this group outlined a
training program for inspectors and foremen. As a result, operating
supervisors and inspectors were able to agree on what was, and was not,
acceptable quality; communications between these two groups was no
longer dominated by the inspectors, and finally, inspectors were
accepted by the foremen ”as part of my group [p. 33]." Now foremen
"tipped off [p. 32]" inspectors on jobs causing trouble. This greater
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acceptance of inspectors took place even though quality standards ted
measurably stiffened during this time.
Also, once a week, initiated by Cooley, the comptroller, the
production manager, the heads of personnel and work standards, all
supervisors in production down through general foremen, and the chief
inspector, met to review matters relating to inspection and quality.
*** 5tan(lfl r<1ff - After several months of discussion between work
Standards and operating supervisors at all levels, a change in policy
was made, whereby the section foremen were made chiefly responsible for
determining the work assignment of the individual hourly employee.
Before, it ted been done by work standards. As a result, foremen and
work standards now communicated frequently, and collaborated.
The union also appeared to change its policy with respect to
work standards disputes. One union officer said:
Now what we do when we hear a complaint is to take
a Quick look at it. If a man doesn't have a gripe
we tell him. If he does, we talk to the fore^n
’
it settled. So, management doesn't have to
send the time standards men out all the time [p. 34],
Maintenance • Within f°ur months, it was observed that operating
and service departments at lower levels were beginning to meet together,
though not specifically ordered to do so by Cooley. With the integra-
tion of activities by other departments, the head of plant maintenance
now focussed on solving technical problems in cooperation with the
people involved. "Doing the right thing for the plant [p. 34 ]»
replaced "doing the right thing for the department — the maintenance
department [p. 3*0."
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C.omDtrol 1 pp. Two or three times a week, Cooley "grabbed
[p. 35]'' the comptroller and took him for a "walk through the plant
[p. 35]." During this time, the comptroller talked with department
heads, superintendents, general foremen, and section foremen about how
the figures coming out of the comptroller's office could be made
meaningful to them. It was discovered that there were many factors
that could cause a foreman to be "over standard [p. 35]," and although
some were beyond his control, he was punished for them. As a result
of these walks and talks, the comptroller worked hard, and produced a
formula which all the foremen and supervisors could use to analyze
efficiency figures quickly. The idea was presented to all of supervi-
sion, saying that this had come out of the comptroller's talks with
them.
Another result was that the comptroller's department, now "cut
in on the deal [p. 37]," was able to make a more convincing case to the
division for money for major physical changes. Now almost no requests
were denied.
Also once a week, at Cooley's initiation, a cost meeting was
held by the comptroller and production manager, attended by Cooley,
heads of personnel and work standards, and all production supervisors
down through general foremen. The comptroller and production manager
presented current figures on costs and plant efficiency, while
participants asked questions and made suggestions.
General meetings . Cooley initiated once a month general
meetings of all members of plant supervision, to "tell everyone in the
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organization what was ahead for the next thirty days, review the past
thirty days, and answer questions that come up [p. 19 ].» Cooley
encouraged supervisors to sutait written questions about any subject,
and promised frank answers.
Staff meetipp=. Once a week, Cooley chaired a meeting of his
immediate staff at which they discussed new developments, information,
and directives from the division and corporation. This group in time
became a decision making body for the plant as a whole.
React ions hv flir^Yi -nr~. Although several members of supervl
sion initially thought the group meetings were too "time consuming
[p. 20]," they changed their opinion. Said one general foreman:
It began to dawn on us that if we were ever to
stop running around and putting out fires, we
had to do this. Also, just getting together as
a group was worth something in itself [p. 20].
Ma.ior Changes in Per.sPnnp]
Although Plant Y made many shifts in supervisory personnel, only
three of the three hundred salaried personnel were discharged or asked
to resign. Plant Y adopted a policy of internal promotions and lateral
job transfers.
Shifts in job assignments were made possible in two ways: one,
when members of supervision on temporary assignment to Plant Y returned
to their home plants, and second, when other plants requested
supervisors from Plant Y. Eventually, Plant Y came to be looked upon
as a "training ground [p. 21]" for other plants in the division.
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One example of an internal promotion oooured when a young time
study man who held a non-supervisory position in the work standards
department was moved up rapidly, and at age twenty-nine became produc-
tion manager for the entire plant.
Most personnel shifts were not promotions, but planned lateral
job transfers, mostly of production foremen. Men were "tried out
[p. 22]” for a period of time. If they did not "work out [p. 22]" they
were returned to their old job. In the long run, the foremen's knowl-
edge of operations was expanded. One foreman observed:
The thing we have noticed is that they do move
the foremen around a lot more than they ever didbefore. I think it is helpful because it gives
the foreman a much broader knowledge of the job
Lp. 22].
A deliberate long-range program was instituted to develop under-
studies. Each member of management above the foreman level gave his
job over to one or more of his subordinates for a temporary period of
sixty days.
Ma.ior Technical Change
Few physical changes had been requested or made for several
years in Plant Y, although it was the oldest among all the assembly
plants. The first requests Cooley made to the division for capital
expenditures were for improvements in working conditions.
The obsolete caXe.tsria was refurbished, re-lighted and air-
conditioned. New clothes lockers were installed. Parking areas were
expanded. Exhaust fans were installed. Large heaters were installed
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at the rail freight doors. Electric Xaua were provided for areas hot
in summer. To eliminate cold drafts, and facilitate unloading, the
entireliving a rea was re-located. Hand loading was eliminated
by elevator The plant hospi tal was air-conditioned. New
Plumbing was installed in the repainted and retiled washroom A
union officer commented that these changes showed that "Cooley meant
business [p. 23]."
Further physical changes were made to improve the operations
themselves. Old ovens were ripped out of the mint department and re-
located on the roof. New spray booths were installed. Major improve-
ments were made in the me.tfll department,. Heavy, obsolete tools were
replaced with lighter tools as quickly as possible. Because of
increased electric power requirements, a new power statiop and later, a
new power house were built.
The method by which changes in the trim department were brought
about provides a model of the change program generally. First Cooley
and the production manager asked the foremen and general foremen for
suggestions on how operations in the trim department could be improved.
Cater, his superintendent began to meet with the foremen and general
foremen to discuss and agree on a minimum number of changes. Next, the
production manager took over a further series of meetings including
service and production groups. Then the agreed-upon changes were
implemented. A general foreman observed that there was "a good spirit
[p. 24]" in the thrashing out process, and "we finally arrived at some-
thing to satisfy all of us [p. 24]."
iteaponafta to Tochnirai Change
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when the technical
"bottlenecks [p. 24]" were eliminated, the
conflicts were sharply reduced, and the extreme sense of emergency
eliminated. Many comments agreed with these of a general forenmn:
With all those little changes and big changes
^
a Uttle bit more about planning"
'*
next"inute
W°rryinS^ g°ing t0 ^
It was when the men saw some of these changesbeing made that they began to believe that we
were trying to do something for them. You cantalk a lot about human relations, but unless
you can show something that you have done, whyit is only a lot of talk. We used to get thattalk in the old training sessions, but it didn't
mean anything [p. 25].
As a result of the changes, supervisors had more time to plan and
reduce the potential for interpersonal conflict. As one foreman said
All of us are more willing to get along because
there are fewer reasons for squawking at each
other [p. 25].
After Change
Climate
After three years, the old climate of fear had disappeared.
One superintendent observed that now "nobody today who knows he's doing
a reasonably good job has any fear of losing his job [p. 26]." With
fear gone, supervisors felt free to express their ideas for improving
the organization.
Attitude Toyjflrrl Manager
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Several supervisors stressed Cooley’s belief in "the worth of
the individual [p. 27]," and stated tha this individual approach was
felt "right down through the organization [p. 27]." The manager’s
informal visits were now seen as opportunities to exchange technical
ideas, or "socializing [p. 27]," not as being for the purpose of punish-
ment. These visits were helped by Cooley's avoiding in his words, or
dress, any display of superior status. Here are some comments of the
foremen:
1. The manager goes all over the plant and
speaks to everybody. Not the way it used
to be. He comes up and says ’Good morning'
to me and the men, and he means it [p. 28].
2. The foreman knows (that)... top management
wants to help the foreman get ahead [p. 28].
Attitudes Among Subordinates
Although attitudes among subordinates were slower to change,
three changes were observed. First, opinions of superiors and sub-
ordinates about each other were now more positive. Second, more
information was flowing between superiors and subordinates. Third, a
greater proportion of communications concerned future planning.
There was a change from fixing the blame on the foreman, to
concentrating on the problem. Said one foreman:
They don't take it out on the men or the foremen
as the scapegoat, but they take it out on the
problem first [p. 29].
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This resulted in more information and help being supplied to the fore-
man who was now in a better position to make his own decisions. This
in turn caused superiors to trust their subordinates to manage; thus
interference from above lessened. One general foreman commented:
Now I don't have to worry all the time about myforemen getting me into hot water [p. 30].
Promotion, often mentioned before the change, was rarely
mentioned after. Almost no one expressed the hope or desire of
advancing out of the plant.
However, despite all the positive changes in attitudes, two of
the twenty-five foremen still feared that if it were not for the pattern
set by the plant manager, some members of middle management would return
to their former tactics of using threats of punishment.
Plant Performance
With labor CQStS down fourteen percent, Plant Y's position was
first in the division. When two major schedule changes during the
year caused major cutbacks, Plant Y's cost rose less than any of the
other plants, and it "recovered" more quickly than any. After the fall
introduction of new models, Plant Y's manufacturing costs were fifty
percent lower than the poorest of the seven plants, and it came up to
line speed more quickly than any of the other plants. The non-production
departments tied for first place in the division for lowest cost per unit.
Plant Y consistently held either first or second place in the
division for quality performance . It stood fourth for its safety
record
r
remarkable since its potential for accidents was higher than
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for roany other types of production operations. With respect to
Plant Y Stood first ln the division with three grievances
per hundred workers per month. Its aimrtee dropped to 4.9 percent
as did its average monthly turnover rate. In gener.1, when compared to
’
the other similar assembly plants, Plant Y went from bottom to top
position in most categories.
At the end of three years, Cooley ws promoted to a higher
position in the division. When he left, Plant Y not only maintained
itself as the leader in the division, but continued to improve.
Analysis of Case Four
Before Change
We become our environment.
Leland Kaiser
The Situation
organisation . Plant Y itself, and the corporation of which
it was a part, were traditional bureaucratic structures. (See figure 43).
The production department of Plant Y, focal point of this analysis, had
four organizational levels below plant manager, approximately 125
supervisors of different types, each with a short span of control, and
three levels to a shared department superintendent. Time and goal
orientation of the production department was short term and specific:
approximately 350 automobiles per eight hour shift. Formal regulations,
218
such as quality standards
focus of this department,
efficiency.
were of utmost importance. The primary
and the plant in general, was on task
fech hourly worker on the assembly line performed a clear and
routine task, under time pressure. Taken together, these thousands of
tasks were highly interdependent, requiring precise orchestration to
keep the sensitive assembly line moving. It „as an enormously complex
and stress filled operation.
Ite. environment. . A booming economy was creating an insatiable
demand for cars. Demands for different models changed seasonally,
necessitating changes in production that involved all departments in
Plant Y. Feedback from the public and dealerships was constant and
insistent. Pressure on Plant Y was intense.
^eriora . As demand from the environment increased, so did
demands from divisional headquarters. With each new crisis in the
plant, the division responded by directing the plant manager as to
exactly what to do in response to the situation. This high task and
low relationships leadership style increased pressure on the already
harried plant manager. He responded defensively and dependency by,
for example, tape recording two of his meetings and playing them back
to the divisional manager to prove he was obeying orders.
Given its organizational structure, type of operation, stress
of demand from the environment, and pressure from top management, Plant
Y needed a high degree of integration between its departments in order
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to function efficiently. Plant Va rock bottom performance showed that
this integration was lacking. Let us examine the factors that prevented
Plant Y from meeting production demands.
Eactors h i ndering production - Plant Y was technically in-
adequate in many areas. Poor layout of equipment, shortages of
materials, outdated heavy hand tools, all combined to produce bottle-
necks on the assembly line. This created short tempers and frustration.
As bottlenecks increased, pressure from above increased, and inter-
personal relations worsened.
Low supervisory morale was not bettered by poor hygiene factors.
Eating in a dismal cafeteria in need of repainting, on old rickety
furniture, using rundown washrooms that needed new plumbing, unloading
and loading supplies in freezing drafts, breathing in paint fumes from
inadequately ventilated paint booths — all of these things and more
increased the workers' dissatisfaction, and further worsened human
relations.
There were no meetings held between supervisory staff of
different departments, or indeed within departments. For example,
inspectors in one area frequently held different quality standards
than inspectors in another area, thus creating greater frustration and
difficulties for the foremen. A general lack of communication existed
because there were no established means by which people could discuss
problems. Therefore, the socio-technical structure worked against
efficient production.
£lant Manager's Leadership
,^ Y l Q
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Feeling pressured and panicky,
"butterflies in ray stomach
[p. 7],- the plant manager attempted to control the situation by using
a punitive quadrant one leadership style. In response to divisional
orders, he customarily made a trip to the plant, "chewed a nan out
[p. 9]," and issued orders. As one general foreman put it, "He has
the first and last word. I just say 'Yes, Sir' [p. 8]." Another
response the plant manager made to a crisis, was to call a meeting to
solve the immediate problem. He requested information, explanations,
and gave opinions and orders. Again, his interruption did not allow
subordinates to respond or discuss the issue. Communications were
vertical, not lateral.
Subordinates Maturity Level
The subordinates' response to the plant manager's quadrant one
leadership style indicates that their "maturity" level, as defined by
Life Cycle Theory, was higher than the plant manager realized. What
were the signs? Subordinates recognized that the plant manager led
through fear. One superintendent commented:
Whatever we had of success was paid for at a great
cost. What a cost!... Out and out fear. This
plant [runs] on fear, and fear alone [p. 25].
As well, subordinates perceived the plant manager's leadership style as
ineffective. His giving of orders was seen as "chewing out [p. 9]."
His emphasis on task was seen this way by a superintendent:
221
This plant is a one-man show, so people aretaught not to be self-reliant [p. 9].
His attempts to solve problems was perceived as useless according to
one section foreman:
I get all nervous and confused You can't
work under a manager like that [p. 9].
According to a department head, the plant manager's problem-solving
attempts were attempts to place blame, and as such, ineffective:
We spent most of our time making explanations
about why something went wrong and who made
it go wrong [p. 8.]
According to Hersey and Blanchard (1972), a leader's style may
be seen as appropriate or inappropriate by the followers. If it is
perceived as inappropriate, then the leader's behavior will be in-
effective. They explain that when a quadrant one high task and low
relationships style is being used inappropriately, the leader is often
seen by followers as having no confidence in others, unpleasant, and
interested only in short-run output. Such was the case in this
situation. The plant's ever decreasing performance and worsening human
relations, culminating in a walk-out, attested to the inappropriateness
and ineffectiveness of the manager's quadrant one style.
On the basis of the above evidence, we argue that the "maturity"
level of the supervisory group was at this time average, not below
average. In terms of ability, they were not as incompetent as the
gripes, absenteeism, turnover, and accidents among the workers made
them appear. Many section and general foremen had been promoted from
the ranks. Their experience on the job, and knowledge of its problems
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was high. TTieir unwillingness to participate in problem-solving, and
their low achievement motivation was the result of the plant manager-
s
leadership style which raised their level of fear to the point where
they were afraid to give the suggestions they had. Equally as
important, technical problems kept them too busy running around "putting
out fires [p. 20]" to think about long term performance improvement.
With this diagnosis, according to Life Cycle Theory, a more
appropriate initial leadership style for this group in their present
situation, would be quadrant two, high task and high relationships.
(See figure 44). Emphasis on task would be needed to rectify the
present problems in operations, while emphasis on relationships would
be needed to raise morale and mend shattered interpersonal relations.
Supervisors' Leadership Shyl p
The plant manager's leadership style had a two-stage effect on
subordinates: it caused them to become "nervous, confused [p. 9]" and
fearful, which in turn caused them to exercise the same punishing leader-
ship style on those beneath them. General foremen were afraid that the
section foremen would 'get them into hot water' if they were not
constantly watching them. They often disciplined the section foreman's
men, much to the resentment of the usurped section foremen. In this
way anger and distrust built up.
At this time, Plant Y was an example of Likert's (1961) system
one of exploitive authoritarian management. Figure 45 shows a comparison
between Likert's system one and Plant Y before change.
223
Leadership style
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supervisory group
Present plant
manager's
leadership style -
ineffective
I
I
above average below
average I average
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Present maturity level
of supervisory group
Maturity
Continuum
Figure 44. Appropriate Leadership Style for
Supervisory Group Before Change
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Likert’s Sv^tpp) nno
•management is seen as having
no confidence or trust in
subordinates
•control lies in top manage-
ment; subordinates seldom
involved in decision-making;
bulk of decisins and goal
setting made at top and
issued down chain of
command
•subordinates forced to work
with fear, threats, punishment
and occasional rewards
•superiors see subordinates
operating at physiological
and safety levels
•the little superior-sub-
ordinate interaction that
does take place, is with
fear and mistrust
•an informal organization
within the formal organiza-
tion opposes the goals of
the formal organization
Plant Y Before ChangP
•at rare meetings, manager
gives orders, asks questions;
subordinates do not talk to
each other, discuss or make
suggestions
•division tells plant
manager what to do in each
crisis; plant manager tells
supervisors what to do
•plant manager ’chews out'
foremen; general foremen
punish section foremen
•'if you can't do it, get
out'
•plant manager plays back
tapes of his meetings to
division manager to prove
his obedience to orders;
'I just say yes, sir.'
•union disputes constant;
quality lowest in division.
Figure 45. A Comparison of Likert's System
One and Plant Y Before Change
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During Change
£fl.Qlev f S Leadership
During Cooley
-s term as plant manager, his leadership style
evolved through three stages according to the Life Cycle Theory.
Initially he adopted a quadrant two, high task and high relationships
style. Toward the middle of his tern, he moved to a quadrant three
style of high relationships and low task. At the end of his term, he
adopted a quadrant four style of low task and low relationships. Let
us follow his development through each of these stages.
Beginning at the introductory dinner meeting, Cooley attempted
to develop personal relationships between himself and members of plant
supervisory personnel. He sat down to dinner with the foremen. After
dinner, instead of hobnobbing with top management, he circulated the
floor, meeting as many men as he could. Right at the beginning of
his term of office, he emphasized and modelled relationships behavior.
Early Stage. During his first days on the job, Cooley
immediately attacked two problems: 1) poor interpersonal relations
and morale, and 2) lack of integration between and within departments.
During this time, according to Life Cycle Theory, he used a quadrant
two style.
Cooley entered a situation full of hostility and frustration;
workers had just staged a walkout. All of his subordinates, down
through foremen, expected him to "get rid of a whole lot of people
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[p. 16]." Division management had advised him to "clear out the
dead wood [p. 16]." Contrary to expectations, Cooley began by admitting
the situation - he had been told it was a "lousy plant with lousy
people in it [p. 17 ]," and stating that he didn , t believe lt
_ He
persisted in developing personal relationships (sent a letter to each
foreman asking to be iiudlfid to visit his section)
; giving socio-
emotional support and psychological strokes (told all of supervision
at a meeting that he believed everyone was capable of doing his job,
and he, Cooley, had full confidence in the group); engaging in
facilitating behaviors (personally invited the union shop committee
to make suggestions as to how to make the plant better)
.
With many years of conditioning in fear, his subordinates were
initially skeptical. They had heard "a lot of soft talk [p. 18 ]"
before. Cooley demonstrated his sincerity in his first step of getting
overtime hours reduced for the hourly workers. The improvements in
working conditions made by Cooley further demonstrated to the workers
that he meant business. A re-modelled cafeteria, refurbished wash-
rooms, fans, heaters — all these raised worker morale.
Recognizing the lack of long range planning, Cooley initiated
meetings at all levels; between material control and production;
between the chief inspector and supervisors; between the comptroller,
production manager, and work standards; general meetings of all
members of plant supervision; staff meetings of his immediate sub-
ordinates. Cooley wanted a concrete, practical, long range program
that "came from the whole organization [p. 18 ]."
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In setting up these meetings, Cooley demonstrated task behavior:
through these meetings he was attempting to establish new channels of
communication and ways of getting the job done. He was also demonstra-
ting relationships behavior; he was present at all meetings initially;
he encouraged the flow of ideas; he used and acknowledged these ideas,
such as the comptroller's formula for analysis of costs. These meetings
opened lateral communications, and created integration within and between
departments. Interpersonal relations began to improve. Although
initially doubtful, one general foreman's comment shows the positive
subordinate reaction:
It began to dawn on us that if we were ever to
stop running around and putting out fires, we
had to do this. Also, just getting together as
a group was worth something in itself [p. 20].
This response by the supervisory group attests to the appropriateness
of Cooley s initial high task and high relationships leadership style.
Middle Stage- Through these meetings, Cooley had established
a means of participative decision making which eventually enabled him
to move a quadrant three high relationships and low task leadership
style. When it came to making major physical changes in the plant,
the changes were discussed by those involved in the area who would be
most affected by the changes. It must be noted that the process by
which the committees became independent from Cooley was gradual. The
change program in the trim department provides an example.
Initially, Cooley and the production manager met with the
general and section foremen and asked for suggestions on how to improve
operations in the trim department. Later, the superintendent met with
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the foremen to agree on the minimum number of changes. Next, the
production manager took over further meetings. Finally, the agreed-
upon changes were implemented.
A number of things are noteworthy about this process. First,
it enabled everyone to have a say. Second, although it allowed initial
control to remain in the hands of Cooley and the production manager, it
also allowed Cooley to exit from the process so that the production
manager could take over. As this committee grew more experienced,
Cooley was not necessary, not even to initiate the process.
Through this mechanism, physical changes in the paint department,
metal department, and in the machinery were made. These eliminated the
bottlenecks on the assembly line. These improvements, made through the
committee decision making process, in turn reinforced the participative
decision making process. The committee process enabled supervisory
personnel to gradually gain in experience, to become more independent,
and in terms of Life Cycle Theory, to "mature" as decision makers.
Cooley’s approach to personnel shifts also provided opportunities
for supervisors to "mature". Rather than discharge men, Cooley estab-
lished a procedure of lateral job transfers, so that supervisors could
"tryout" another position. In this way, they gained broader knowledge
about the job. Another of Cooley’s innovations, the "understudy
[p. 217]" program, enabled each member of management above foreman
level, to train a subordinate in his position. Thus when another plant
requested a supervisor from Plant Y, there was a replacement available.
Signs of the group's increase in task relevant "maturity" began
to appear. Inspectors and foremen cooperated on quality standards; the
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uruon shop committee began to settle disputes without always involving
management; the operating and service departments began to meet on
their own initiative; Cooley's immediate subordinates, the staff
committee, became a decision nuking body for the plant as a whole.
As subordinates gained in "maturity", Cooley gradually moved
to a quadrant three high relationships and low task leadership style.
His visits around the plant became informal opportunities to exchange
technical ideas and socialize. Rising plant performance, and improving
human relations were witness to the appropriateness of Cooley's quadrant
three style.
After Change
Each system tends to mould people in its own
linage. ... Participative organizations tend to
develop emotionally and socially mature
persons capable of effective interaction,
initiative, and leadership.
Rensis Likert
The Organization
As a result of Cooley’s leadership, Plant Y, without changing
its organizational structure, and dismissing only three out of three
hundred salaried personnel, changed from Likert’s (1961) authoritarian
system one, to one approaching a system four of participative manage-
ment. The following chart compares the elements of Likert’s system four
with Plant Y after change.
Likert's Svstpp) p^ 1r
management has complete
confidence and trust in
subordinates
decision-making widely
dispersed throughout
the organization and
well integrated
communication flows up
and down the hierarchy
and among peers
workers motivated by
participation and
involvement in: develop-
ing economic rewards,
setting goals, improving
methods, and appraising
progress toward goals
extensive
,
friendly
superior-subordinate inter-
action with a high degree
of confidence and trust
widespread responsibility
for control process, with
lower units fully involved.
informal and formal
organization one and the
same
Plant Y After Change
changes was in the hands
of the committees
foremen involved in long
range planning; foremen
responsible for work
assignment to hourly
employees; all supervisory
personnel involved in cost
control
Cooley a member at some
committee meetings, and
later, they are held without
him; Cooley invites
suggestions
subordinates feel top
management wants them to get
ahead; they participate
actively in committees;
a free flow of suggestions
Cooley visits plant to
exchange ideas and socialize;
well liked by all subordinates
no fear, high trust; positive
superior-subordinate opinion;
no scapegoating; promotion
out of the plant not sought
inspectors and foremen take
responsibility for quality
control
union committee settles its
few grievances largely without
involving management
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Along with this change in orientation and management style,
Plant Y rose to a top position in almost every category among all of
the assembly plants in the division. Other plants began requesting
Plant Y personnel; it came to be looked on as a training ground.
gflQlev's Leadershi p Style
Figure 46 shows a comparison between Cooley's sequence of
leadership styles, and Likert's four systems of management.
According to Life Cycle Theory, Plant Y after change was operated
by a highly "mature" group. As such, the appropriate leadership style
for this group would now be quadrant four, low task and low relation-
ships. (See figure 46). This in effect happened, for when Cooley was
promoted out of the plant to a divisional position, Plant Y maintained
itself as the leader in the division, and continued to improve.
Summary
Mhy Pifl Cooley Sucfl.e.e.d,?
1. Cooley's leadership style was both appropriate
and flexible. His initial high task and high
relationships style was perceived as appropriate
by his subordinates who responded in a positive
manner. His flexibility allowed him to change
his leadership style as the managers and workers
of Plant Y gained in "maturity".
2. Cooley's implementation of plant-wide meetings
at all levels improved communications, and
allowed managers and workers practice in decision-
making and problem-solving. Through these meetings,
they were able to develop their managerial ability
—
their "maturity".
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Cooley's
second
leadership
style
during
change
Cooley's
final
leadership
style
after
change
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Figure 46. Cooley's Leadership Styles and Likert's
Four Systems of Management Compared
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S^rzbe^s^MW 1?8 00nd^i°n3 raised morale,xn nerzDerg s (1959) terms, ’hygiene factors’ weresatisfied through improvements in working condi-tions, while 'motivators' were satisfied throughmeetings. In this way, the productive abin?ygSftuant Y personnel increased.
Technical improvements supported and enhanced
improvements in the social and managerial systems
within the plant.
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£ase F i ve; Change 1r,1l|f,try
Background
In the mid 1930 's Alfred and Seymour Marrow took over their
father's pajama factory. Alfred, a psychologist, became chains of the
board, while his brother Seymour, an engineer, assumed the presidency.
Because of their interest in applying group dynamics to manage-
ment problems, in 1939 they invited Kurt Lewin to conduct a program of
leadership training and betavioral science research in the Harwood
company. This approach succeeded, and the company thrived.
Twenty-two years later Harwood purchased its leading competitor,
the Weldon company. The initial plan was to continue Weldon as an
autonomous division; however, within a few months Harwood's owners
decided that they would have to step in and make major changes in their
fast sinking acquisition.
The following case is a condensed account of that change, as
seen through the eyes of Alfred Marrow and other behavioral scientists.
It follows the events of two years, during which the Harwood company
changed the management system of the Weldon Company.
Before Change
Background of the Harwood Company
In 1899, with a carefully put together capital of $1000, a
personable man of limited technical knowledge opened a pajama factory.
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With a philosophy of benevolent nanagement, he survived on a TOrglnal
basis in the highly competitive garment business, and after more than
thirty-five years, turned the company over to his two sons. Seymour
Marrow, an engineer, became president, and Alfred, a psyhologist,
became chairman of the board. They expanded the company in 1939 by
opening a new plant in a small Virginia community.
Seymour and Alfred began immediately to apply group dynamics to
management problems by, in 1939, inviting Kurt Lewin to work with plant
management in a program of leadership training and behavioral research.
Their aim was to bring about more satisfying employee relationships, and
more willing, active cooperation in work. As Harwood's president put it
People can enjoy working together far more than
they do. For a majority dissatisfaction,
ill will and conflict have produced anxiety,
resentment, and hostility, with disruptive and
harmful consequences for the individual and
the organization [p. xiiij.
Some tenets of Harwood philosophy were that:
1. a participative approach to management leads
to more loyalty, flexibility, cooperation and
efficiency, and will succeed only when there
is mutual confidence [p. 27].
2. a job is done best when employees feel their
needs are considered in a way that they can
maintain self-respect and a sense of respon-
sibility [p. 26.]
3- employees have more informed opinions on matters
relating to their own jobs than top managers,
and can make practical suggestions of merit
[p. 26].
4. when the findings are the group's own, they
will be inspired to change their behavior [p. 26].
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5. employees are unlikely to rebel
decisions they helped make [p.
against
33 J.
6 . employees want the same things that their
employers do [p. 32].
After twenty years, gratifying job satisfaction among employees
and owners, high profits and productivity demonstrated the effective-
ness of Harwood's participative approach to management. On January 1,
1962, With underutilized capital, and an opportunity for growth, and
higher profits, Harwood purchased its largest competitor, the Weldon
Manufacturing Company. As of 1967 Harwood-Weldon was the largest
company in its field, producing about twenty percent of the world's
supply of its product. This case describes the process by which the
Harwood company, within two years, changed the management system of the
failing Weldon company.
Sactaround Of the Weldon Company
In 1932 the Weldon Manufacturing Company, under the leadership
of two owner-managers, moved into a plant in the coal region of
Pennsylvania, and became one of the fastest growing producers of
quality pajamas in the industry. During the 30s and 40s attempts to
unionize Weldon failed, as they were to do for the next three decades.
Whenever a union organizer appeared in town, Weldon’s management would
shut off the machines, start rumours that the plant would move if the
union came in, and make intimidating speeches. The Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers of American (ACWA) officials said that the company's methods
for playing on workers' fears were they worst they had encountered in
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the Pennsylvania area. In spite of this, Weldon became by the end of
World War II, one of the recognized and highly respected leaders in the
garment industry. By the mid-fifties, at the height of its success,
Weldon had expanded to five plants which employed 3500 people.
Weldon's Leaders
The company was almost solely run by two partner-owners. (See
figure 47). According to Harwood-s president, one outgoing partner in
charge of merchandising, would frequently solicit ideas from his staff
on policy, but would always make the final decision to suit himself.
The other more taciturn and uncommunicative partner in charge of manu-
facturing rarely shared problems, plans, or objectives. He announced
schedules, budgets and production quotas, expected his staff to meet them,
and gave a hard time to anyone who failed to. Each partner directed his
area independently of the other. With energy and competence, they made
all the necessary plans and decisions.
In this situation, over a number of years, the partners drove
themselves and their staff almost to the point of collapse. Every small
and necessary expenditure had to be personally approved by one of the
partners, regardless of the time loss or work delays. They spent evenings
and week ends on the job and required most of their executives to do
likewise.
Weldon's Pecline
In the postwar transition from a sellers' to a buyers' market,
Weldon's management problems began to grow. The owner-managers made
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Organizational
Structure
of
Weldon
Company
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decisions independently of each other and their executives. This
resulted in two costly errons fY>r> mo Ti r o the company. Ia 1953, though lacking
in necessary technology, the owners entered the lower-priced, mass
production shirt and pajama business, and the womens- pajama business.
Both ventures failed.
At the end of the fifties, Weldon's problems intensified.
There was bad will toward Weldon when, in I960, the union picketed the
prestigious stores selling Weldon products. Yet when the union held a
vote at Weldon, because of management threats of firings, it lost again
Between 1959 and I960 Weldon closed five plants, and consolidated its
work and remaining 1000 employees in the main Pennsylvania plant. To
meet mounting loses, the partners cut down on staff, withheld wage
increases, called on people to make sacrifices, and applied strong
pressure from production. Within months following the failed union
election, Harwood purchased Weldon.
During Change
lha Situation at Weldon
At the time of purchase, Harwood's plan was to continue Weldon
as an autonomous division, with no change in its product, management,
or employees. Weldon's two owner-managers were to continue as salaried
managers. In the months after purchase, it became painfully obvious to
Harwood that this plan was not possible and that major organizational
changes would have to be made — and fast. According to the Harwood
chairman of the board:
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Heavy losses, haphazard inventory building
excessive costs and sagging sales called for
organizational changes... to protect ourinvestment at Weldon [p. 64].
Harwood's discoveries about Weldon's advantages an disadvantages are
summarized in figure 48.
Goals of the Program
Because they felt that the Weldon people had little experience
in learning new ways of working together, the Harwood executives indepen-
dently planned the goals and approach of the change program, and in the
words of the board chairman, "imposed [p. 65]" it on Weldon. The four
goals of the change program were:
1. to retain existing personnel if possible
2. to modernize the physical plant and work methods
3- to introduce a new pattern of organizational life
4. to accomplish these changes as soon as possible [p. 66].
MfilhQd Qf the Change Program
Harwood hired five consulting organizations to work on different
problems
.
Teams 1 and 2
Team 3
Team 4
Team 5
Norris & Elliott Inc.
Consulting Engineers
Leadership Development
Associates and Dept, of
Behavioral Science,
Boston University
Ladhams Associates,
training engineers
Survey Resarch Center,
University of Michigan
to improve engineer-
ing and production
to improve inter-
personal relations
to train operators
to observe events,
measure what was
done, and evaluate
program
Disadvantage
Advantages.
former owner-managers, now
salaried managers, do not
communicate; make unilateral
decisions; do not delegate
authority
little communication, no
coordination, antagonism
between manufacturing and
merchandising.
Plant production in turmoil;
mixed batch system, no pro-
duction coordination, high
costs
,
poor layout
.
outdated equipment
,
no
repair supplies.
supervisory staff over-
worked (1 supervisor to 155
employees) uninformed about
policy decisions; lack job
security; do not delegate
authority; discouraged from
making suggestions; some
falsified records to keep
information from owner-
managers.
one-third of hourly employees
(8056 women) young (under 25)
and inexperienced; highly
transient (half were planning
to leave); had high absentee-
ism, double that in the
industry-12/6 per day.
inadequate operator, .training;
chaotic production system
prevented skill development.
large roster of hesirabla
customers.
ardaca on hand to be filled.
basic facilities sound; plant
very large; floor space for
production ample.
large number of technically
competent supervisory staff .
large number of enereeti
o
people., willing and motivated
to undertake a change program.
highly skilled core of hour!
y
employees .
two-thirds of hourly employees
were older (over 25) and
experienced (over two years).
personal relationships between
hourly employees good; 8556
liked their fellow employees.
personal relationships between
supervisors and hourly employees
fairly good; 64% satisfied with
supervisor.
Figure 48. Advantages and Disadvantages of Weldon at Purchase
Steps in the Change Progp^
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The two and a half year change program had three phases: phase
one, assessment, during which a diagnosis of Weldon was made; phase two
of technical change, and phase three, changes in the management system.
Figure *)9 presents a detailed chronology of the change program, fech
of the numbered items in the chronology will be briefly discussed.
Phase One: Assessment
Initial Period of Oairq
The acquisition of Weldon brought relief to those who had
feared the plant would be shut down, and also raised anxieties about
"cleaning house [p. 130]" through wholesale staff dismissals. The new
owners made statements of their philosophy of management, assuring
employees that the operation would continue, and that no changes in
personnel were planned. According to the Weldon plant manager,
changes introduced by the new owners were imperceptible at first.
Plans were made to bring in a new personnel manager, and attitude
surveys were conducted. One executive commented:
It seemed to me there was no change for a long
time. After all the talk about the new people
and new ideas, nothing happened. More than once
I said to myself ’You wouldn’t even know we had
new owners [p. 131].'
This period of quiet ended when the personnel manager was hired. In
the view of a top plant staff member, this action
was an early indication, I think, that things were
going to be stirred up a bit I would say it was
the first indication that there was going to be a
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Assessment
Technical
Changes
Manage-
ment
System
Changes
Consoli-
dation
Jan. 1962
June 1962
Oct. 1962
Dec. 1962
Feb. 1963
Mar. 1963
Apr. 1963
May 1963
July 1963
Sept. 1963
Oct. 1963
Nov. 1963
Dec. 1963
Jan. 1964
to
Dec. 1964
Harwood buys Weldon
attitude surveys and feedback begin
Personnel Manager hired
1 * Ifoit production svstPrri b»nn
shipping department reorganized
incentive pay plan introduced
2
- Supervisors and Managers
meetings
.hfigin
SelectionJ^ests fo
.
r
.
new empioyppp
-begin
absence and termina tion nolioy
changes
Management training program hggjna -first group
5- Operator training prog ram begins
Management training program - second
group
Supervisors and Managers staff
meetings end
three units in production
6* earnings development program begins
evaluation of Management training
program
7* problem-solving meetings of
Supervisors and Operators begin
unionization; minimum wage increase
Operator training program completed
period of rapid change ends
during this year:
unit production systems completed
attitude surveys and feedback
completed
problem solving meetings continued
change program ends, consultants
leave
Figure 49. Chronology of Change Program at Weldon
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completely different approach
personnel [p. 68].
at least to
Phase Two: Technical Changes
Unit System of Prodnot-.inp
The desire to satisfy their customers had resulted in the
practice of putting small lots into production in any part of the
plant without much consideration of the effects on work flow. In
some cases, operators faced seven to nine job changes in an eight
hour shift. In order to raise operator earnings, lower costs, and
better utilize operators, materials and machines, a decision was
made to change to a unit system of production.
This conversion was accomplished through several technical
changes. Four self-contained production units were set up. Cutting
work was modified and work standards introduced so that cutters were
provided with incentive earnings opportunities. Warehousing and
shipping operations were reorganized, cutting down on the overload
of employees in that area. Newer machines were brought in to replace
outmoded ones. Maintenance service was improved and stocks were
brought up to requirements. The technically competent employees, who
expected and respected expertness in their superior, understood and
appreciated these improvements.
Supervisors and Managers Staff Meetings
To improve production efficiency of the new unit system,
supervisors, managers and consulting engineers met every Saturday
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morning to review plant progress, discuss priorities, and decide next
Steps. Initialy, the effort to get a freer flow of reactions and
ideas did not go well. At early meetings, the plant manager did most
of the talking while the supervisors and managers remained generally
quiet. This pattern did not change until the supervisory training
program (to be described later) was completed. After this, the
supervisors began to address each other directly in their staff
meetings, join in the discussion, and challenge the opinions of the
managers and the consultants.
Personnel Policy chan^
Weldon’s high turnover (90% in the four months after purchase)
and absenteeism (double the usual rate in the industry) was accepted
by supervisory staff as an unavoidable fact of life. The supervisors
felt that there was a shortage of good people in their community, and
that ’’You can't get people to work on a more consistent basis [p. 117]."
Unable to gain support for investigating the causes of
absenteeism, the personnel manager, outside consultants, and some staff
found that the same people were continually absent due primarily to
factors that existed within the plant. This data, along with tables
demonstrating the high costs of one absentee for a department, was
shown to the supervisors, who in time were convinced that reduction in
absenteeism was possible and necessary.
Once convinced, the supervisors kept records on absenteeism,
discussed with absentees their reasons for staying away, and tried to
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assist absentees with outside problems. Gradually a new plant policy
was formulated in which:
1 .
2 .
3.
selection tests were introduced
chronic absentees would not be recalled after
layoff
after a cutoff date, a certain number of
unexcused absences would result in dismissal
Lp. 118 J.
Absentee rates were cut in half. Qnployees regarded the new policy as
a fair one.
Phase Three: Management System Changes
Management Training Program
Although things were improving, the new owners felt that the
hostilities, fears and suspicions of managers and supervisors were
blocking potential progress. Only one approach to solving this problem
was seriously considered by Harwood executives and decided upon: a
direct examination by staff members themselves, of their own ideas,
attitudes and practices in management. This examination would:
1. be conducted away from the normal working
environment
2. last for two to four days
3. focus on practical problems arising at work
4. use methods derived from "laboratory" or
"sensitivity" training
5. use a "family group" format
6. be mandatory - staff members were expected
to attend
7. all be conducted by the same trainer
8. not include the new owners or their
representatives unless asked by the group
9. have a follow-up of a similar kind
[p. 98-991.
Merchant i ,si.ng Snh-,^t- Pm
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Initially three major training sessions were held. Session
ne was attended by the five merchandising department heads from the
New York office. Despite the mandate to attend, their superior, the
fonner owner-manager, did not. He became the focus of discussion.
One result of this session was a subsequent problem solving meeting
with the superior, soon after which he left the company. The five
department heads and the two new owners distributed organizational
responsibility and authority among themselves, changing the pattern
of the organization. Friendship among them spread from business to
social relationships off the job.
Manufacturing Sub-Sy^em
Session two was attended by the six top administrators from
the Weldon plant, but not the former owner-manager who by this time had
become inactive in the daily affairs of the plant. The administrators
focused on the plant manager, who as a result of this session, changed
his behavior in the plant in a way satisfactory to himself and his
staff. Another result of this session was the beginning of positive
relationships with the New York office.
Merchandising and Manufacturing Together
Session three was attended jointly by administrators from
manufacturing and merchandising. According to the consultant, the
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session resulted in better communication, some openness and trust, and
a detailed plan for improving cooperation.
Later sessions, not family groups, were held for groups of
supervisors, assistant supervisors, and senior staff members, until
all staff were covered. According to the consultant, evaluations of
all sessions in the series were favorable.
The consultant for the training sessions described some
instances of transfer of training to on-the-job situations in the
plant. In response to interdepartmental quarrels, the plant manager
initiated a series of staff meetings modeled on the training sessions.
Differences were talked out, and some solutions tried. Meetings were
initiated between operator trainers and their trainees; frustrations
were reduced. Overproduction of merchandise was confonted in a
meeting with top management in which plant staff acknowledged their
limitations and requested assistance from top management. This
degree of openness was previously unknown.
Qjrerator Training Program
A vestibule training area was set up where new operators
would be trained under the same conditions as the production line
except for pace and interruptions for demonstrations. Trainers were
drawn from the staff, and instructed in teaching methods. After four
weeks in the vestibule area, operators moved to the production line
with the machine on which they were trained. As well, selection tests
were introduced, efforts were made to pre-determine the number of
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trainees needed in each department, and provisions were made for re-
training low performing operators.
With considerable skepticism among some supervisors, the
program was initiated, and positive effects became quickly apparent.
Within four months:
!• labor turnover decreased from 9056 to 5056
2. speed of learning increased from 89% of standard
to 10556
3. training costs were reduced from $1,650 per
trainee to $703 [p. 92-93].
Earnings Development P rogram
The operator earnings program was initiated to raise low
operator income. First the consulting engineer made a three or four
hour production study of the operator to estimate her performance
potential. He and her supervisor then sat with the operator for three
or four hours while the engineer taught the operator more effective
work methods and encouraged her. Often meetings of these three were
held to discuss how the operator could increase her output and earnings.
In this way, supervisors were trained in assisting operators to improve
their performance.
Familiar with the tasks and equipment of garment making, and
lacking in knowledge of the principles and methods of controlling work
flow, the supervisors reacted to the engineers stoically at first.
They carried out his advice, even if they disagreed with it. As success
was demonstrated, the supervisors began to seek out the engineers for
assistance. Gradually the need for help diminished.
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The operators’ response to this program was, according to the
consultants, generally good from the start. By the end of 1963, the
majority of employees felt that management wanted them to improve their
production, and would help them get their earnings up.
PXQblem Solving Meetings
Shortly after the sensitivity training sessions for plant
supervisors were completed, problem solving meetings between supervisors
and operators began. In this program, work groups met in two one hour
sessions, approximately two weeks apart. In the first meeting, the
production manager, the personnel manager, and the two production
assistants met with the consultant, floor supervisor and a group of
operators. They outlined their ideas about participation and discussion
of work problems, supported the program, and left. The consultant and
floor supervisor then asked the operators to give their ideas for
improving operations. These ideas were recorded and posted on the
walls. When the next group entered the room, they started by reviewing
the suggestions of the previous group. In the second meeting, the
group sorted out the more practical suggestions, and discussed
conflict-laden issues. Out of this meeting came a list of problems
which became the basis for follow-up investigations.
As a result of these meetings, employee morale improved. As
one operator said:
What a welcome change. This is something Weldon
never did before. You have a chance to tell them
what you think, and you feel you're a part of the
company [p. 121].
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Supervisors began to spend more time following up on problems, and
delegated more responsibility to their assistants. One supervisor
commented:
to t
^
ink about the problems my unit facedand I began to come up with answers. I amazed
there was never any time beforeto do anything but go from one crisis in the sewingroom to another [p. 122]. s
According to the consultant, one example of the way this
approach was transferred to daily operations occured when an inventory
imbalance made a cutback in production necessary. The final decision,
to reduce the work load for all employees, was mutually agreed on as
the most equitable solution by the plant manager and the operators.
In the eyes of the plant manager, the problem solving meetings
were a painful process to people unused to frequent contact with the
high levels of the organization. As well, the program put very
heavy demands on the staff physically and emotionally. Fifteen hour
days with week-end and take-home work were common. In the face of
this, many were surprised at the interest in the "experiment [p. 137]"
of trying to change Weldon, and the ease of getting positive results.
Period of Slower Change
The acceptance of the union in November 1963 marked the
beginning of a slower period of consolidation for Weldon. During the
following year, the change-over to the unit system of production was
completed; the attitude surveys and feedback sessions were completed,
and the problem solving meetings continued. In December 1964 when
the outside consultants left, the change program officially ended.
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After Change
At the end of 1964, the team of consultants from the Survey
Research Center at the University of Michigan reported their findings
on the effects of the change program at Weldon. In mid 1969, two
consultants returned to Weldon to make further assessment of the long
term results of the change program. For discussion purposes, the
findings will be generally grouped into three broad categories:
1) performance and production changes, 2) leadership changes, and 3)
interpersonal relations changes.
Performance and Production
flaalQVee are., experience and stability
. During the span of
the formal change program, the employees age and level of experience
increased. By 1964, very few employees were under 25, or had less
than two years of experience. As well as this change, there was a
change in attitude toward staying with the company (p. 198). See
figure 50.
1962 1264 1263.
Plan to stay indefinitely 12% Ql% 66%
Figure 50. Attitude Toward Staying with Weldon
The desire to remain with the plant was accompanied by a lowering of
absenteeism and turnover (p. 147). See figure 51.
253
1262 19M
Absentee Rate (per day) 6% 3%
Turnover Rate (per month) 10% 4$
Figure 51. Absentee and Turnover Rate at Weldon
Operator perfonmnoe . During the change program, there was a
substantial rise in operators’ performance and operators' earnings
(p. 147). See figure 52.
1262 1261 126a
Operator Performance 89% 1145S 7
Operator Earnings
above minimum - incentive
employees
none 165S sustained at
a relatively
high level
Figure 52. Operator Performance and Earnings at Weldon
After extensive analysis, the consultants concluded that the following
four elements in the change program, in this order, were the prime
cases for the above changes:
1. earnings development program
2. weeding out of low earners in 1963, and
training of supervisors and staff in
interpersonal relations
3- group consultation and problem solving
meetings
4. miscellaneous sources, or the combination
of several sources [p. l8l-l82].
Efficiency of production . Over the period of the change
program, production and profits rose, and continued to rise through
1969 (. 147). See figure 53.
Production Efficiency
Return of Capital Invested
1262
-11*
-15%
12M
+14 *
+17*
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Figure 53. Production and Profit at Weldon
According to the consultants after their 1969 visit to Weldon, "during
the period since 1964, there have been substantial gains in efficiency
and volume for the factory as a whole".
Leadership
Supervisors . The consultants divided leadership generally into
1) "supportive" and 2) "goal setting" or "work facilitating". The
conclusions about the change in leadership styles practiced by
supervisors as experienced by employees, during the change program, are
summarized in figure 54 (p. 209).
1262 1264 196a
Supervisors’ Supportiveness remained constant rose
relatively high
Supervisors' Goal Emphasis 38* 27* 47*
and work facilitation
Figure 54. Leadership Styles of Supervisors at Weldon
The consultants state that while the amount of task oriented leadership
provided by the supervisors to the operators dropped substantially
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during the change program, the task oriented leadership provided by the
supervisors to their assistant supervisors was relatively high during
the same period.
According to the operators, when the supervisors changed to
less close supervision and gave less exclusive emphasis to productivity,
they became 'less good at dealing with people [p. 208].' This was
accompanied by a drop in satisfaction with supervisors which remained
constant to 1969. After the change program, the employees' task
•ientation increased greatly (p. 208). See figure 55 below.
12&2. 1964 I2S2
Peers approve of high
producers
58* 58* 66*
Desired closeness of
supervision
57% 52* 64*
Satisfaction with
supervisors
64* 54* 54*
Figure 55. Task Orientation and Attitude toward
Supervisors of Weldon Operators
Organization . One of the goals of the new owners was to
transform Weldom into a system four organization with a completely
participative management system. According to the employees, the
control structure at Weldon did not change much during the change
program. The influence of the higher people diminished slightly, but
the changes were not statistically significant. However, trends toward
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system four began to appear. There was a general agreement that before
change Weldon fell at the border line between Likert's (1961) system one,
exploitive-authoritarian, and system two, benevolent-authoritarian
management systems. Ratings in 1964 showed that Weldon had shifted to
system three, a consultative management system. In 1969, there was a
small change "of modest degree" which brought Weldon still closer to
system four.
According to the plant manager at Weldon, some who felt at home
in the old system found it very difficult to change. As of this writing,
one senior member of management had left. To a majority, the strenuous,
if not painful change, "has meant a good adjustment to their work for
the first time, and they derive a good deal of satisfaction from it".
Interpersonal Relations
19.6.2, 1964 1969
Like fellow employees 85$ 86$ 85$
Group Cohesiveness 25$ 25$ 30$
Figure 56. Personal Relationships at Weldon
In general, attitudes toward the company moved from neutral to slightly
more positive [p. 189]; attitudes toward the job remained quite
positive [p. 189], and attitudes toward fellow employees remained quite
positive [p. 197].
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Analysis of Case Fiv^
Before Change
ve passed a law that everyone should be happy.
Eugene O’Neill,
Marco Millions
Hie Leaders
,
;
.
—
Original Owner-Managers
Weldon’s original owner-managers practiced an almost exclusively
high task leadership style. They organized the roles of all their
administrators; they directed when, where and how all activities were
to be carried out; they set up the pattern of organization in two
separate hierarchies, and they formalized the channels of communication
one way, downward, with almost no horizontal communication between
them, or their two divisions. Not only did they not engage in inter-
personal communications, their policy was to deliberately maintain
secrecy about all of their decisions. For example, the sale of Weldon
to Harwood came as a complete surprise to all but a very few top
executives. Along with their policy of secrecy went a spy system, in
which certain of their subordinates "reported confidentially [p. 9]"
to them any deviations from their orders. The effects of this created
animosity, fear, hostility and frustration among management.
Insofar as relationships behavior is concerned, these two
leaders appeared to adopt a style devoid of personal relationships.
They established no personal relationships with their executives, save,
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one might suppose, that between themselves and their relatives whom
they had placed in positions of authority. They appeared to give no
socioemotional support, or psychological strokes. Subordi^tes heard
from them only when they had done a ted job. This behavior, practiced
on overworked executives and administrators who were TOny tunes required
to spend evenings and week-ends on the job, was demoralizing. Finally,
the owners intimidated and threatened the largely female work force,
for over thirty years, to prevent unionization. As the ACWA said,
their methods of playing on worker fears were the worst the union had
encountered in the Pennsylvania area. The hourly workers, therefore,
lived in a perpetual state of job insecurity.
According to Life Cycle Theory, each of the four basic leader-
ship styles can range from extremely effective (+4) to extremely
ineffective (-1). In this case, the owners' leadership style would
fall close to the ineffective extreme of the continuum, in a quadrant
one high task and low relationship style. Hersey and Blanchard (1972)
state that an ineffective quadrant one leader is seen by subordinates
as having no confidence in others, unpleasant, and interested only in
short run output.
Ihs. Followers; Managerial Staff
For discussion, the followers referred to will be the
personnel in manufacturing, and will be divided into two groups: 1)
executives, administrators, department heads, supervisors, and assistant
supervisors, and 2) hourly workers or operators. This section, will
focus on group one.
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Task reWant fiXperlfnffi
. As a group, the Weldon managers were
highly knowledgeable in the details of naking gannets, the styles, the
manufacturing process, the plant's problems, and its equipment. Thus
their level of technical competence was high. As policy makers, the
managers' task relevant experience was low, for they were actively dis-
couraged from making suggestions or giving ideas for improvements, and
deliberately kept uninformed about costs, policy decisions, and what was
happening in merchandising.
WlllinKrififfS and abi lity to take respond hi i ^ y Considering
the conditions under which management worked, their willingness to take
responsibility was surprisingly high. Although there was only one
supervisor to 155 workers, orders were always produced. The production
manager literally ran through the sewing rooms all day giving orders
and checking on them, to make sure production quotas were met.
According to the Harwood vice-president, considering they (the managers)
were terribly overworked, bogged down in detail, and not given the
information needed to understand supervisory responsibilities, their
performance was better than might have been expected.
That their ability to take responsibility was greater than
they were allowed, was evidenced by their frustration. Each level of
management checked the work of the one below it, often unnecessarily
reversing decisions that had been made. As managers and supervisors
were frustrated by their inability to deal directly with matters within
their personal competence, their anger, worry and confusion increased.
Aoilie.Y.ement. motivation. According to McClelland’s (1961, 1965,
1972, 197^) theory, Weldon’s management were moderately high in achieve-
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ment motivation. These managers took moderate, calculated risks; in
order to get merchandise produced on time, they would use any methods
they could. In their situation, they felt production depended on their
skills and abilities, and were frustrated they could not exercise them
more. They constantly had to meet the challenge of ever changing orders
for different items. Their creativity was stretched in finding ways to
meet demands in a chaotic factory. It is difficult to assess their
attitude toward the probability of their being successful in their job.
It seems likely that by the time of purchase, confidence was at a low
ebb. Long range goals were not made by the managers; goals were set
by the owners, who, if they had them, kept them to themselves.
Managers' goals were, by and large, to meet the demands of the season,
while supervisors concentrated on meeting quota demands each day.
Feedback to the managers was constant; quotas were met or they were
not met; customers were pleased, or they were not. The managers always
knew how well they were doing, though usually they heard about their
mistakes rather than their successes.
To summarize, those factors characteristic of high achievement
motivation were: risks were calculated, personal efforts were
important in outcomes, challenges were constant, and feedback was
immediate and constant. Those factors characteristic of low achieve-
ment motivation were: their attitude of confidence was low and they
did not plan ahead.
Maturity Level . From the above, in terms of Life Cycle Theory,
management's "maturity" level, as managers, at the time of purchase,
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would be low average. (See figure 57). With this "maturity" level,
e initial leadership style appropriate for management at the time of
purchase would be quadrant two, high task and high relationships.
As previously discussed, the owners practiced an ineffective
quadrant one high task and low relationships leadership style. Accord-
ing to Life Cycle Theory, this style would be inappropriate to manage-
ment’s "maturity" level. The frustration, hostility and breakdown at
Weldon attest to the inappropriateness and ultimate ineffectiveness of
the owner’s leadership style.
Mhy was the Owners*
.
Leadership style Unsuccessful ?
The question may be asked, why, if the owners' leadership style
was inappropriate, did Weldon succeed for over thirty years? To answer
this, let us first consider the Weldon organization. The garment
industry operates by seasons, at the mercy of fashion dictates. As a
manufacturer of quality garments, Weldon operated under the stress of
seasonal style changes and special orders from prestigious stores. The
primary orientation of each department in manufacturing was towards
task. Time pressures were intense; every eight hour shift, certain
orders had to be produced. Customers were always waiting. While each
operator had a clear independent task, high coordination of production
was required to produce the finished item under time pressure. In
order to produce large amounts of merchandise within short time spans,
high cooperation and coordination between the departments within
manufacturing, and between manufacturing and merchandising was needed.
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Figure 57 Weldon Management's Maturity Level at Purchase
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During Weldon's beginnings, when all manufacturing operations
were located under one roof, and all merchandising operations were in
one New York office, the partner-owners could personally control all the
activities in their building. In this situation, it would be possible
for them to personally sign every order. Through close supervision they
could keep production going even though coordination and cooperation was
poor. However, when Weldon expanded to five plants in the mid-fifties,
the owners could no longer personally direct all operations. Like the
frog who tried to swallow the pond, they drove themselves and their staff
to exhaustion and ulcers trying.
Another question logically occurs: if the owners were successful
at the beginning when Weldon was one factory, why were they not success-
ful when Weldon shrank its operations back to one plant and 1000 employ-
ees? By 1959 Weldon's leadership had created hostility among the staff,
fear among its workers, and bad will in the public. In addition, in the
early fifties, the owners had made two costly business errors. The
reasons for the owners' decision to enter the two unsuccessful ventures
were never explained; however, had they consulted their executives, they
might have been prevented from making these mistakes. With a great loss
of capital, the owners had not kept up with technological changes.
Unable and apparently unwilling to put money into equipment, they now
operated with outdated machines. At this point, Weldon was caught in a
downward spiral.
The Followers: Hourly Workers
The hourly workers at the time of purchase were, as a group,
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below average in "maturity". Because of Weldon's practice of taking
on operators before peak periods, and firing them immediately afterward,
Weldon had come to be regarded as a place of seasonal employment.
Workers would leave as soon as they could find other jobs. The
workers' view was summarized by a taxi driver:
It's a sweat shop. They work you like crazy for
a couple of weeks and then throw you out [p. 114].
Turnover and absenteeism were very high. At the time of purchase,
half of the employees were planning to quit. In the four months after
purchase, turnover was 90%. The absentee rate of 12% per day ran
double that in the industry. Workers operated in an atmosphere of job
insecurity, increased by top management's anti-union intimidation and
threats.
In this situation, achievement motivation was low. Even
though two thirds of the largely women workers were older and
experienced, with a core of highly skilled workers, ability to take
responsibility was generally low. Experienced senior operators kept
the "best" and easiest jobs. Because of the chaotic production system,
an operator often had seven to nine job changes in an eight hour shift,
preventing skill development for new operators.
Thus the general level of skill in the sewing room was below
industry strandards, and earnings for a great number of operators were
at minimum or below. With no fringe benefits, no opportuniies to gain
skills to make more money, willingness to take responsibility was
generally low. Thus, according to Life Cycle Theory, the hourly workers
"maturity" level at the time of purchase was low. (See figure 58).
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As such, the appropriate leadership style for the hourly employ-
ees at purchase would be quadrant one, high task and low relationships.
(See figure 58). This was, in fact, the leadership style attempted by
management, but to no avail. With one supervisor to 155 workers, there
were simply not enough managerial staff to go around. In addition, the
supervisory staff were given no opportunity to actually supervise; the
plant manager retained the authority and control in the plant. This
resulted in the plant manager giving most of the task leadership, and
bearing most of the managerial responsibility in the plant. Hence the
hourly workers lacked the direction and assistance they needed.
We note at this point, that in spite of their condition, the
interpersonal relations among the hourly employees was good: 8556 liked
their fellow employees. 64$ were satisfied with their supervisor.
Situation At Purchase
The following diagram illustrates the situation and motivation
level of each of the levels of the hierarchy of the Weldon manufacturing
division at purchase.
During Change
A boss who is considerate tends to have foremen
who believe and behave the same way.
Fleishman & Harris
Kew Leaders; The Harwood. Owners
According to Life Cycle Theory, the new owners, after an initial
assessment period, adopted a quadrant two high task and high relation-
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Ships style at the beginning of the change program. Toward the middle
Of the program they and their consultants adopted a quadrant three
high relationships and low task style. Toward the end of the change
program, they attempted a quadrant four low task and low relationships
leadership style, but found it to be premature. At the end of the
change program, they remained for the most part, in a quadrant three
style.
Iiu.t 3.al leadersh i p Style. ;—quadrant twp. The initial high task,
high relationships approach of Harwood was reflected in the decision to
implement a change program at Weldon. As the Harwood chairman of the
board Alfred Marrow stated, the Harwood executives independently
planned the goals of the program aimed at participative change, and
"imposed [p. 65]" it on Weldon. High relationships was shown from the
time of purchase, when the Harwood owners made statements of their
participative philosophy at Weldon, assured employees that the
operation would continue, and that no one would be fired.
Quadrant two style was also shown in the technical changes at
Weldon. The change over to the unit system of production was decided
upon by Harwood, and implemented by their consulting engineers. How-
ever, these technical and physical changes were accompanied by
supervisor and manager staff meetings, where those present tried to
open channels of communications, share problem solving, and better
interpersonal relations.
In like manner, Harwood owners saw that changes in personnel
policy were needed. They hired a personnel manager, and consultants
269
to bring about personnel policy changes. But rather than impose these
policy changes on supervisors and workers, the consultants and
personnel manager gathered evidence to convince the supervisory staff
of the need for these changes, emphasizing joint decision making, the
opening of communications, and facilitating behaviors.
The management training program was decided upon by Harwood,
and attendance was mandatory. Yet the focus of the sessions was
divided between practical problems and emotional issues affecting
personal relationships.
In every facet of the change program, the Harwood owners
continued to attend to task and relationships. The operator training
program was instituted by Harwood; throughout the engineers encouraged
the operators and supervisors, who were eventually won over by the
demonstrations of success. So too the earnings development program,
initiated by Harwood amid initial skepticism by supervisors. As
earnings rose, operators gained in confidence, morale improved, and
supervisors were convinced of the program's benefits.
The problem solving meetings between supervisors and operators,
again initiated by Harwood, focused on problems in the plant and areas
of interpersonal conflict between staff and workers. After the higher
management personnel introduced and supported the meeting, they left,
leaving it in the hands of the supervisors and consultant. In this
way, supervisory authority was built up. Again, there was an emphasis
in these meetings on both task and relationships.
As previously discussed, the appropriate leadership style for
management at the time of purchase was quadrant two, high task and high
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relationships. Thus the new owners initial leadership style was appro-
priate to management’s "maturity” level at the time of purchase. It is
interesting to note here that whereas Crockett attempted to use a
coercive change strategy to bring about a participative system in the
State Department case, and failed; here, the Harwood owners used a
coercive change strategy for the same ends, and succeeded.
Some differences that might account for this are:
1. While Crockett’s leadership style was diagnosed
as being inappropriate to his staff's "maturity"
level, the Harwood owners leadership style was
diagnosed as being appropriate to their staff's
"maturity" level.
2. Crockett had begun by making a structural change
in his organization which raised anger, hostility
and fear among his staff. The Harwood owners
had begun with an extensive program of technical
changes which had been implemented with success,
and raised worker morale.
Later leadership style; quadrant three . When changes were
well underway, the Harwood owners and their representatives began to
practice a quadrant three high relationships and low task style. In
the earnings development program, once operators had received instruc-
tion, the consulting engineers stepped back and let the supervisors take
over the instruction and support function. As success became apparent,
the initially skeptical supervisors would seek out the engineers for
advice and guidance.
In the problem solving meetings, the consultant was able to
take a back seat in the room and let the superior conduct the meetings.
The consultant was present for support and advice if asked.
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Thus as supervisory staff and managers gained expertise and
bettered interpersonal relations, the consulting staff and managers
gradually withdrew.
An attempt at quadrant four - Top management unsuccessfully
attempted to adopt a quadrant four low task and low relationships
leadership style late in the change program. When they left the
production of the fall line entirely in the hands of the Weldon staff,
they were warned that things were not going well. Indeed, the result
was overproduction of unordered merchandise. In a meeting with top
management, requested by the Weldon staff, the staff acknowledged they
were not ready for complete responsibility and asked for help from top
management. Though the quadrant four attempt was premature, the
benefits of the change program were apparent in the meeting.
By the end of the change program, the Harwood leaders had
progressed to a quadrant three high relationships and low task leader-
ship style, with brief uses of quadrant two when help was requested.
The Followers: Managerial Staff
By the end of the change program, management "maturity" had
risen. Because of the more equal distribution of authority and control
achievement motivation and willingness to take responsibility had
increased. Through management training sessions and the earnings
development program, managers and supervisors had increased their
managerial competence. Their ability to take responsibility was rising
Through the training sessions, and with the former owner-managers gone,
272
morale had improved and Interpersonal relations were better. I„ fact
,
greatest progress in improvement of interpersonal relations was made
’
among the managerial staff. Thus by the end of the change program
.
Harwood leaders had brought the Weldon management to a position of
high average "maturity". (See figure 60).
Ihe Followers: Hourly Work^
As a result of the earnings development program, the operator
training program, the problem solving meetings, the unit system of
production, and unionization, operator skills, earnings, proficiency,
hygiene factors, and fringe benefits increased. This was reflected in
a lower rate of turnover (see figure 51) and absenteeism (see figure
51), a rise in production efficiency (see figure 53), and a rise in
profits (see figure 53). Worker "maturity" gradually rose.
Leadership, which used to come from the plant manager, now
came from several sources: the supervisors, assistant supervisors, and
consultants. Generally speaking, the leadership style adopted during
the change program by supervisory staff was quadrant two; high task
and high relationships. This style was typified by the consulting
engineers in the earnings development program, who would sit for hours
with the operator, instructing her in skills and offering constant
support and encouragement. The engineer modeled this leadership style
to the supervisor who was constantly present during instruction, and who
ultimately took over.
According to figure 54, task oriented leadership on the part
of supervisors dropped during the change program, while their supportive
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leadership behavior remained relatively high. The supervisors attend-
ing more to unit problems, delegated authority to their assistants,
who gradually took over their role with the operators. However, the
operators did not perceive this new behavior on the part of their
supervisors as a quadrant three high relationships style. According
to the consultant’s measures, satisfaction with supervisors dropped and
remained at a lowered level through 1969. Workers also thought
supervisors became "less good with people [p. 208." It appeared to be
a case of ’out of sight, out of mind'.
By 1969, five years after the change program, supervisors' task
oriented leadership behavior had risen to its highest level ever; higher
that it had been at the beginning of the change program. (See figure 54).
Apparently, according to the consultants, worker turnover had again risen
in 1969, causing an influx of new employees. Hersey and Blanchard (1972)
suggest that a leader may have to move back through the cycle, to a
leadership style he or she previously used, in order to meet the ever
changing demands upon the people for whom he or she is responsible. In
this "project cycle", when the temporary needs of a person or group have
been met, the leader can return to his or her usual style. In this
situation, the supervisors had to return to a quadrant two style in order
to train the new employees. When the new employees had gained competence
and skills, the supervisors could return to their quadrant three style.
This raises an interesting question of whether, in a manufacturing situa-
tion where worker turnover is constant, supervisors can ever progress to
a quadrant four style, or whether they will arrive at a quadrant three
style, and then move between quadrant two and quadrant three.
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After Change
We sh°uld really begin working with leadership
attitudes at tba JtQC. so that a favorable leader-
ship climate will spread down Certainly it
will not spread up in the industrial organization.
Fleishman & Harris
The following diagram illustrates the focus on the change
program, what was done for each level of the manufacturing division of
Weldon, and the motivation or need level that group was likely operating
on at the end of the change program.
Summary
May The Weldon Change Program Succeeded
1. The initial high task and high relationships
leadership style of the new owners was
appropriate to the initial "average maturity"
level of the Weldon managerial staff. The new
owners had flexibility in their leadership
style which allowed them to shift to a high
relationships and low task style as the
"maturity" level of the Weldon managerial
staff increased.
2. The new owners began with an extensive series
of technical changes in the plant and corres-
ponding training programs for operators. This
raised both productivity and plant morale. It
also allowed supervisors and managers to devote
time to administration.
3. After the technical changes were well underway,
management training programs for top management
began followed in turn by training in problem-
solving at each level of the plant’s organiza-
tion down to supervisors and operators. Thus
changes in management style at each level were
prepared for and supported by the level above.
MOTIVATION
LEVEL
SITUATION
AFTER.
CHANGE
276
Figure
61.
Results
of
Change
Program
at
Weldon
277
In the words of those directly involved in evaluating the change at
Weldon, it succeeded because "a multiplicity of varied change
strategies and methods were employed [p. 233]," and because "there was
unusual scope and coherence in the program of change [p. 233]."
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chapter VII
CONCLUSIONS
Summary of the Study
This study has attempted to answer the question, "How useful is
the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method for determining the most
appropriate leadership style in any given organisational situation"?
Life Cycle Theory postulates that high task and low relation-
ships leader behavior (quadrant one) is appropriate for working with
people of below average "maturity", and has the best probability of
success. As the followers progress from below average to average
"maturity", a leader's behavior should move in turn through high task
and high relationships (quadrant two) to high relationships and low
task (quadrant three). With people of above average "maturity", a
leadership style of low task and low relationships (quadrant four) has
the highest probability of success.
Five cases of organizational change, acknowledged as successes
or failures by their writers, were selected for study. In the un-
successful cases of change, the objectives of the change program were
not achieved; in the successful cases the objectives, to a large extent,
were achieved.
Three cases contained accounts of change programs that had
failed. These were: "Creating An Open School", "Change in a Newspaper"
and "Change in the State Department". The attempt to create an open
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school was not successful. At the end of the first year, classrooms
became self-contained; all but eight teachers left the school; the
superintendent went on leave of absence and resigned afterwards, and
the curriculum director quit. The principal resigned during the first
semester of the second year, and the school became traditional. The
three-year attempt to bring about a participative management system in
a newspaper also failed. Argyris was not asked back. The authoritarian
management of the newspaper system continued as before. At the end of
the first attempt to reorganize the State Department, the chief ex-
ecutive in charge of the change program resigned because of active
resistance} the consultants he had hired were fired by his successor.
His successor restored the organizational structure to its previous
highly bureaucratic condition.
Three cases contained accounts of change programs that succeeded.
These were: "Change in the State Department", "Change in an Automobile
Plant" and "Change in the Garment Industry". As a result of the second
and this time successful attempt to change the State Department, 500
recommendations for change were submitted by the employees; 400 were
accepted; 75$ were implemented; praise for the program was given by the
Secretary of State, and employee morale was raised to a high level.
After Cooley’s period of leadership in the automobile assembly plant,
the plant became the best in the division. Absenteeism, grievances,
turnover and complaints from dealers dropped to a low level; profits,
productivity and morale rose to a high level; other plants requested
staff from that plant, and plant management operated collaboratively
.
After Harwood’s two year program to change Weldon to a profit-making
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division With a participative system of marcgement, profits, productivity
and management morale rose; turnover and absenteeism dropped, and the
organization moved from one rated as borderline between systems one and
two on Likert's [1961] scale to one rated in system three.
Each of these cases was first described and then analyzed accord
ing to a theoretical framework. The framework contained all of the
variables of the Life Cycle Theory and variables from other situational
leadership theories.
Emergent Issues
Out of the analyses of these cases, several issues emerged for
this writer.
1. The usefulness of the Life Cycle Theory as a diagnostic method.
2. The patterns of leadership revealed in the successful and
unsuccessful change efforts.
3. The relationship between technical change and human systems
change in successful change programs.
The casualty rate of outside consultants in organizational change
programs and the predominant use of the T-group, human relations
approach to organizational change.
5. The relationship of organizational crisis to organizational change.
The Life Cycle Theory as a Diagnostic Method
Leader Behavior
The analytic framework used to analyze the cases in this study
contained all of the variables of the Life Cycle Theory. The leadership
style of the key leaders in each case was analyzed according to the LCT
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variables of task and relationships behavior. In order to analyze the
leader's style, all recorded evidences in the case of the leader's
behavior were extracted and placed in one of these two categories.
Leader behavior which, to this writer, showed the leader developing
personal relationships between him or herself and group members, giving
socioemotional support and psychological strokes, and engaging in inter-
personal communications and in facilitating behavior, was placed in the
category of leader relationships- Leader behavior which, to this writer,
showed the leader organizing and defining roles of individuals and group
members, explaining what activities to do, when, where, and how, and
endeavoring to formalize channels of communication, was placed in the
category of leader task behavior.
This Classification process was limited by the amount of informa-
tion on the leader's behavior available in each case; this depended on
what information about the leader's behavior the author of the
particular case had chosen to include. In some cases this factor
assumed more importance than in others. One of the consultants involved
in Crockett's reorganization of the State Department expressed great
disapproval of Marrow's account of the reorganization which he
(consultant) considered extremely biased and limited. [Seashore, 1975].
He thus felt that this writer's analysis must necessarily suffer, being
based on a partial account.
The classification process was therefore subject to two
interpretations; 1) the information that the author of each case had
chosen to include, and 2) the interpretation of that information by
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this writer. Both conditions apply throughout the analyses of each
case.
In spite of these two limitations, classification of the
leader's behavior did not present difficulty to this writer. After
categorizing the available information under task and relationships
behaviors, a general tendency toward one category or other generally
emerged, at least clearly enough to make a conclusion about the leader-
ship style in question.
Followers' "Maturity" LpvpI
Harder to classify, however, was the followers' "maturity" level
In order to analyze follower "maturity" with respect to a given task,
the followers behavior was categorized under the four "maturity"
variables of the LCT: 1) achievement motivation; 2) willingness to take
responsibility; 3) ability to take responsibility; 4) task relevant
education and/or experience.
In order to ascertain achievement motivation, McClelland's (1961
1965, 1966, 1974) characteristics of the achievement motivated person
were used as category headings. These included: 1) the tendency to
take moderately difficult but potentially achievable risks; 2) the
preference for non-routine jobs; 3) the tendency to have a positive,
even over-confident attitude toward being successful; 4) the tendency
to think ahead; 5) the tendency to work harder only when there is a
chance that personal efforts will make a difference in the outcome;
6) a preference for constant feedback on how well one is doing; 7) a
tendency not to be motivated by money alone. All follower behaviors
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which, to this writer, corresponded to one or other of these characteris-
tics were appropriately accounted for within the "maturity" dimension.
At this point, the writer had to make a personal judgment on how many
characteristics must be fulfilled in order to label the followers as
"achievement motivated". A general rule of thumb which this writer
adopted was that one to two of the above characteristics, if satisfied,
would indicate low achievement motivation, three to five would indicate
moderate achievement motivation, and if six or seven were satisfied,
then high achievement motivation would be recorded. Using this method,
it was not too difficult to analyze the respective level of achievement
motivation of the followers in each case. Two limitations, however,
preceded each analysis: 1) the information about the followers that
each author chose to address, and 2) the classification of McClelland's
achievement motivation theory adapted by this writer as outlined above.
With respect to the other three variables of "maturity":
willingness to take responsibility, ability to take responsibility, and
task relevant education and/or experience, the writer had to make
entirely subjective decisions. These variables have not been
operationally defined to the extent of the achievement motivation
variable. One of the difficulties seemed to be that, at times, the
"maturity" variables did not necessarily appear mutually exclusive,
while on other occasions, discrepancies began to surface. This being
the case, the writer had to decide upon the following questions: What
behavior(s) indicates willingness to take responsibility? What
indicates ability to take responsibility? What behaviors and other
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types of information such as job qualifications, standards, and
productivity results, would indicate that the followers had or had not
the education or experience to carry out the job at hand? Therefore,
in analyzing these three variables, the writer had to rely mostly upon
subjective interpretation.
After the follower behavior had been classified and analyzed
according to the above four variables, an overall assessment of the
followers' level of "maturity" had to be made. In fact, the four
assessments had to be reduced to one general judgment of the "maturity"
of the followers. Here the writer met another problem. How was the
final assessment to be arrived at? Was it simply a question of finding
the average of the four assessments? Was there one variable that held
more importance than the others? Should the interpreter follow the one
or two variables that gave more reliable data? Whatever the slot,
(above average, average, below average) that the maturity of the
followers finally entered, some important considerations were apparently
ignored
.
Frequently this writer found a wide discrepancy between the
four "maturity" characteristics. Often, for example, followers were
high in ability to take responsibility but apparently low in their
willingness to do so. Occasionally they were high in task-relevant
education and/or experience while low in willingness. Several questions
arose at this point. What causes people who are educated, experienced,
and able, to be unwilling to accomplish the task? What causes educated,
capable, and highly motivated people to sink in their achievement
motivation? Merely averaging out the four variables seemed to ignore
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the weight of importance attached to different variables. Also, the
weight of importance of each variable appeared to be different in
different cases and situations. Thus, rather than merely average out
mechanically the assessment of the followers' level in each of the four
"maturity" variables, this writer combined the four assessments, while
attempting to acknowledge the importance of different variables in
different cases. In short, the analysis of the follower's "maturity"
level in each case was subject to a great deal of subjective interpreta-
tion on the part of this writer. Added to this, it should be noted
that case studies limit the accuracy of analysis because they usually
do not record sufficient or detailed data and, as such, deny the
objectivity and first-hand data available to the participant observer
or field researcher.
Becommendations for Future Study for the LCT
The "maturity" dimension within the LCT undoubtedly needs a
clearer definition. (Currently a research project on this area is
underway). Up until the present there has been a gap between the
conceptual and operational definitions of the "maturity" variables of
willingness and ability to take responsibility and task relevant
education and/or experience. For the most part, analysis of these
variables is dependent upon the subjective interpretation of the
diagnostician, an interpretation which in turn depends upon the
competence and skill of the practitioner as well as the degree and
availability of relevant data.
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While the "maturity" variables are differentiated within the
LCT, they are not entirely distinct measures of task maturity. There is
much overlapping. Ability to take responsibility seems far removed
from willingness to do the same, yet task relevant education and/or
experience appears to correspond highly with ability.
Task relevant education and ability appear to depend on
technical and intellectual factors, while willingness and achievement
motivation appear to depend on these plus emotive factors. One question
that arises here is: what influence does the emotional climate, the
interpersonal relationships among followers, have on their achievement
motivation and willingness to do a job? In other words, what influence
does the relationships among followers, presently not incorporated into
the LCT, have on their "maturity” level? It would seem that while
there is a task-relevant maturity, there is also a relationships-
relevant maturity, and that both of these will influence productivity.
Patterns of Leadership in Successful and Unsuccessful
Change Efforts
In cases describing successful change programs, the leadership
style showed flexibility; leaders of successful change programs were
able to adopt styles of both high task and high relationships, as the
situation demanded. (See figure 62).
When he changed the systems of the automobile assembly plant,
plant manager Cooley progressed through an initial quadrant two style
to quadrant three finally ending in quadrant four. (See figure 62).
When Harwood took over Weldon, the new Harwood owners and their
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representatives began their change program using a quadrant two style
and progressed to a quadrant three style by the end of the change
program. They were still working toward their ultimate goal to turn
over management to Weldon staff, and adopt for themselves a quadrant
four style of leadership. (See figure 62). In bringing about change
in the State Dept., deputy undersecretary Macomber began by practicing
a quadrant two style, progressd to a quadrant three style and ended
using a quadrant four style. (See figure 62). In each of these cases
the change program was successful.
In these cases, too, the level of the followers' "maturity" was
assessed as average. The former plant manager of the automobile
assembly plant, the former owner-managers of the Weldon plant, and
deputy undersecretary Rimestad had all used an exclusively quadrant one
style. (See figure 62). Under these leaders, each of the organizations
reached a crisis point. These leadership profiles are in accord with
the Life Cycle Theory hypothesis that while a quadrant one style has
the best chance of success with followers of below average "maturity"
quadrant two and three styles have the best probability of success with
followers of average "maturity".
In the cases of unsuccessful change, the leader’s styles
vacillated between quadrant one and quadrant four. Deputy undersecretary
Crockett practised a basic high task and low relationships style, with
a secondary style of quadrant four. (See figure 63). So too, the
president of the newspaper, and principal Shelby practices a pre-
dominantly quadrant one style. (See figure 63). Each of these leaders
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were either highly visible directing all activities, or completely with-
drawn. None practiced a leadership style involving relationships
behaviors. These leadership profiles are in accord with the Life Cycle
Theory hypothesis that a leader who does not have flexibility in leader-
ship style and whose style does not progress in turn through each of
the four quadrants, will have less probability of success.
These leadership profiles suggest a question for further study:
Can the leader who does not practice relationships behavior be success-
ful in long term change programs? This study suggests not, if the leader
has to develop the potential of his or her followers from low to high
levels of "maturity". While most leaders who practiced quadrant one
and four styles were successful in the short run in the cases studied
here, their programs were not successful in the long run. The question
remains: what is the relationship between leadership styles lacking in
relationships behaviors, and successful change efforts?
Technical Change and Human Systems Change in Successful
Change Programs
In the cases of successful change, inadequate technical systems
were improved before human systems change was attempted. Before change,
in both the automobile assembly plant and the garment factory, equipment
was outdated, plant layout poor, and technical operations inefficient.
As well, the human system functioned poorly. Cooley’s first move as new
plant manager was to improve working conditions in the factory? then he
introduced plant-wide meeings to improve communications. At Weldon, the
new owners first installed new production systems and taught operators
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how to function in them. Then they introduced management training
programs.
In the case of the newspaper, the technical systems functioned
well both before and after change. Although laced with conflict and
intrigue, those working for the newspaper understood and accepted this
condition as a "fact of life". The human system functioned efficiently
before the attempt at change. It still produces an internationally
recognized newspaper.
In the cases of unsuccessful change, however, human systems
change was attempted without corresponding improvements of technically
inadequate systems. The State Department was overburdened with a
multitude of administrative levels which strangled communications.
After one attempt to cut out several bureaucratic layers, no further
attempt at structural change was made; all efforts were bent towards
human systems change.
The open school attempted a non-structured organizational
system which functioned passably well at the beginning of the school
year, and produced chaos toward the end of the year when the funds ran
out. Here all attention was paid to the human system; it was assumed
that technical and structural systems were unimportant.
In successful change programs, the leaders improved the
technical systems and provided both the means and the opportunity
for followers to take responsibility. This caused the followers to
grow in ability. In unsuccessful change programs the leaders tried to
'fix’ human relations in the system before they fixed the system so
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that people could take responsibility. This suggests an issue for
further study; what is the nature of the relationship between technical
change and human systems change in an organization, and how does this
relationship affect attempts at organizational change?
Casualty Rate of Outside Consultants and the Use of theT- Group Approach to Organizational Change
The casualty rate among outside consultants hired to assist and
advise on the process of organizational change in these cases was high.
Out of five cases, only the reorganization of the automobile assembly
plant used no outside consultants. Cooley, who directed the changes
was plant manager. Robert Guest, who wrote the account of the re-
organization, was an observer only.
In the change effort at the Weldon pajama manufacturing plant,
five teams of outside consultants were hired; two engineering teams,
one evaluation team, and two human systems teams. The engineering and
evaluation teams were concerned with technical factors. The human
systems teams used a T-group based approach to solve management problems.
These outside consulting teams were hired by the new owner-managers, the
Marrow brothers, who planned and spearheaded the changes. They, there-
fore, gave the consultants full support. Only in this case study did
the consultants survive and succeed in their task.
In the reorganization under Crockett at the State Department,
five teams of outside consultants were hired by Crockett: one advisory
team of human systems consultants (unpaid), two human systems teams, one
technical team, and one evaluation team. All three human systems teams
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used the T-group aproaeh to organizational change. All the consultants
were fired or dismissed when Rimestad took over as deputy undersecretar?
.
There was some doubt in this case as to whether using outside consulting
teams and their approach to the reorganization had the full support of
Crockett’s superiors.
In the attempted change program in the newspaper, Argyris was
brought in by the president and top management to conduct a study of the
newspaper's human system. He retained one other consultant to assist
him during a training seminar for executives. Argyris used the T-group
technique to facilitate organizational change. After three years his
study was terminated by the newspaper’s management.
In the attempt to create an open school, one human relations
team and one outside consultant were hired by the principal to assist
the faculty and administrators in implementing a new approach to
education. The consulting team was hired for one week only to conduct
a T-group as the first element in the teacher's summer preparatory
workshop. The other consultant worked with the teachers in their
meetings during the year; these meetings were conducted in the manner
of mini-T-groups with norms of no one person taking task leadership,
and considerable expression of feelings. During the first year, as
teachers began to experience more and more difficulties, and the
experiment began to fail, the principal fired the ongoing consultant.
A summary of the survival and mortality rate of outside consultants
is presented in figure 64.
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Figure 64 shows the high mortality rate of outside consultants
in oases of unsuccessful organizational change, as well as the pre-
dominating use of the T-group approach. The above observations suggest
several issues for further study: 1) the effectiveness of the T-group
as a method for bringing about organizational change. When is it
appropriate? When isn’t it? 2) The effect of the times on organiza-
tional development; today, the current trend is toward efficiency in
organizations, and T-groups are no longer the popular method for
training. Yet, paradoxically, there is an increased need today for
human system development. How will it be accomplished? 3) The
relationship between successful organizational change, and support for
change within the organization. These case studies suggest a need for
massive support for massive change.
The Relationship of Organizational Crisis
to Organizational Change
For purposes of discussion, crisis will be defined as a period
of substantial organizational turmoil (Greiner, 1972), acknowledged by
those within and without the organization. When a crisis occurs, people
together recognize the need for change. ^For example, in the automobile
assembly plant, a wildcat walkout, followed by the "retirement" of the
plant manager, signaled the point of crisis. By this time, the plant
was the worst in the division, according to nearly every criteria.
The Welden garment factory was at the point of bankruptcy when purchased
by the Harwood company. Shortly after the change program began, the
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former owner-managers left the company. It was when the foreign officers
banded together to demand change, forming a union, and the White House
pressured for change, that the former Deputy Undersecretary left and
Macomber was hired to effect a reorganization.
Crisis and ChangR
Through this study, this writer observed that in each of the
cases of unsuccessful change, there was no state of organizational
crisis acknowledged by those both within and without the organization,
prior to the change program. When deputy undersecretary Crockett was
hired to reorganize the State Department, change was being called for
by the upper echelons of government: the President, and the Executive
Branch. However, those within the State Department were not calling
for change. Thus, there was a great need for change in the eyes of the
superiors, but not in the eyes of the employees.
Principal Shelby opened his innovative school well supported by
grants and enthusiasm. During the first year, public fanfare and
journalistic attention kept the fires of enthusiasm alight for him and
the teachers. During the major portion of the academic year, although
many parents, and some members of the superintendent’s office thought
the school was in need of reorganization, this sentiment was not shared
by the majority of the school's staff.
Through his own efforts, Chris Argyris was "invited" in to
conduct a study of the newspaper's organization. Although the president
felt that his executive committee was ineffective, neither he nor his
executives thought there was any overall crisis in the organization.
297
This observation suggests an issue for further study: what is
the relationship between successful organizational change, and a prior
recognition of organizational crisis by both those within and outside of
the organization?
Leadership Style and Change
Through the analyses of the cases, this writer also observed that
inappropriate leadership did not seem to become an issue in the organiza-
tion until a point of organizational crisis was reached. In the State
Department case, both Crockett’s and Rimestad’s leadership styles were
inappropriate to their followers ’’maturity" level, according to Life
Cycle Theory. Yet, successful organizational change did not occur until
both those within and without the State Department demanded change. At
that point, Macomber replaced Rimestad. It was not until funds ran out
and both public pressure and teacher resignations pressured for change,
that Principal Shelby resigned. Not until after the plant workers
staged a walkout did top management retire the plant manager, whose
leadership style, according to Life Cycle Theory, was inappropriate,
and hire Cooley. Not until Weldon was at a point of bankruptcy and the
union picketing stores selling its product, did the owner-managers sell.
Their leadership style was diagnosed according to Life Cycle Theory as
being inappropriate to their staff. Shortly after Harwood began its
change program, they resigned.
In the newspaper case, executives refused to discuss the
president’s leadership style. While his quadrant four, low task and low
relationships style was, according to Life Cycle Theory, inappropriate
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for his executive committee, his basic quadrant one, high task and low
relationships style was, according to his executives, an appropriate
leadership style in a newspaper. In this situation, there was no
organizational crisis. Supported by a good technical system, an
efficient human system, and vast assets, the newspaper was functioning
effectively. As of this writing, this newspaper is continuing to
function successfully under the same president.
In an ideal 'system four' organization of highly mature
personnel, it would be possible theoretically for inappropriate leader-
ship to be recognized and dealt with before a crisis occurs. However,
in none of the cases in this study did this occur. These observations
suggest issues for further study: what is the relationship between the
recognition of organizational crisis and the recognition of, and dealing
with, inappropriate leadership? Is crisis necessary before successful
change can occur?
Summary of the Chapter
In this chapter, the writer has drawn five issues from the
study, and raised questions associated with each issue. From these,
this writer suggests some recommendations for future studies.
1. As a diagnostic method, the Life Cycle Theory
is subject to individual interpretation and
the ability of the practitioner to diagnose
the data at hand. This writer recommends
that the situational variables incorporated
in the "maturity" dimension be operationally
defined.
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2. The most outstanding difference between
leaders of successful and unsuccessful change
programs was that the former were able to usehigh relationships in their behavior towards
followers. Leaders of unsuccessful programs
tended to use low relationships behavior
constantly towards followers. Recommendation
for future study: an examination of the
relationship between leadership styles lacking
in relationships behavior and successful
change programs.
3- In cases of unsuccessful change, inadequate
technical systems were not improved; attention
was given only to human systems. Recommenda-
tion for future study: an examination of the
relationship between technical change and
human systems change and how this affects
attempts at total organizational change.
4. The casualty rate of outside consultants who
employed a T-group strategy for change was
extremely high. Recommendation for future
study: an examination of when the T-group
approach is an appropriate strategy for
bringing about successful organizational
change
.
5. Successful change was preceded by recognition
of organizational crisis. Crisis brought an
awareness of inappropriate leadership which
was then dealt with. In cases of unsuccessful
change, a state of crisis did not exist, or
was not acknowledged. Recommendation for
future study: the influence of organizational
crisis on change.
It is the writer's opinion that the Life Cycle Theory provides
a useful framework for diagnosing the appropriate leadership style in
a given situation. In its present state of development, this model has
taken some important steps toward creating, if possible, a theory which
can incorporate the major variables of any organizational situation,
and determine the most successful style(s) of leadership for that
situation. Much study needs yet to be done. Since the Life Cycle
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Theory classifies both leadership style and follower "maturity" in
general terns, further research needs to be conducted to a) concretize
leader-follower behaviors, b) to make more objective the interpretation
of data, and c) to validate the basic assumptions that underlie the
model itself. In the last analysis, the Life Cycle Theory is a fore-
runner in situational leadership. For the experienced practitioner,
it can be of immense help in his or her relationship with a client
system.
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